



FINAL EVALUATION

Croatia

Thematic window
Conflict Prevention and Peace Building

Programme Title:

Closing the Chapter: Social Inclusion and
Conflict Transformation in War Affected Areas
of Croatia

Prologue

This final evaluation report has been undertaken by the MDG-F as part of its monitoring and evaluation strategy requiring all joint programmes to complete a mid-term and final evaluation. Typically, mid-term evaluations are commissioned by the MDG-F Secretariat while final evaluations are commissioned by the UN Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO) in the programme country. Some joint programmes however, such as the Croatia programme "Closing the Chapter: Social Inclusion and Conflict Transformation in War Affected Areas of Croatia", have a shorter timeframe than the average 3-4 years and therefore did not require a mid-term evaluation. In these few cases, the final evaluations were commissioned by the Secretariat.

All final evaluations are expected to be conducted in line with the OECD Development Assistant Committee (DAC) Evaluation Network "Quality Standards for Development Evaluation", and the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) "Standards for Evaluation in the UN System".

Final evaluations are summative in nature and seek to measure to what extent the joint programme has fully implemented its activities, delivered outputs and attained outcomes. They also generate substantive evidence-based knowledge on each of the MDG-F thematic windows by identifying best practices and lessons learned to be carried forward to other development interventions and policy-making at local, national, and global levels.

We thank the UN Resident Coordinator and their respective coordination office, as well as the joint programme team for their efforts in undertaking this final evaluation.

MDG-F Secretariat

The analysis and recommendations of this evaluation are those of the evaluator and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Joint Programme or MDG-F Secretariat.

Submitted to MDGF Secretariat - New York

Report on Final Evaluation of the

MDG-F Programme

Closing the Chapter:

Social Inclusion and

Conflict Transformation in

War Affected Areas of Croatia

Submitted September 18, 2011 by

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

<u>SOME FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</u>	<u>Suggested Actors</u>
<u>Findings</u>	
1. The joint programme is a locally significant experiment, which, in that it involved several UN agencies, represents an addition to the UN system's practices in Croatia. The individual interventions of three of the four agencies involved, given the relatively short life of the interventions in an area of considerable complexity, have produced satisfactory results.	
2. According to all signals received the key stakeholders appreciate the contribution that the Joint Programme has made. However as of mid May 2011, as the programme ends, the gap between the original very sound aspirations and the subsequent reality is still quite large and leaves a set of issues which some entity should address thereafter. None appears ready to do so, potentially a loss to Croatia and Europe.	UNCT
3. The complex problem of restoring the fabric of Croatian society remains, even if it is subdued and the understanding of its nature is evolving. Were such an initiative being designed now, an approach more focussed on further strengthening of the capacity for national policy analysis and dialogue might set additional positive processes in motion.	UNDOCO MDGF
4. The process of requiring UN agencies to work in a more co-ordinated fashion needs much stronger inducements both for leadership and for followership and closer monitoring by those urging it than were present in this programme.	UNDOCO MDGF
5. The role and performance of the IOM requires careful scrutiny by its management.	IOM
6. Current UN agency procedures may be conducive to joint programming but have not led to such an outcome in this instance. If the procedures are conducive, they are not sufficient to ensure joint programming. Some members of the UNCT have not yet had the time or resources or inclination to concentrate on joint programming. As long as the agencies are funded and evaluated separately there will be competition and incoherence. The bottlenecks are political and bureaucratic and well known both to practitioners within the UN system and to outside observers of "UN reform". Progress can be made if/when relevant decisions of the UN General Assembly are put into effect by the Boards/Managers of the other bodies of the UN system.	UNDP/ HCR/IOM /UNICEF
<u>Recommendations for future policy and practice</u>	
7. Long term conflict resolution may be helped if there is enlightened public consideration and discussion of such issues based overt public policy analysis made available to the very well educated, articulate and talented population.	MDGF
8. Programmes such as this one have experimental exploratory elements. Accordingly they should be monitored intelligently, and tested to see if and how they work over an extended period with a provision for i.) learning by doing and ii.) recording that learning, built into the management mechanisms.	MDGF
9. The performance framework should include indicators monitoring how well each agency fulfils its role/responsibilities as a member of the UNCT, whether as a follower or as a leader.	UNCT/ MDGF
10. Any programme management mechanism should have the instruments and information needed to manage.	
11. An informal mechanism, analogous to an ombudsman, representing all stakeholders, which could provide informed, wise commentary on the real progress being achieved in Conflict Prevention, Reconciliation, Recovery, Community Integration, Safety and Social cohesion, as well as suggestions for improvements, might be a useful addition to the society's institutions. It might be worthwhile for regional leaders and organisations as well as the international community to consider whether to extend such a mechanism to the level of the sub-region.	UNCT

ACRONYMS

ASSC	Areas of Special State Concern
AWP	Annual Work Plan
BCPR	UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CAS	World Bank Country Assistance Strategy
CODEF	Central Office for Development Strategy and Co-ordination of EU Funds
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CPD	Country Programme Document
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSR	Corporate social responsibility
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
IBRD	World Bank
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPA	Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (for EU funding)
JIM	Joint Inclusion Memorandum
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NCC	National Competitiveness Council
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NUNV	National UN Volunteer
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
RBEC	UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
SEC	State Election Commission
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
WHO	World Health Organization
WVS	Witness and Victims Support

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Annex 4.B DRAFT EVALUATION REPORT COMMENTS MATRIX: Comments from MDGF Secretariat

Annex 5 *Final Report* MDGF-1975: Closing the Chapter Social Inclusion and Conflict Transformation in War Affected Areas of Croatia by Hans Risser

Introduction

This Final Evaluation has been commissioned by the MDGF Secretariat, as part of its role to monitor and evaluate the MDGF. This is in line with the instructions contained in the MDGF's Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy and the Implementation Guide for Joint Programmes under the Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund. These documents stipulate that all joint programmes will be subject to a final evaluation.

Final evaluations are formative in nature and seek to generate knowledge, identifying best practices and lessons learned to improve implementation of future programmes. As a result, the conclusions and recommendations generated by this evaluation are addressed to its main users: the Programme Management Committee, the National Steering Committee in Croatia, to the international partners of Croatia not least the EU and to the Secretariat of the Fund and the management of UNDP in New York.

The Conflict Prevention and Peace Building thematic window under which this joint programme was elaborated is one of the 128 JPs in 49 Countries funded by the MDG Achievement Fund (MDGF), supported by the Spanish Government. The MDGF Fund is executed by UNDP under a partnership agreement signed between UNDP and Spain in 2006.

The Croatian Joint Programme entitled, "Closing the Chapter: Social Inclusion and Conflict Transformation in War Affected Areas of Croatia" is a two year US \$ 3 Million fund, executed through four agencies of the United Nations system. Effective Programme implementation started on 15 May 2009 and will end on 14 May 2011.

The field work for the evaluation took place 2-14 April 2011 and was carried out by a Croatian consultant, Ms. Ivana Novoselec and an external consultant Dr. Roger Maconick, in Zagreb and in various parts of Croatia where the joint programme has been active following a schedule detailed in Annex 2.

The diligent and helpful support throughout the mission of the UNRC Ms Louisa Vinton, the programme manager Mr Hans Rinsser and his colleague Ms Ana Grozaj and of the rest of the UNCT in Zagreb should be acknowledged and applauded. Some wise observations and advice were obtained from the first UNDP OIC in Croatia, Mr Filip Marusic.

Extensive use was made of interviews with government officials and key Programme and UN system staff both those currently in the UN system in Zagreb and in the regions.¹ A diversity of interventions carried out under the aegis of the programme was examined in a variety of settings within the country. Prior to the missions arrival, the Performance Framework in the Joint Programme Document was distributed in simplified form to all programme/sub programme managers with the request that data be provided on performance and achievement that had been achieved for each sub programme. The responses received are to be found in Annex III.

Any errors or omissions in the report are entirely attributable to the principal author.

I. The Concept and the subsequent reality

The concept note for this joint programme stated

“At the national level, the UN Programme under the leadership of the DPM will coordinate all activities related to the recovery of war affected areas and post conflict reconciliation. It will also integrate peace building activities into existing national development mechanisms. Concurrently, a supporting rule of law strengthening component will ensure adequate access to law and justice for those groups whose current exclusion most risks a deepening of tensions (Outcome 1). National level work will directly support existing community-based mechanisms for sustainable reintegration of targeted populations through safer community plans, violence prevention in schools and issue-based conflict resolution (Outcome II). This mechanism will, in turn, facilitate the economic recovery of socially excluded and at-risk groups in ASSC (Outcome III). Taken together, these three concrete and mutually reinforcing levels of support constitute a Programme that will consolidate Croatia’s tenuous peace-building gains and help guard against future conflict”²

These were noble goals commensurate with, and relevant to, the problems facing the society and worthy of the best efforts of an integrated UN country team.

There has been concrete achievement by three of the four UN agencies involved in the joint programme. They have diligently pursued the activities expected of them under the revised performance framework agreed with the Secretariat.

What has not emerged is mutually reinforcing support for each other and for Croatia’s peace building efforts. Nor do the UN Agencies involved appear to have reflected on the fact that singly and alone they have not in the past, and are unlikely to be able in the near future, to

¹ At least one UN agency, one whose performance appears to have been less than satisfactory, was represented only at low level, so the less than positive conclusions arrived on its performance and recommendations for prophylactic actions by the MDGF Secretariat and the agency concerned may need to be viewed with care pending the further investigation this report urges.

² Concept Note, Section III. Joint Programme Results para.1.

address the complex problems woven together in this post conflict situation seriously. As of mid May 2011 as the programme ends, the gap between the original very sound aspirations and the subsequent reality is still quite large and leaves a set of issues which some entity should address thereafter.

It is possible that these remaining issues could be best addressed either by a sub regional approach or a country by country one but whichever it is, if the UN system is to offer its capacities in the future it will need to take the holistic and integrated approach to the principal residual questions which this joint programme has aspired to address..

In that context the MDGF Secretariat is to be lauded for having initiated efforts towards such a coordinated approach and the Government of Spain for its funding of this initiative dealing with such an important set of issues. One lesson to be drawn from all this is that peace building and a coordinated approach to peace building is a long term process that can absorb a great deal of effort and of resources. One question remaining is whether the integration of peace building activities into existing national development mechanisms coordinating would under, the leadership of the relevant Deputy Prime Minister, have led to faster recovery of the war affected areas and greater post conflict reconciliation.

As a senior member of the regional grouping to which Croatia seek to accede, the Government of Spain, in concert perhaps with the UN RC, may wish to consider drawing this point to the attention of the EU delegation in Zagreb for their attention and eventual action during the period between the end of the programme and Croatia's eventual accession to the EU.

The presentation of the analysis, which follows resulting from the work of the evaluators, is based on the specific queries posed in the Terms of Reference, which have been disaggregated to respond to each question.

II The Programme:- Design level

A: Relevance: The extent to which the objectives of this development intervention are consistent with the needs & interest of the people, the needs of the country, the Millennium Development Goals & the policies of associates & donors.

1. Is the identification of the problems, inequalities and gaps, with their respective causes, clear in the joint programme?

There is a reasonable description of the underlying problems in the Areas of Special State Concern (ASSC) and the problems in those areas are quite well documented. However the linkages between the issue of economic backwardness and reconciliation could have been elaborated in greater depth along with a more specific explanation of the theory of change underlying the specific initiatives taken. The evaluation team had hoped to examine the extent to which the peace building mechanisms in the ASSCs were clear and distinct from

any parallel activities existing in areas less affected by the war. It was not possible to do so in the time available

2. Does the Joint Programme take into account the particularities and specific interests of women, minorities and ethnic groups in the areas of intervention?

The programme is designed to attenuate those differences, which led to conflict. This includes assistance to women, minorities and war victims in war affected areas known as Areas of Special State Concern (ASSC).

3. To what extent has the intervention strategy been adapted to the areas of intervention in which it is being implemented? What actions did the programme take to respond to obstacles that arose from the political and socio-cultural context?

The programme is an amalgam of the ongoing activities of four UN agencies, all of which were already active in Croatia, when the MDG-F resources became available. All of these agencies had taken their own measures to respond to the obstacles focussing their activities on the conflict related phenomena, which provided a rationale for their presence in a relatively affluent country.

While the design of the programme in general reflects the problem analysis laid out in the Programme Document, it is not sufficiently clear why the particular strategy used has been devised, i.e. why the combination of activities and outputs expected would represent the most appropriate approach to the socio-cultural and political problems and needs identified³.

More importantly, early on there was a change in the responsibilities of the Deputy Prime Minister most clearly involved with the programme removing from his portfolio the responsibility for the implementation of regional development element which was a key feature of the original intent of the joint programme. The UNDP office and the Programme's Management responded by discussing this with the Ministry of Regional Development and the office of the 'new' Deputy Prime Minister for Regional Development.

On at least two occasions, the UNDP RR requested meetings with both the Minister for Regional Development and the Deputy Prime Minister for Regional Development. The meetings were never granted and the MDGF Programmes offers of assistance for coordination were not accepted. So as the UNDP office's good faith efforts to recalibrate the goals and expectations of the programme in the light of these changes did not succeed, it is not surprising that the contribution of the programme to the out comes that depended crucially on this has been mitigated.

³ For example, the relevance of victim witness support for reconciliation is questionable, since, according to the data of the Witness and Victim Support Office in Vukovar only 17% of cases supported in the project relate to war crimes

4. Are the monitoring indicators relevant and do they meet/have they met the quality needed to record/measure the outputs and outcomes of the joint programme?

The monitoring indicators are relevant and do, at least at process level, meet the quality needed to record/observe/help to measure progress towards the outputs of the programme. That is less so for the indicators of achievement. While the indicators are relevant, they do not seem to be much used, by the Programme Team. The current Programme management had not been there at the time of Programme elaboration and approval and apparently there was no handover note left by previous managers⁴. So there is at least some question as to the extent to which the stated central goals of the joint programme were taken seriously by those who initiated it

The Evaluation Team was not sure which sources of verification should be used to measure the indicators and should have been used for the baseline measurements given in the programme document. The situation regarding the outcomes of the joint programme was even less clear. In consultation with the Government and the MDG Secretariat, the new programme management⁵ have taken some common sense measures to revise the performance framework in a way that moved things towards greater clarity. This was a significant improvement, which appears to have helped three of the four agencies organize their work better even if they continued to work more separately than together.

However for the three programme outcomes⁶ there were no achievement indicators⁷ and although as part of the evaluation the individual programme component managers were asked, prior to the mission's arrival in Croatia, to indicate where they were in terms of achievement against the respective outcomes, they were not able to do so. A majority did provide detailed statements of progress towards outputs. Two did not. But none of them spoke to the joint programme's outcomes. In some cases this may be because they did not think and manage in those terms.

It may also be that there has been a trade off between attention to financial management/recording of interim achievements/work planning as against focus on outcome indicators and

⁴ Whether this was required or would have been just good practice and good manners, this would seem to be a sine qua non for a sensitive Conflict Prevention Peace Building programme.

⁵ Officially 'management' of the programme started when the Programme Manager position was filled in May 2009.

⁶ Outcome 1: National policy coordination on conflict prevention, reconciliation and recovery strengthened

Outcome 2: Enhanced community integration, safety and social cohesion

Outcome 3: Enhanced socio-economic recovery of areas of Special State Concern

⁷ The programme's management noted that

i. the only indicators for the outcome level remained the six listed in the Programme Document's Results and Resources Framework, which were vague or not readily/easily updateable.

ii. that the original and revised M&E frameworks did not include indicators for the Programme Outcomes.

iii. The original M&E framework was approved by the MDGF Secretariat.

iv. Its revision was done in consultation with the MDGF Secretariat and with advice from an expert the secretariat recommended and paid for.

on longer term achievement. Recognising that peace building is usually seen as a long term process, which may be complex and may take time, and that the situation in Croatia is perhaps more than averagely complex, greater focus on achievement of the longer term goals and the key processes that are a necessary condition for their attainment may have been /would be more useful.

There was one important aspect that was absent from the M&E framework. The purpose of the MDGF Spanish Fund was inter alia to promote co-ordinated behaviour by UN agencies. However there was no indicator in the performance framework that permits monitoring and or evaluation of each agency's and the team's collective performance in this regard. The omission of this important process indicator was a lacuna, which should be avoided in future.

5. To what extent has the MDG-F Secretariat contributed to raising the quality of the design of the joint programmes?

Initial contributions were modest at least in so far as records are available in the files in Zagreb. For instance, it is unclear to what extent the MDGF Secretariat was aware that there was no UNRC, only a UNDP Resident Representative (RR)⁸ in Zagreb at the time of programme formulation, There was a mission from the MDG Secretariat shortly after the programme started its work and the Secretariat appears to have provided helpful ongoing guidance thereafter including agreeing appropriately to a simplification of the performance framework.

B: Ownership in the design: national social actors' effective exercise of leadership in the development interventions

6. To what extent do the intervention objectives and strategies of the Joint Programme respond to national and regional plans?

The Joint Programme clearly responded initially to national and regional⁹ plans. National, in that Croatia is endeavouring to restore its social fabric after conflict. Regional, because Croatia is at an advanced stage of negotiating access to the EU and one of the requirements of accession is the resolution of resettlement and related issues left outstanding from the conflict. So both national government and regional commission have a strong shared interest in resolution of the issues and by implication in achievement of the three programme outcomes.

⁸ A UN RC was appointed and took up her assignment in July 2010

⁹ It is important to distinguish here between "regional" as supra-national, relating to the wider geo-political region, and "regional" as at the sub-national level (in Croatian case – counties). Speaking of the former, there is a regional IPA project in which UNHCR participates and there is cooperation at the political level (in particular between Croatia and Serbia). The joint programme aimed to coordinate the regional policy as such (because policy towards ASSCs was embedded in it), but did not succeed due to the evolutions of the mandate of the Deputy Prime Minister.

As far as the county-level policies, such as Regional Operational Programmes/ Development Strategies are concerned, there is no reference to them in the programme document. The programme has not seized the opportunity to introduce the work of the UN Agencies to the Regional Partnerships (which were established for the preparation and implementation of the ROPs/RDSs) as the key forum for regional development on regional level and to increase the sustainability of its results through embedding further activities into the Regional Development Strategies that were being prepared during the programme's implementation period.

Nationally, while the programme was affected by changes in the Deputy Prime Minister offices' mandates and lack of cooperation with the Regional Development Ministry, it remained closely linked to the Government policy of return of the refugees, even if outside of the scope of regional policy. Through close cooperation with Deputy Prime Minister Uzelac's office, the project remained one of the important tools of national policy in the area of refugee return.

At the time of programme preparation, the National Strategy for Regional Development had not yet been prepared. However, the programme document does not contain any reference to the Regional Operational Plans that existed at the time of preparation of the Document as the key tool of socio-development planning on the county level.

7. To what extent have the country's national and local authorities and social stakeholders been taken into consideration, participated, or have become involved, at the design stage of the development intervention.

It is clear from the interviews and the programme document that Deputy Prime Minister Uzelac's office was involved in programme preparation and design, strongly supported the involvement of the four agencies and agreed with the structure and approach taken. It was not involved in the definition of specific activities, but has approved of the set proposed.

However, other ministries and regional level governments were not involved in the programme design. This probably contributed to the problems in implementation - at least when it comes to the Ministry of Regional Development. In terms of county level, the impact and sustainability of activities in theory could have been much greater had the process been linked with the process of preparation of Regional Development Strategies and the work of Regional Partnerships.

III: Process level

C: Efficiency

1. How well does the joint programme's management model – that is, its tools, financial resources, human resources, technical resources, organizational structure, information flows and management decision-making – contribute to generating the expected outputs and outcomes?

The budget of the joint programme was \$3,000,000. \$1,587,090 was allocated to UNDP, \$834,110 to UNHCR, \$297,900 to UNICEF and \$ 280,900 to IOM. Indirect Support costs amounted to \$196,261. It is understood that this budget will be exhausted by May 14 2011.

There have been instances of collaboration between UNHCR and UNDP. The participating agencies appear to share information about what they are doing, but it seems that coordination of different agencies and some information flows and decision-making has in some aspects been difficult. While the programme manager has received regular reports from all the agencies involved, he did not have detailed 'real time' information on the financial management of the project on agency level (other than aggregate amounts spent) and no instruments for follow up and intervention in case of delays and problems in implementation.

All agencies appear to share a commitment to achieve the programme's goals, that is the socio-economic recovery and conflict prevention in the ASSCs. It may be that each agency perceived that by doing their individual bit, they were contributing to this shared goal. At no time during the evaluation mission was there any indication to the team of any shared commitment to the achievement of the programme's goals. Each agency has (with one exception) pursued its individual tasks without resorting to much in the way of joint implementation. None of them provided any evidence of having much of a sense of contributing to common outcomes, perhaps because they were more focused on their individual outputs.

An example can be seen from the response to this final evaluation. The mission requested data on achievement in terms of the performance framework. Replies were received from four component managers (UNICEF, Witness & Victim Support, and the offices in Zadar and Petrinja). No replies were received from IOM or UNHCR despite two emailed requests. There is no indication that these responses were shared and or discussed by the UN agencies involved prior to their being shared with the evaluation. That implies that they see themselves as responsible for their individual components but do not yet have a shared vision of any joint accountability in the co-ordinated UN system approach in which they are supposed to be active participants.

9. To what extent are the participating agencies coordinating with each other and with the government and civil society? Is there a methodology underpinning the work and internal communications that contributes to the joint implementation?

The programme remains essentially four projects with some modest degree of ‘jointness’, more a marriage of convenience under the logo of the UN. This situation, which existed from its inception, was apparently reinforced by the apparent views of the previous leadership of the UNCT of the appropriateness of maintaining four separate “project streams”.

As noted elsewhere this programme is an amalgam of ongoing sets of activities already begun by IOM, UNDP, UNHCR and UNICEF. So the respective counterparts of each agency were already involved not only in the design of what the UNCT was doing but also in its implementation

Quite understandably the UNDP RR¹⁰, when he was offered the chance to bid for MDG F resources under this window, encouraged the agencies to make a common presentation, which under the active leadership of the UNDP DRR they did.

However there was no real effort to create a programmatic element drawing together the four threads into a common thread “integrating a community decision making methodology into socio economic recovery of war affected areas through shared needs/interest projects; introducing peace building into existing local structures that provide social services education, community policing, justice and job creation to address a conflict prevention agenda”¹¹. Nor is there evidence of a serious effort to create a programme management structure staffed and resourced to manage for the agreed outcomes, nor evidence of a change of approach within the UNDP and later the UNRC’s office to reflect a new focus on a “programme approach’ to managing for results.

This being said it does appear that the programme has been quite well administered for the last two years and some perhaps many of the pitfalls that have hindered the implementation of some other MDG F programmes may have been avoided by having a young and capable programme manager assigned at least part time to the administration of the programme

There is apparently one significant exception to this perception; the IOM programme.

- i. The time and the information readily available to the team were not sufficient to make hard and reliable judgements based on a proper examination into the element, which IOM was to implement. However it was enough to indicate cause for concern, a concern which was prompted by a number of signals and to suggest an a priori need for further investigation.
- ii. IOM has initiated some of the activities foreseen in the programme document but for reasons not entirely apparent appears to have been deficient in completing its share of the outputs and nothing appears to have been produced.
- iii. Not only did IOM not achieve what they were supposed to achieve and but they appear to have done very little real work towards producing that output.

¹⁰. NB At time of programme formulation there was no UN Resident Co-ordinator in Croatia

¹¹. See Concept note for the Joint programme para. 1

- iv. If the MDG-F Secretariat concurs with these observations, and there is no compelling evidence running counter to them, it would be appropriate for the management of the IOM, in close consultation with the UN RC's Office and the MDG-F secretariat, to examine very closely the role and the contribution of IOM and its staff at all levels to this component of the joint programme and if circumstances suggesting significant non performance are indeed as at first sight they appear, to consider refunding the monies it received to the programme's budget.

10. Are work methodologies, financial tools etc. shared among agencies and among joint programmes?

All of the agencies involved are part of a well established system. Each has its own work methods, financial systems and accountability mechanisms. Each one was already operating in Croatia when the MDGF window opened. Steps were taken by the UNDP RR to bring in a programme manager, who was 25% devoted to the programme and that manager has been effective in arriving at some degree of common administration. However he did not have access to real time financial data so this stopped well short of shared work methods and financial tools.

One agency in particular, UNICEF, insisted on its unique (separate?) message¹².

¹² In their comments on the draft report, UNICEF asserted that: - i. "On some points where UNICEF is mentioned statements made do not correspond to the evidence, they were not checked or confirmed during the meetings with UNICEF staff and are not true. ii. It is important to notice that MDG-F programme was the first joint exercise in achieving UN coherence in programming. No existence of UNDAF in Croatia should be taken in consideration in analyzing the context of both the MDG-F programme and evaluation. iii. UNICEF mandate as self-funded entity in Croatia has been approved by the Executive Board and none of the other UN agencies in Croatia operate under such mandate. Being an office that in the majority of its operation relies solely on locally raised resources, UNICEF indeed has unique status and way of operating. However, this has never impeded collegiality and coherence of the programme. Coherence of the programme was achieved whenever possible and we would like to state examples of schools in Gračac and Knin where joint activities of UNICEF, UNDP and UNHCR were undertaken, showcasing coherence of UN and fulfilling goals of MDG-f in Croatia. In absence of UNDAF, within all other programs except those funded by MDG-f, UNICEF needs to preserve branded communication of results to private sector in the country. Still, this had not in any way jeopardized communication on MDG-f in relevant schools. iv. Executive Board has approved UNICEF mandate in Croatia. Country Office operates in full compliance with organizational rules and procedures, including monitoring and reporting mechanisms in programme and operations. During meetings of UNICEF staff with evaluators, separate nature and independence from UNICEF Geneva and New York was never stressed or even mentioned, since it does not in any way correspond to the actual situation. To imply that "separate nature and independence even from UNICEF Geneva and NY...does little to foster a vision of coherent UN..." is unacceptable and not based on evidence".

The comments are addressed separately in the Draft Evaluation Report comments matrix; but the evaluator's view is that these comments tend to confirm that there is a strong local perception of 'unique status and way of operating' and that stressing these characteristics however comprehensible, given the anticipated accession of Croatia to EU membership and the consequent need for UNICEF Croatia to position itself accordingly, may not be the best way to foster a coherent UN Delivering as One in the interests first of Croatia.

status and way of operating. This may well have been to the detriment of the collegiality and coherence of the programme. It was noticeable that in one visit to a school in which that agency's support was active and ongoing, there appeared to have been no consideration by any of the actors of the possible relevance of the other elements in the programme and of deploying them in that locality and no particular interest in doing so.

11. Are there efficient mechanisms for coordination that prevent counterparts and beneficiaries from becoming overloaded?

The co-ordination mechanisms do not speak/are invariant to the procedural aspects of programme administration. Those co-ordination mechanisms require considerable time and effort to be spent on work planning in order to facilitate release of successive tranches of programme resources.

This may make a great deal of sense if the substance of the programme is of a straightforward "production process", one which involves mobilising well defined inputs in order to implement clearly defined and easily implementable activities which in turn produce a set of intended and defined outputs and so lead to desired objectives. Initiatives such as conflict prevention and peace building, like other forms of sophisticated capacity building, are not always so straightforward or "linear"

In the case of "non production process" initiatives such as conflict prevention and peace building, restoring the social fabric in a war affected society with residual ethnic differences and tensions, such co-ordination mechanisms may not be so appropriate or may perhaps need modification to reflect the evolving circumstances in which the process is operating .

In this case it meant that the various apparently quite talented managerial resources were very much involved with the administrative aspects of managing an already complex process without adequate time and "space" to consider more subtle issues of getting the programme to respond to the evolving imperatives of transforming the conflict through social inclusion.

12. Does the pace of implementing programme outputs ensure the completeness of the joint programme's results? How do the different components of the joint programme interrelate?

Overall and with the one important exception already noted, the programme was delivered as planned. The pace of delivery in most cases was appropriate and according to the plan. It was successful at the output level. There has been some contribution towards achieving the outcomes, as stated by the interviewed beneficiaries, but it was not systematic.

The adequacy of the pace of implementation does not speak to the completeness of the joint programme's results as there has been insufficient effort to create a coherent whole. The different components of the programme appear to have been carried on more in parallel than in concert. There has been some visible joint work of UNHCR and UNDP, which appears to have been all the more productive because of the collaboration.

UNICEF Zagreb on the other hand stressed their separate nature and independence even from UNICEF Geneva and New York. This does little to foster a vision of a coherent UN helping to analyse the challenges facing the society and offering dispassionate advice and helpful advice to a society and in a problem area, where demonstrated synergy by the UNCT would be all the more essential both as the medium and as the message

13. Have more efficient (sensitive) and appropriate measures been adopted to respond to the political and socio-cultural context identified?

At the level of individual micro project initiatives the measures/approaches adopted appear to have been appropriate to the political and socio-cultural context. But the problematique is one of knitting back a torn social fabric and while the individual initiatives have favoured cross ethnic collaboration this commendable aspect could perhaps have been further generalised.

14. How conducive are current UN agency procedures to joint programming? How can existing bottlenecks be overcome and procedures further harmonized?

Current UN agency procedures may be conducive to joint programming but if they are they have not led to such a state in this instance. Some possible inferences include that if the procedures are conducive, they are not sufficient to ensure joint programming, or that some members of the UNCT have not yet had the time or resources or inclination to concentrate on this, or that as long as agencies are funded and evaluated separately there will be competition and incoherence.

The bottlenecks are political and bureaucratic and well known both to practitioners within the UN system and to outside observers of “UN reform”. They can be resolved if/when the decisions of the UN General Assembly are put into effect by the Boards of the other bodies of the UN system and implemented by the members of the CEB¹³.

D: Ownership in the process: National social actors’ effective exercise of leadership in the development interventions

15. To what extent have the target population and the participants taken ownership of the programme, assuming an active role in it

Croatia is a country with many very able citizens so the programme is very much owned by the national organisations involved. There are some questions as to why in a society with

13 [The United Nations System Chief Executives Board](http://www.unsceb.org/ceb/home) (CEB) is the highest level co-ordination mechanism of the UN system and the prime instrument for supporting and reinforcing the coordinating role of United Nations intergovernmental bodies on social, economic and related matters. The CEB aligns the strengths of a decentralized system of specialized organizations into a cohesive and functioning whole. It ensures that the UN system delivers as one at the global, regional and country levels on the broad range of commitments made by the international community. <http://www.unsceb.org/ceb/home>

such able human resources it has been necessary for UNDP and UNHCR to set up sub offices.

While the interviews undertaken with a wide variety of relevant interlocutors ensured the evaluators that there has been high level of involvement of beneficiaries and some of the local governments in the project, in particular in its elements of small community sub-projects, there is some evidence of active involvement of regional, county level governments and regional development partnerships and no evidence that the Project Team has persistently attempted to ensure such involvement.

Insufficient advantage was taken of the opportunity to bind the small grass-root initiatives into a coherent strategic regional-level action that would have a more visible impact on socio-economic development and cohesion in ASSCs. At the time of the programme's implementation, regional governments and the partnerships that they established had been preparing the new Regional Development Strategies (as the continuation of previous Regional Operational Programmes).

The Agencies' staff and beneficiaries were explicitly asked about connections with the process and they all, other than in Knin, stated there had been none. There has been some good cooperation with some of the local governments, and there may have been county-level cooperation on some of the sub-projects, but ownership of the County Governments in the programme was not apparent.

16. To what extent have national public/private resources and/or counterparts been mobilized to contribute to the programme's goals and impacts?

Mobilisation appears to have been diligent at the local governmental level. In several cases the mission met with local government officials who indicated their support for and interest in the activities of the programme. They were in at least some instances not so much thirsty for more money more for better more helpful services from concerned government agencies

Private involvement and that of larger governmental entities appears to be much more mitigated.

IV: Results level

F: EFFECTIVENESS Extent to which the objectives of the development intervention have been met or are expected to be met, taking into account their relative importance.

17. Did the programme achieve the stipulated results?

The programme management system established at the outset does not focus, nor has it really facilitated reporting, on the three outcomes of:-

- i. National policy coordination on conflict prevention, reconciliation and recovery strengthened
- ii. Enhanced community integration, safety and social cohesion
- iii. Enhanced socio-economic recovery of Areas of Special State Concern.

The major focus has been on immediate questions of delivery of inputs, implementation of activities and to some extent progress towards outputs. This also involved careful attention to work planning and facilitating release of the second tranche of the resources foreseen in the budget.

That being said there has been definite progress in producing the stipulated outputs and while they are sensitive to the larger process of EU accession, there are some positive signs with respect to the second two outcomes. It is not so clear for the first one.

18. To what extent and in what ways is the joint programme contributing to the Millennium Development Goals at the local and national levels?

Croatia as a country is already performing very well in terms of the first 7 MDGs.

19. To what extent is the programme contributing to the goals set by the thematic window, and in what ways?

The Terms of Reference for the Conflict prevention window note

“iv To be fully conflict-sensitive in increasingly complex conflict situations, a wide range of competencies is required. Beyond the traditional diplomatic and developmental skills, there is increasing demand for experts trained in techniques of institutional and conflict transformation. Conflict sensitivity also needs collection and analysis of data. This is a particular challenge in both low-intensity conflict and post-conflict settings, where updated and reliable data are often scarce. Besides expertise and data, these situations need long-term engagement to produce sustainable results. Many efforts require a significant transformation of societal relationships and attitudes in highly fragile, complex and rapidly changing environments. This is particularly true of efforts to build multi-stakeholder consensus around critical peace building issues. It is also true of efforts to impart constructive negotiation and consensus-building skills that can be applied to prevent or settle disputes.

v. Conflict prevention and peace building policies and programmes should avoid fragmented approaches. Instead, an integrated multi-sector approach is required, built on a comprehensive needs assessment, on strategic planning, with coordinated engagement of national expertise and capacities with those of the UN. This requires that the UN reach out and work closely with all relevant national and local stakeholders. These include governments at all levels, political actors, the security sector, civil society including

women's groups, the private sector, and the international (donor) community. vi. To escape a downward spiral of insecurity, criminalization and under-development, socioeconomic, justice and security dimensions must be tackled simultaneously.”¹⁴

The concept note for the programme noted that:-

*“Croatia has not had the political will (nor the mechanisms) to effectively manage the latent ethnic and resource related disputes that originated from the conflict and the immediate post conflict period. Accordingly ten years since the final settlement of territorial disputes, there has emerged a ‘negative peace’ resulting in socio-economic disparities and community lines”*¹⁵

If these postulates and observations are correct or at least reasonably plausible, it is not clear that a positive peace is in the process of being restored nor that the required capacities and analysis have been brought to bear or perhaps more importantly are being now engendered and prompted as necessary features of Croatian society as the MDGF intervention comes to a close.

However it may be that such ambitions were unrealistic and further that Conflict Prevention, Reconciliation, Recovery, Community integration, Safety and Social cohesion are imprecise concepts difficult to measure and it may have been /be more useful for those elaborating the programme to think in terms of processes set in motion that are more or less promising.

The goals of the thematic window are not readily reducible to a mechanistic “engineering” approach. Conflict prevention, Reconciliation, Recovery, Community integration, Safety and Social cohesion are imprecise concepts difficult to measure. They are however possible to observe and to subject to the scrutiny of the well informed and the wise.

Perhaps it would have been/would be useful to set up a mechanism representing all stakeholders which could have/could provide in the future informed, wise commentary somewhat above the regular political process on the real progress being achieved in Conflict prevention, Reconciliation, Recovery, Community integration, safety and Social cohesion.

The mission was informed that there is discussion of a regional programme being organised among the four governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia, with support from UNHCR, to address residual housing claims from the 1991-95 conflict in the sub region. Based on the performance of the UN system in Croatia, it may not be optimal to leave this issue in the hands of a single UN agency but to ensure ‘an integrated multi-sector approach, built on a comprehensive needs assessment, on strategic planning, with coordinated engagement of national expertise and capacities with those of the UN’ . The

¹⁴ Terms of Reference for Thematic Window on Conflict Prevention and Peace building page 2, v.

¹⁵ Concept Note Section II para1.

model the UN has used elsewhere of sub regional conflict prevention/peace building may be something to consider ¹⁶

20. Was the stipulated timeline of outputs met? What factors contributed to progress or delay in the achievement of the outputs and outcomes?

Changes in the attribution of responsibilities of the principal government counterpart provided a significant obstacle to achievement of one of the principal objectives of the exercise. Other than that, the majority of the programme has remained on time. This was helped significantly by the appointment of a programme manager who helped keep three of the four agencies on the timeliness track.

21. Do the outputs produced meet the required high quality?

With the exception of the one sub programme/agency referred to, the outputs produced by and large meet the required high quality. However precise quality standards were not articulated so a definitive judgement would be a little rash. Greater use of participatory monitoring and evaluation might have been helpful in providing both more evidence and at the same time promoted more local capacity development.

Moreover the management of all the agencies concerned have needed to be prodded to think and to respond in terms of the outcomes laid out in the performance framework. So addressing outputs has been feasible but by and large they have not been attentive to, or aware of, programme level outcomes and their achievement.

22. Does the programme have follow-up mechanisms (to verify the quality of the products, punctuality of delivery, etc.) to measure progress in the achievement of the envisaged results?

It does not appear to have such mechanisms and their lack is a matter the agencies concerned and the government may wish to consider in any follow up to the programmes activities.

23. Did the programme provide coverage to beneficiaries as planned?

The Programme has addressed issues of post-conflict society and socio-economic development and cohesion in war affected areas mainly through an array of small, local initiatives. In the current socio-economic and political context in Croatia, it seems that this is the type of support missing from national and EC-funded programmes and projects. Most of the beneficiaries interviewed claimed that national programmes they would require do not exist, while the procedures that need to be followed to obtain EC funds are complex and inflexible.

Accordingly the joint programme missed some of the opportunities to integrate an array of small scale interventions into a limited number of innovative local development strategies

¹⁶ See for example the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA)

in post-conflict context and take advantage of potential synergies that co-operation of more than one UN agencies could bring to such strategy.

At the societal level, it may be that the nature of the programme is such that its products and the mode and punctuality of their production should be the topics of enlightened public discourse as a means of promoting progress towards the goals of the programme. Support for a more evident capacity for public policy analysis and discourse might be something for concerned stakeholders to consider.

24. In what way has the programme come up with innovative measures for problem-solving?

While the different components of the programme have addressed different target groups as planned, the interviews have affirmed the evaluators' impression that the actions undertaken were a prolongation of the previous loosely coordinated work of the UN agencies. The approach to problem solving is in that sense not really innovative.

25. Have any good practices, success stories, or transferable examples been identified?

There does not appear to be a system for seeking out good practices and success stories for eventual transfer elsewhere. See also response to question 37.

26. In what ways has the joint programme contributed to the issue of conflict prevention and peace building?

See answer to question 23.

27. What types of differentiated effects are resulting from the joint programme in accordance with the sex, race, ethnic group, rural or urban setting of the beneficiary population, and to what extent?

The beneficiaries interviewed did not offer significant examples of differentiated effects nor were such effects observed during the missions visits within Croatia.

V: Sustainability: The probability that the benefits of the intervention will continue in the long term.

28. Are the necessary premises occurring to ensure the sustainability of the impacts of the joint programme?

While there are lingering concerns over property rights and education, the basic premise of the programme, creating a frame within which the complex of different communities:- Croats from Croatia, Croats from Bosnia, Croatians from Serbia, Serb returnees, Muslims displaced from Bosnia etc, can co-exist appears to be in place. The dynamic and ongoing question is whether this framework can be maintained in the future and linked constructively

and cost effectively to the process of accession to the EU, which is tentatively discussed as if it is likely to occur by 2013.

At local and national level:

29. Is the programme supported by national and/or local institutions?

As a programme agreed to by a functioning government the response is positive. The programme while “technical” in content is “political” by nature so any constraints are more political than technical. The issue is restoration of a social fabric torn by a war and Croatian society or at least some elements within it may not want external actors from the UN system meddling in their affairs. It would take a major longer and more detailed exercise than this evaluation to consider such a question properly.

The principal technical obstacle is the lack of public policy analysis capacity and discourse referred to earlier. Closing the conflict and addressing the hangover from it is the most obvious public policy issue. It may be that the best way for the society to address it is by benign neglect, on the principle that time heals all things but that is not the approach that has been followed in some other post conflict societies from Northern Ireland to Spain to South Africa.

30. Are these institutions showing technical capacity and leadership commitment to keep working with the programme and to repeat it?

Croatia is a society full of very capable people. However there was no sign during the mission that there is a national institution like the performance and innovation unit in the UK cabinet office or the GAO in the USA evaluating national progress analysing policy choices and providing the material to drive a national dialogue on these issues.

It is a truism that ‘everything in Croatia is seen in the context of anticipated EU accession’. If this is so and if accession is indeed tentatively likely to occur by 2013 then there will be a period of hiatus while the useful activities which the programme has supported no longer have the financial resources needed. There was no indication of a lack of technical capacity to keep working with the programme.

31. Have operating capacities been created and/or reinforced in national and local partners?

The question here includes which capacity and for what purpose. As for the response to question 11 above, if the substance of the programme is a “production process” mobilising well defined inputs to implement straightforward activities which in turn produce intended and well defined outputs and so lead to desired objectives then assessing capacity building is a simple process. In the case of “non production process” initiatives such as conflict prevention and peace building restoring the social fabric in a war affected society with residual ethnic differences and tensions this may not be so appropriate.

Capacity building, particularly in such circumstances is unlikely to be straightforward. It is much more than simple training which seems to have been the UN system's common tactic in dealing with needs for stronger and more capable organisations and institutions.

*“No single magic factor, by itself, can account for big gains in capacity. The basic systems thinking insight remains valid: i.e. it is the shifting pattern of relationships or the interaction between and amongst components or activities that matters crucially. Capacity emerges and develops fitfully and organically in ways that are only partially susceptible to management and direction. Our sense is that the utility of using planned, scheduled, controlled approaches to managing change is limited. We need new ways to deal with complexity, diversity and rapid change”.*¹⁷

So the production process approach perhaps not being fully applicable here, there is a strategic question here for the Government of Croatia and for the political/ economic entity to which it wishes to accede, the EU. It is how to create and sustain the organisations and the organisational environment which will keep Croatia on a sustained path of community reconciliation. The programme had as an outcome “National policy coordination on conflict prevention, reconciliation and recovery strengthened”. But apparently little overt thought has been given to the organisations and capacities needed to provide stronger policy coordination along the path to ongoing reconciliation, recovery and prevention of the re occurrence of conflict. No one should pretend that these are negligible and easy tasks but neither UNDP, which has a mandate for and a track record in, capacity building nor UNHCR, which has a mandate for reconciliation appear to have given much thought to this, at least at local level.

Overall the programme does appear to be supporting quite effectively the process of return of refugees and displaced persons and the slow building up of a modus operandi for the different communities. The process is not yet complete.

32. Do the partners have sufficient financial capacity to keep up the benefits produced by the programme?

It would be in the interests of, and to the long run and cost effective benefit of, all the stakeholders concerned if some appropriate form of this process were to continue. Yet resources apparently are not currently available to do so nor are they foreseen. Some appropriate solution should perhaps be entertained by the parties concerned.

33. Is the duration of the programme sufficient to ensure a cycle that will ensure the sustainability of the interventions?

Two years has not been enough for sustained peace building. Hopefully other sources will be found to bridge those useful activities already being carried on under the programme until eventual accession to the EU. A third year of MDGF support might have led to more sustainable results. The Croatia UNCT requested a third year of funding, with support from

¹⁷. Peter Morgan, ECDPM Background paper / final workshop – Maastricht, 15-17 May 2006

both the Deputy Prime Minister and the Spanish Ambassador; this, however, was rejected. Peace building seems to require much longer involvement than is usually foreseen in typical programmes and projects so the need to elaborate a sustainability strategy and the provisions needed to sustain any capacities created and any processes set in motion by the joint programme remains and should be considered by all relevant stakeholders in the context of the anticipated accession to the EU.

34. Have networks or network institutions been created or strengthened to carry out the roles that the joint programme is performing?

No. Please see earlier remarks on this issue.

35. To what extent are the visions and actions of partners consistent with or different from those of the joint programme?

The government Minister¹⁸ most closely related to the Programme has noted the drawbacks of a top down approach by the government. Were the UN system to be able to contribute to a national debate perhaps also including the EU on this issue, it might lead to some progress

36. In what ways can governance of the joint programme be improved so as to increase the chances of achieving sustainability in the future?

The goals of the thematic window are not readily reducible to a mechanistic “engineering” approach. Conflict prevention, Reconciliation, Recovery, Community integration, safety and Social cohesion are imprecise concepts difficult to measure. They are possible to observe and to subject to the scrutiny of the well informed and the wise. Perhaps it would have been useful to set up a mechanism (A Council of Village/ community leaders) representing all stakeholders which could have/could provide informed, wise commentary on the real progress being achieved in Conflict prevention, Reconciliation, Recovery, Community Integration, Safety and Social cohesion.

With the exception of the one UN agency referred to, the outputs produced by and large meet the required high quality. However the local managers of all the agencies concerned have needed to be prodded to think and to respond in terms of the outcomes laid out in the performance framework. So addressing outputs has been feasible but by and large they appear not to have been attentive to or aware of outcomes and their achievement.

Country level

37. Are there any practices that can/should be transferred to other programmes or countries?

Countries in Western Balkans region share the history of conflict and displacement, but they also share European ambitions. While European integration and accession processes involve

¹⁸ Deputy Prime Minister

political criteria for potential candidates, which include protection of minority rights and access to law, as well as the introduction of EU-style regional policy; based on Croatian example, there seems to be a gap between well planned national policies and actual capacities to implement such policies in areas of special concern, particularly in minority communities. UN agencies, especially if they succeed in “working as one” have a potential to act as a support mechanism for implementation of such policies on local level, in smaller communities.

A lesson learned within the “Closing the Chapter” programme is that UN agencies are best suited to act in building the capacities of small, socially and economically marginalised communities to actively consume the national and European level policies, which are devised to support them, but often too complex for these communities to actually make use of.

The programme has shown that the strong local presence of UN agencies makes them very influential and effective on the local level of war-affected communities. On the other hand, national policies in pre-accession countries are very much framed by the process of European Integration and there seems to be little interest by national politicians to involve another international interlocutor in their creation. Symbolically, UN could support and do more to act as an explicit champion of the disadvantaged areas with minority populations in catching up with more prosperous regions and political and economic centres of the countries on the path to European economic and political standards.

Given that all the national policies and reforms are so firmly embedded into the EU accession process in Croatia, there is little public policy debate and most of the reforms and policies have been formulated and developed hastily in order to join the EU as soon as possible. Either capacities or interest of the government, media and civil society to get involved in a wider policy debate seem to be absent.

So there appears to be little public awareness of the specific conditions of life in the war affected areas and economically and demographically, the ASSCs seem to continue to move on a downward spiral. One of the potential future roles of the UN, therefore, both in Croatia and in neighbouring countries could be to work on raising the capacities of all the stakeholders (government, media, civil society, academia) for public policy analysis so as to make sure that the policies and legislation reforms on the way to EU are firmly based on the local needs and that they take into account the specific conditions of war affected areas and that these needs are not forgotten in the period between the end of the programme and the arrival of resources anticipated after EU accession.

38. To what extent and in what way is the joint programme contributing to progress towards the Millennium Development Goals in the country?

The programme was designed to help achieve three national Millennium Development Goals (quoted here from Joint Programme Document):

The 'Mitigation of Poverty' (N-MDG1), through empowering those groups most likely to be long-term unemployed and through supporting the creation of improved local development conditions and access to basic services in those areas most prone to poverty and conflict;

'Education for All' (N-MDG2); supported by UNICEF's 'Protecting children from violence' project that works to ensure children do not enter adulthood as individuals likely to become prejudiced, or socially / economically excluded. This situation is particularly acute for national minorities that face added ethnic intolerance barriers to accessing education; and,

Gender equality (N-MDG3) will be advanced by supporting relevant legal frameworks, national strategies and substantive projects that target women at high risk of poverty and violence, particularly those in rural areas with lower levels of education and those living in areas of former conflict. This is particularly important given that women – nation-wide - are 20% more likely to be at risk of poverty than men.

The programme aimed to reduce the negative effects of exclusion from socio-economic life based on identity (ethnic, gender, age). The programme has actively supported implementation of relevant national policies in Areas of Special State Concern and it directly supported the target groups in the area: returnees (mainly representatives of Serbian minority), women, school-children, long-term unemployed, war veterans. Based on the interviews with the Country Team and Beneficiaries, the support has been effective and the beneficiaries feel it has helped them in improving their socio-economic conditions.

The programme has in selected communities helped create longer-term local partnerships in improving the conditions of these target groups, such as work of Crime Prevention Councils, establishment networks of women associations for unemployed women, introducing the UNICEF Violence-Free School Programme to schools in the area etc. Unfortunately, the programme has been somewhat less effective in achieving its aim to streamline and coordinate national level policies towards these target groups in the ASSCs, mainly due to external factors (change of the mandates of Deputy Prime Ministers in the Government).

39. To what extent and in which ways are the joint programmes helping make progress towards United Nations reform (i.e. One UN)?

The key contribution of the programme to "One UN" concept lies in the fact that it has, for the very first time, brought four agencies together in Croatia and introduced the idea of joint programming where up to that point there had been none. All the interviewed members of the programme team stated that the programme represented a significant change in their approach to cooperation. All UN agencies and several partners indicated that, compared to the status of UN cooperation prior to the joint programme, there has been an improvement, but still may not be at the level of other UNCT's with longer established UNRC offices.

"ONE PROGRAMME". However, most agree that this is only the first step that needed to, but has not been taken any further than the establishment of communication and that there

are further steps to be achieved if the agencies are to work together with added value. The programme has allowed the agencies to continue working according to their own individual practices, and cooperation was either administrative (in reporting and partly in management of the finances – even that to a limited degree to the extent which different procedures in the agencies allow) or opportunistic (some good examples of cooperation of UNDP and UNHCR in implementation of Safe Community Plans or other small community sub-projects which took place in some communities, but not in others, which depended on the prior presence and involvement of the agencies in question).

Unfortunately, the programme was not designed/resourced so as to plan strategically to achieve joint impact in a limited area by taking advantage of capacities of different UN agencies. It has put the work of these agencies in a wider set of counties under the same framework, but this framework remained very loose to say the least. The visibility of the cooperation of UN agencies in public is also questionable. Most of the interviewed beneficiaries were aware only of the work of the Agency or Agencies that supported them and were not aware of the fact that the assistance they received was a part of a wider programme implemented by a number of agencies supposed to deliver as One.

If the intent is to highlight the delivering as one aspects of UN collaboration with Croatia and by so doing prompt a more integrated approach by national and regional authorities then the recommendation of the evaluation team for the future joint programmes could be to limit the programmes to smaller geographical areas and then present a joint strategy, a set of more focused and systematic cooperative actions leading to simpler but more visible results. For future programmes, a limited number of municipalities could be taken into consideration so that all the agencies could work towards the same goal in the same community and jointly contribute to a visible impact.

“ONE LEADER” AND “ONE OFFICE” The “One UN” concept brings the idea of one Country Team working in concert under a Resident Coordinator. While the programme has followed the general structure proposed in most of its aspects and, according to the interviews with the team, the Resident Representative¹⁹ played a significant role in programme preparation; it seems that during the implementation, programme coordination remained mainly with the Programme Manager based in UNDP.

During the Evaluation mission, when they were asked about problem solving and troubleshooting during the programme implementation, in particular in relation to coordination of the inputs of the different agencies, the members of the country team usually explained that they understood this to be the programme manager’s job.

¹⁹ Since the UNRC office was not established until July 2010, as noted elsewhere, the UNDP Resident Representative played a significant role in the programme preparation, but he was not at the time designated as the UNRC.

The expectations and a shared vision of good leadership by one Agency are both clear to the members of the UNCT. The requirements of good followership by the other agencies and how this would fit into a coherent UN approach are much less well articulated and/or understood. In order for this situation to evolve in a positive direction the UNCT's performance in terms of joint programming and in co-ordinated planning and action needs to be consciously managed and specifically monitored.

The MDGF Secretariat attached quite a lot of significance to where the programme manager and implementation unit were seated (e.g. in the government office, in separate office or in the RC's Office). The UNCT in Croatia is fortunate to have shared premises and the MDGF joint programme manager was seated in the UN House in the UNDP Country Office. The RC's budget supported the programme manager position financially²⁰, but was never formally considered part of the RC's office. The impression is that MDGF joint programme was treated more as just a project and not a joint programme formally supported by the RC's office.

Therefore if enhanced UN coordination is to be achieved through such joint programmes, the programmes and their coordination would need to be firmly anchored in the RC's office. In practice, this would mean that programme manager would need to be supported by the UNRC office. This should be clear to all UN agencies from the beginning. The Programme manager should report to UNCT meetings on progress of the programme to ensure that the program manager is seen as working for all involved agencies and not just one agency. Furthermore the programme manager should have the mechanisms to actually manage other agencies and not just act as an administrator or coordinator.

“ONE BUDGET” In terms of budget planning, the programme has sufficiently streamlined the plan of all the agencies in one document. However, the evaluation team has learned that even in the programming stage, different internal budgetary procedures, especially the difference between project based and other agencies in the level of budgetary flexibility to plan programme/project based activities, limited the idea of joint planning. Furthermore, joint management of the programme budget presented a very difficult task for the programme manager, since all the agencies keep different financial reporting systems.

40. How have the principles for aid effectiveness (ownership, alignment, managing for development results and mutual accountability) been developed in the joint programmes?

The programme's design was embedded in national policies and reforms and foresaw effective leadership of Deputy Prime Minister's office. The programme has been designed as a joint initiative of the Deputy Prime Minister's office and the UN Country Team, even though the detailed design remained with the UN agencies. It foresaw a strong involvement

²⁰ UNICEF, UNHCR, and IOM all contributed to covering the programme manager's salary costs in the first half of 2011.

of the Deputy Prime Minister's office in implementation of a set of activities leading to the Outcome 1 ("National policy coordination on conflict prevention, reconciliation and recovery strengthened"). Since the concept of Aid delivered under the programme to the War Affected Areas for all the 3 outcomes was embedded in the process of national regional policy development, it seemed that national ownership would be sufficiently ensured by a close and fruitful relationship with the Deputy Prime Minister's office in charge of regional development, reconstruction and return.

However, the change in the mandate of the Deputy Prime Minister's office and subsequent lack of interest of the new Deputy Prime Minister responsible for regional development for cooperation in programme implementation demonstrated that the concept of strongly basing the ownership and alignment of aid on one of the very benevolent government bodies and even more so on the political profile of the persons in seat (Mr. Uzelac is the representative in Government of the Serbian minority party in the ruling coalition) brings along a risk, especially in politically dynamic countries. Therefore, we recommend that, for a programme touching a wider range of sectors, such as this one, a wider set of national government stakeholders are firmly "on board" already at the time of programme preparation. It is, of course, not a guarantee that institutional changes will not endanger programme implementation, but represents an obvious risk reduction tactic.

Deputy Prime Minister Uzelac's office remained very strongly and effectively involved in the programme management even after part of the programme no longer fell under its mandate and the practice of the National Steering Committee proved effective. The role of Programme Management Committee, which incorporated all the UN Agencies and a number of line ministries, however, remained weaker. The Programme Management Committee met twice during the programme implementation. The Evaluation Team therefore concludes, that mutual accountability, national ownership and alignment with national policies in this programme heavily relied cooperation with one individual and one government body. While this can be a very effective approach, it proved to be a risky one and not necessarily conducive to sustainability.

41. To what extent is the joint programme helping to influence the country's public policy framework?

One of the three key planned outcomes of this programme is "National policy coordination on conflict prevention, reconciliation and recovery strengthened". The project aimed at establishing the coordination mechanism for regional development of war affected areas and violence prevention/safety mechanisms under the Deputy Prime Minister. This national-policy impact of the project suffered severely from the change of mandate of Deputy Prime Minister Uzelac, who, at the time of project design and in the first part of implementation period, was in charge of regional development, reconstruction and return, but in August 2009 changed into social affairs and human rights, while Minister Pankretić became Minister of Regional development and Deputy Prime Minister of the Government. While Deputy Prime Minister Uzelac retained issues of refugee return and revitalisation of ASSCs under his

mandate, these issues were, within the new structure of the government, detached from the sector of regional development despite several attempts by UNDP and the MDGF management to engage him in the joint programme offering the same coordination assistance that had been offered to Deputy Prime Minister Uzelac.

Initially, the programme has been successful in achieving the framing its efforts in conflict prevention, reconciliation, social inclusion and economic recovery within the context of regional policy, putting an emphasis on the Areas of Special State Concern as the key issue of regional development. An adviser for regional development was assigned to Deputy Prime Minister Uzelac's office to assist in preparation of the National Strategy for Regional Development and other related issues. In June 2009, the first co-ordination meeting on regional development was hosted by the Deputy Prime Minister and the co-ordination meeting included 8 ministries relevant for regional development, 3 national funds (for regional development, employment and environment protection) and 2 national service providers. However, with the change in mandate, by which Deputy Prime Minister Uzelac was no longer in charge of regional development and the new responsible Deputy Prime Minister Pankretić did not continue cooperation with the joint programme, but continued with the preparation of regional policy documents (National Strategy and Law) without its inputs.

Deputy Prime Minister Uzelac's office, however, continued active co-operation with the MDGF programme in all other areas of reconciliation, social inclusion and economic development in ASSCs even if outside the mandate of the body responsible for the co-ordination of regional policy. Through this cooperation, the programme has managed to support Deputy Prime Minister Uzelac's office determination to retain the return policy issues on Government agenda.

The programme's success, however, remains predominantly on local level, where it supported and in some cases supplemented the implementation of Government policies, but could not help set their framework. In particular, the programme has helped implement some of the key policy issues relevant for the development of Areas of Special State Concern and refugee return, such as Implementation on the Free Legal Aid Act, putting in practice the Safe Community Plans, introducing LEADER approach to local rural development planning and working on raising the capacities of regional and local institutions for management of EU funds.

One well qualified local researcher with whom the team met, noted the lack of a national capacity to do public policy research and the issues the joint programme has been addressing are the topics that would be very usefully on the agenda of any such capacity. Perhaps the most useful aspect the programme could have addressed/capacity it could have supported/highlighted would have been a nationally managed barometer of how the process is advancing.

VI Cross cutting

42. How well did co-ordination work? i.e. how well did the UN agencies concerned work together?

When the programme was proposed and negotiated, there was no UN RC. So the existence of the programme is in itself a significant step in an environment that appears previously to have been inimical to co-ordination. The UN system only came to Croatia in the context of the conflict in the region; initially UNHCR and UNICEF then IOM and UNDP. UNHCR has been in Croatia since 1991. UNICEF came to Croatia shortly thereafter and then IOM. UNDP's office was set up in 1996. Prior to the joint programme each agency had worked on its own and appear to have become set in their ways. So 'Coordination' in the formal sense is still in its infancy in Croatia.

Based on the one interview for which their staff were available, UNICEF appears to see itself very much nationally financed, nationally owned and nationally run and as such more answerable to local constituencies than to the Regional Office responsible for Europe (Geneva), let alone UNICEF New York its Executive Board or the UN GA. UNHCR has been active in all of the countries affected by the conflict. Each of the Agencies has been used to running its "own" projects without much reference to the other agencies in the country. The joint programme has therefore made a significant step in organising the systematic exchange of information. However it has not achieved synergy in planning and action.

The fourth agency, IOM, has hardly played any part in the programme so whether they would or would not have worked well with the others is hard to say.

The programme manager has visibly worked hard and persuasively to promote a coherent approach using the modest levers available to him. But therein lies much of the problem. The post has had little power to induce co-ordination and so the tasks that could be accomplished were more administrative than managerial. The manager has no control over the budgets of each agency and is only aware of expenditures when they are reported by the agencies concerned.

43. What are the principal risks to sustainability?

As everything on the current political agenda is seen to be governed by the process of EU accession so the principal 'risk' would be the emergence of problems in this process. A related risk is the attitude that the ASSCs are regions from which people will emigrate as economic opportunities are greater elsewhere. So the residual populations will be aging and potentially more and more isolated and so more and more a source of problems of social inclusion and welfare. Yet because they are a problem in decline they will continue to be neglected.

44. What are the principal lessons?

- i. Any country emerging from conflict poses special problems. Solutions need to be tailored to the society and its dynamics and the choices involved are delicate ones. Croatia has an active democratic process but well qualified observers confirmed the mission's tentative impression that there was little overt public policy analysis despite a very well educated and talented population.
- ii. A programme seeking to resolve conflicts in the longer term might see enlightened public consideration and discussion of such issues as beneficial and wish to put greater emphasis on this aspect of closing the chapter of the conflict.
- iii. The MDG-F Spanish fund has had the courage to take on the issue of UN system coherence, But history shows that the process of inducing UN agencies to work in a more co-ordinated fashion requires much stronger incentives or inducements than were present in this programme.
- iv. It also requires that their performance as individual agencies and as a team be specifically monitored as part of the performance framework established at the outset of such programmes. Such monitoring should concentrate on the macro aspects of their performance as followers and leaders not on the micro aspects.

I. VII SOME FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings

1. The joint programme is a locally significant experiment, which, in that it involved several UN agencies, represents an addition to the UN system's practices in Croatia. The individual interventions of three of the four agencies involved, given the relatively short life of the interventions in an area of considerable complexity, have produced satisfactory results.
2. According to all signals received the key stakeholders appreciate the contribution that the Joint Programme has made. However as of mid May 2011, as the programme ends, the gap between the original very sound aspirations and the subsequent reality is still quite large and leaves a set of issues which some entity should address thereafter.
3. The complex problem of restoring the fabric of Croatian society remains even if it is subdued and the understanding of its nature is evolving. Were such an initiative being designed now, an approach more focussed on further strengthening of the capacity for national policy analysis and dialogue might set positive processes in motion.
4. The process of requiring UN agencies to work in a more co-ordinated fashion needs much stronger inducements both for leadership and for followership and closer monitoring by those urging it than were present in this programme.
5. The role and performance of the IOM requires careful scrutiny by its management.
6. Current UN agency procedures may be conducive to joint programming but have not led to such a state in this instance. If the procedures are conducive, they are not sufficient to ensure joint programming. Some members of the UNCT have not yet had the time or resources or inclination to concentrate on joint programming. As long as the agencies are funded and evaluated separately there will be competition and incoherence. The bottlenecks are political and bureaucratic and well known both to practitioners within the UN system and to outside observers of "UN reform". Progress can be made if/when relevant decisions of the UN General Assembly are put into effect by the Boards/Managers of the other bodies of the UN system.

Recommendations for future policy and practice

7. Long term conflict resolution may be helped if there is enlightened public consideration and discussion of such issues based overt public policy analysis made available to the very well educated, articulate and talented population.
8. Programmes such as this one have experimental exploratory elements. Accordingly they should be monitored intelligently, and tested to see if and how they work over an extended period with a provision for i.) learning by doing and ii.) recording that learning, built into the

management mechanisms.

9. The performance framework should include indicators monitoring how well each agency fulfils its role/responsibilities as a member of the UNCT, whether as a follower or as a leader.

10. Any programme management mechanism should have the instruments and information needed to manage.

11. An informal mechanism, analogous to an ombudsman, representing all stakeholders, which could provide informed, wise commentary on the real progress being achieved in Conflict Prevention, Reconciliation, Recovery, Community Integration, Safety and Social cohesion, as well as suggestions for improvements, might be a useful addition to the society's institutions. It might be worthwhile for regional leaders and the international community to consider whether to extend such a mechanism to the level of the sub-region.

Annex I

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE FINAL EVALUATION OF MDGF-1975: Closing the Chapter: Social Inclusion and Conflict Transformation in War Affected Areas of Croatia

Country: Croatia

UN Agencies: UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, IOM

Programme start date: 15 May 2009 **Programme end date:** 14 May 2011

Total duration of the Programme: 2 years

Programme Budget \$3,000, 000

MDGF Project ID: 1975 **MDTF Project ID:** 00067230

BACKGROUND:

The MDGF and the Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Thematic Window

In December 2006, the UNDP and the Government of Spain signed a major partnership agreement for the amount of €28 million, with the aim of contributing to progress on the MDGs and other development goals through the United Nations System. In addition, on 24 September 2008 Spain pledged €90 million towards the launch of a thematic window on Childhood and Nutrition. The MDG Achievement Fund (MDGF) supports countries in their progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and other development goals by funding innovative programmes that have an impact on the population and potential for duplication.

The MDGF operates through the UN teams in each country, promoting increased coherence and effectiveness in development interventions through collaboration among UN agencies. The Fund uses a joint programme mode of intervention and has currently approved 128 joint programmes in 49 countries. These reflect eight thematic windows that contribute in various ways towards progress on the MDGs.

The Conflict Prevention and Peace Building thematic window aims to foster an enabling environment for development as a precondition for MDG fulfilment. Conflict is addressed as both a cause and symptom of poverty and hunger in the world. These efforts contribute to achieving MDG goals on eradicating extreme poverty, promoting gender equality and empowering women. 15% of the budget in this area is directed towards gender related interventions.

The 11 programmes in this window seek to contribute to the achievement of 3 of main goals through interventions tackling conflict prevention and violence reduction, livelihood improvements against youth violence, and the fostering of dialog. These outcomes represent a variety of direct and indirect approaches to building peace and preventing conflicts. One common premise is ensuring that people know and exert their rights as an important component of a peace building and conflict prevention strategy, and appears as an outcome of many Joint Programs as well. Some joint programmes also pursue specific outcomes that are relevant in their context and situation, such as helping returnees and building public spaces. Virtually all stakeholders in the joint programme within this window involve supporting the government, at the national and/or local levels. Many programs also engage civil society, community, and/or indigenous organizations and leaders.

Closing the Chapter: Social Inclusion and Conflict Transformation in War Affected Areas of Croatia:

Under the CPPB Thematic Window, MDGF-1975 entitled “Closing the Chapter: Social Inclusion and Conflict Transformation in War-Affected Areas of Croatia” is being implemented by the UN Country Team from 15 May 2009 to 14 May 2011. The UN Programme will tackle the endemic social, economic and political exclusion of returnees, minorities, veterans and economically-disempowered women whose marginalization most jeopardizes peaceful coexistence and sustainable return, and risks cementing the emergence of ‘Two Croatias’; one relatively well off, vibrant and Euro-centric; the other home to the poor disempowered and excluded.

The Programme employs a ‘root cause’ methodology that pioneers the integration of a community decision-making methodology into the socio-economic recovery of war-affected areas through shared needs / interest projects. This will introduce peace-building mechanisms into existing local structures that provide social services, education, community policing, justice, and stimulate job creation. Nationally owned at all levels; coordination will be institutionalized by the Vice Prime Minister (VPM) for Return, Reconstruction and Regional Development, and supported by a Secretariat.

The Programme is directly linked to the achievement of three national Millennium Development Goals, namely:

- The ‘Mitigation of Poverty’ (N-MDG1), through empowering those groups most likely to be long-term unemployed and through supporting the creation of improved local development conditions and access to basic services in those areas most prone to poverty and conflict;
- ‘Education for All’ (N-MDG2); supported by UNICEF’s ‘Protecting children from violence’ project that works to ensure children do not enter adulthood as individuals likely to become prejudiced, or socially / economically excluded. This situation is particularly acute for national minorities that face added ethnic intolerance barriers to accessing education; and,
- Gender equality (N-MDG3) will be advanced by supporting relevant legal frameworks, national strategies and substantive projects that target women at high risk of poverty and violence, particularly those in rural areas with lower levels of education and those living in areas of former conflict. This is particularly important given that women – nation-wide - are 20% more likely to be at risk of poverty than men.

At the national level, the Programme, under the leadership of the Vice Prime Minister, will coordinate all activities related to the recovery of war affected areas and post conflict reconciliation (Outcome 1) It will also support the integration of peace building activities into existing national development mechanisms. Concurrently, a supporting rule of law component will support adequate access to law and justice for those groups whose current exclusion most risks a deepening of tensions. National level work will directly support existing community-based mechanisms for sustainable reintegration of targeted populations through safer community plans, violence prevention in schools and issue-based conflict resolution (Outcome 2). This mechanism will, in turn, facilitate the economic recovery of socially excluded and at-risk groups in Areas of Special State Concern (Outcome 3). Taken together, these three concrete and mutually reinforcing

levels of support constitute a Programme that will consolidate Croatia's tenuous peace-building gains and help guard against future conflict.

The UN in Croatia does not operate under an UNDAF, but rather, all four involved agencies work under the mandate of furthering regional development, safety and social inclusion in war affected areas enhanced. The UNCT is composed of seven resident agencies and organizations. The relatively small size of the country team provides incentive and rationale to work together; though the Joint Programme will be the first time this has happened on a structured premise.

The Programme has entered its final semester and is scheduled to finish on time on 14 May 2010.

2. OVERALL GOAL OF THE EVALUATION

One of the roles of the Secretariat is to monitor and evaluate the MDGF. This role is fulfilled in line with the instructions contained in the Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy and the Implementation Guide for Joint Programmes under the Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund. These documents stipulate that all joint programmes will be subject to a final evaluation.

Final evaluations are formative in nature and seek **to generate knowledge, identifying best practices and lessons learned to improve implementation of future programmes**. As a result, the conclusions and recommendations generated by this evaluation will be addressed to its main users: the Programme Management Committee, the National Steering Committee and the Secretariat of the Fund.

3. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION AND SPECIFIC GOALS

The final evaluation will use an expedited process to carry out a systematic, fast-paced analysis of the design, process and results or results trends of the **joint programme**, based on the scope and criteria included in these terms of reference. This will enable conclusions and recommendations for the joint programme to be formed within a period of approximately three months.

The unit of analysis or object of study for this final evaluation is the joint programme, understood to be the set of components, outcomes, outputs, activities and inputs that were detailed in the joint programme document and in associated modifications made during implementation.

This final evaluation has the following **specific objectives**:

- To discover the programme's **design quality and internal coherence** (needs and problems it seeks to solve) and its external coherence with the UNDAF, the National Development Strategies and the **Millennium Development Goals**, and find out the degree of national ownership as defined by the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action.
- To understand how the joint programme **operates** and assess the **efficiency of its management model** in planning, coordinating, managing and executing resources allocated for its implementation, through an analysis of its procedures and institutional mechanisms. This analysis will seek to uncover the factors for success and limitations in inter-agency tasks within the **One UN** framework.

- To identify the programme's **degree of effectiveness** among its participants, its contribution to the objectives of the Conflict Prevention and Peace Building **thematic window**, and the Millennium Development Goals at the local and/or country level.

4. EVALUATION QUESTIONS, LEVELS AND CRITERIA

The main users of the evaluation represented in the evaluation reference group (Section 8 of the TOR), and specifically the coordination and implementation unit of the joint programme, are responsible for contributing to this section. Evaluation questions and criteria may be added or modified up to a reasonable limit, bearing in mind the viability and the limitations (resources, time, etc.) of a quick interim evaluation exercise.

The evaluation questions define the information that must be generated as a result of the evaluation process. The questions are grouped according to the criteria to be used in assessing and answering them. These criteria are, in turn, grouped according to the three levels of the programme.

Design level

- **Relevance: The extent to which the objectives of THIS development intervention are consistent with the needs and interest of the people, the needs of the country, the Millennium Development Goals and the policies of associates and donors.**
 - a) Is the identification of the problems, inequalities and gaps, with their respective causes, clear in the joint programme?
 - b) Does the Joint Programme take into account the particularities and specific interests of women, minorities and ethnic groups in the areas of intervention?
 - c) To what extent has the intervention strategy been adapted to the areas of intervention in which it is being implemented? What actions did the programme take to respond to obstacles that arose from the political and socio-cultural context?
 - d) Are the monitoring indicators relevant and do they meet/have they met the quality needed to record/measure the outputs and outcomes of the joint programme?
 - e) To what extent has the MDG-F Secretariat contributed to raising the quality of the design of the joint programmes?
- **Ownership in the design: national social actors' effective exercise of leadership in the development interventions**
 - a) To what extent do the intervention objectives and strategies of the Joint Programme respond to national and regional plans?

- b) To what extent have the country's national and local authorities and social stakeholders been taken into consideration, participated, or have become involved, at the design stage of the development intervention?

Process level

– Efficiency

- a) How well does the joint programme's management model – that is, its tools, financial resources, human resources, technical resources, organizational structure, information flows and management decision-making – contribute to generating the expected outputs and outcomes?
- b) To what extent are the participating agencies coordinating with each other and with the government and civil society? Is there a methodology underpinning the work and internal communications that contributes to the joint implementation?
- c) Are there efficient mechanisms for coordination that prevent counterparts and beneficiaries from becoming overloaded?
- d) Does the pace of implementing programme outputs ensure the completeness of the joint programme's results? How do the different components of the joint programme interrelate?
- e) Are work methodologies, financial tools etc. shared among agencies and among joint programmes?
- f) Have more efficient (sensitive) and appropriate measures been adopted to respond to the political and socio-cultural context identified?
- g) How conducive are current UN agency procedures to joint programming? How can existing bottlenecks be overcome and procedures further harmonized?

- Ownership in the process: National social actors' effective exercise of leadership in the development interventions

- h) To what extent have the target population and the participants taken ownership of the programme, assuming an active role in it?
- i) To what extent have national public/private resources and/or counterparts been mobilized to contribute to the programme's goals and impacts?

Results level

-EFFECTIVENESS Extent to which the objectives of the development intervention have been met or are expected to be met, taking into account their relative importance.

- j) Did the programme achieve the stipulated results?
 - a. To what extent and in what ways is the joint programme contributing to the Millennium Development Goals at the local and national levels?
 - b. To what extent is the programme contributing to the goals set by the thematic window, and in what ways?
- k) Was the stipulated timeline of outputs met? What factors contributed to progress or delay in the achievement of the outputs and outcomes?
- l) Do the outputs produced meet the required high quality?
- m) Does the programme have follow-up mechanisms (to verify the quality of the products, punctuality of delivery, etc.) to measure progress in the achievement of the envisaged results?
- n) Did the programme provide coverage to beneficiaries as planned?
- o) In what way has the programme come up with innovative measures for problem-solving?
- p) Have any good practices, success stories, or transferable examples been identified?
- q) In what ways has the joint programme contributed to the issue of conflict prevention and peace building?
- r) What types of differentiated effects are resulting from the joint programme in accordance with the sex, race, ethnic group, rural or urban setting of the beneficiary population, and to what extent?

Sustainability: The probability that the benefits of the intervention will continue in the long term.

- a) Are the necessary premises occurring to ensure the sustainability of the impacts of the joint programme?

At local and national level:

- a.i. Is the programme supported by national and/or local institutions?
- a.ii. Are these institutions showing technical capacity and leadership commitment to keep working with the programme and to repeat it?
- a.iii. Have operating capacities been created and/or reinforced in national and local partners?
- a.iv. Do the partners have sufficient financial capacity to keep up the benefits produced by the programme?
- a.v. Is the duration of the programme sufficient to ensure a cycle that will ensure the sustainability of the interventions?
- a.vi. have networks or network institutions been created or strengthened to carry out the roles that the joint programme is performing?
- b) To what extent are the visions and actions of partners consistent with or different from those of the joint programme?
- c) In what ways can governance of the joint programme be improved so as to increase the chances of achieving sustainability in the future?

Country level

- d) Are there any practices that can/should be transferred to other programmes or countries?
- e) To what extent and in what way is the joint programme contributing to progress towards the Millennium Development Goals in the country?
- f) To what extent and in which ways are the joint programmes helping make progress towards United Nations reform (i.e. One UN)?

- g) How have the principles for aid effectiveness (ownership, alignment, managing for development results and mutual accountability) been developed in the joint programmes?
- h) To what extent is the joint programme helping to influence the country's public policy framework?

Cross cutting

- i) How well did co-ordination work? i.e. how well did the UN agencies concerned work together?
- j) Were there any unanticipated outcomes or outputs?
- k) What are the principal risks to sustainability and
- l) What are the principal lessons?

5. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

The final evaluation will use an international consultant, appointed by MDG-F, as the Evaluator to conduct the evaluation and a locally hired consultant who will support the Evaluator by providing information about local context such as institutions, protocol, traditions, etc. and assist with translation of key meetings/ interviews during the mission as needed. It is the sole responsibility of the Evaluator to deliver the inception, draft final and final reports.

The Evaluator will use methodologies and techniques as determined by the specific needs for information, the questions set out in the TOR, the availability of resources and the priorities of stakeholders. In all cases, the Evaluator is expected to analyse all relevant information sources, such as annual reports, programme documents, internal review reports, programme files, strategic country development documents and any other documents that may provide evidence on which to form opinions. The Evaluator is also expected to use interviews, key stakeholder dialogues and beneficiary focus groups as a means to collect relevant data for the evaluation. The methodology and techniques to be used in the evaluation should be described in detail in the inception report and the final evaluation report, and should contain, at a minimum, information on the instruments used for data collection and analysis, whether these be documents, interviews, field visits, questionnaires or participatory techniques.

6. EVALUATION DELIVERABLES

The Evaluator is responsible for submitting the following deliverables to the Secretariat of the MDGF:

☞ **Inception Report** (to be submitted within seven days of the submission of all programme documentation to the Evaluator)

This report will be 5 to 10 pages in length and will propose the methods, sources and procedures to be used for data collection. It will also include a proposed timeline of activities and submission of deliverables. The inception report will propose an initial theory of change to the joint programme that will be used for comparative purposes during the evaluation and will serve as an initial point of agreement and understanding between the Evaluator and the evaluation managers. The Evaluator will also share the inception report with the evaluation reference group to seek their comments and suggestions.

☞ **Draft Final Report** (to be submitted within 10 days of completion of the field visit)

The draft final report will contain the same sections as the final report (described in the next paragraph) and will be 20 to 30 pages in length. This report will be shared among the evaluation

reference group. It will also contain an executive report of no more than 5 pages that includes a brief description of the joint programme, its context and current situation, the purpose of the evaluation, its methodology and its main findings, conclusions and recommendations. The MDGF Secretariat will share the draft final report with the evaluation reference group to seek their comments and suggestions.

✧ **Final Evaluation Report** (to be submitted within seven days of receipt of the draft final report with comments)

The final report will be 20 to 30 pages in length. It will also contain an executive report of no more than 5 pages that includes a brief description of the joint programme, its context and current situation, the purpose of the evaluation, its methodology and its major findings, conclusions and recommendations. The MDGF Secretariat will send the final report to the evaluation reference group. This report will contain the following sections at a minimum:

1. Cover Page
2. Introduction
 - Background, goal and methodological approach
 - Purpose of the evaluation
 - Methodology used in the evaluation
 - Constraints and limitations on the study conducted
3. Description of interventions carried out
 - - Initial concept
 - - Detailed description of its development: description of the hypothesis of change in the programme.
4. Levels of Analysis: Evaluation criteria and questions
5. Conclusions and lessons learned (prioritized, structured and clear)
6. Recommendations
7. Annexes

7. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND PREMISES OF THE EVALUATION

The final evaluation of the joint programme is to be carried out according to ethical principles and standards established by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG).

- **Anonymity and confidentiality.** The evaluation must respect the rights of individuals who provide information, ensuring their anonymity and confidentiality.
- **Responsibility.** The report must mention any dispute or difference of opinion that may have arisen among the consultants or between the Evaluator and the reference group of the Joint Programme in connection with the findings and/or recommendations. The Evaluator must corroborate all assertions, and note any disagreement with them.

- **Integrity.** The Evaluator will be responsible for highlighting issues not specifically mentioned in the TOR, if this is needed to obtain a more complete analysis of the intervention.
- **Independence.** The Evaluator should ensure his or her independence from the intervention under review, and he or she must not be associated with its management or any element thereof.
- **Incidents.** If problems arise during the fieldwork, or at any other stage of the evaluation, the Evaluator must report these immediately to the Secretariat of the MDGF. If this is not done, the existence of such problems may in no case be used by the Evaluator to justify the failure to obtain the results stipulated by the Secretariat of the MDGF in these terms of reference.
- **Validation of information.** The Evaluator will be responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the information collected while preparing the reports and will be ultimately responsible for the information presented in the evaluation report.
- **Intellectual property.** In handling information sources, the Evaluator shall respect the intellectual property rights of the institutions and communities that are under review.
- **Delivery of reports.** If delivery of the reports is delayed, or in the event that the quality of the reports delivered is clearly lower than what was agreed, the penalties stipulated in these terms of reference will be applicable.

8. ROLES OF ACTORS IN THE EVALUATION

The main actors in the final evaluation are the Secretariat of the MDGF, the Programme Management Office of the joint programme, National Steering Committee and the Programme Management Committee. The Programme Management Office, PMC Co-Chairs, NSC and RC Office will serve as the evaluation reference group. The role of the evaluation reference group will extend to all phases of the evaluation, including:

- Facilitating the participation of those involved in the evaluation design.
- Identifying information needs, defining objectives and delimiting the scope of the evaluation.
- Providing input on the evaluation planning documents (Work Plan and Communication, Dissemination and Improvement Plan).
- Providing input and participating in the drafting of the Terms of Reference.
- Facilitating the evaluation team's access to all information and documentation relevant to the intervention, as well as to key actors and informants who should participate in interviews, focus groups or other information-gathering methods.
- Monitoring the quality of the process and the documents and reports that are generated, so as to enrich these with their input and ensure that they address their interests and needs for information about the intervention.
- Disseminating the results of the evaluation, especially among the organizations and entities within their interest group.

The Secretariat of the MDGF shall manage the final evaluation in its role as proponent of the evaluation, fulfilling the mandate to conduct and finance the final evaluation. As manager of the final evaluation, the Secretariat will be responsible for ensuring that the evaluation process is conducted as stipulated; promoting and leading the evaluation design; coordinating and monitoring progress and development in the evaluation study and the quality of the process. It

shall also support the country in the main task of disseminating evaluation findings and recommendations.

9. TIMELINE FOR THE EVALUATION PROCESS

Execution phase of the evaluation study

Field visit (12 days)

In-country, the Evaluator will observe and contrast the preliminary conclusions reached through the study of the document review. The planned agenda will be carried out. To accomplish this, the Joint Programme Manager may need to facilitate the Evaluator's visit by means of phone calls and emails to the reference group. The Evaluator will be responsible for conducting a debriefing with the key actors he or she has interacted with.

1. The Evaluator will deliver a draft final report, which the Secretariat's Portfolio Manager shall be responsible for sharing with the evaluation reference group (**within 10 days of the completion of the field visit**).

2. The evaluation reference group may ask that data or facts that it believes are incorrect be changed, as long as it provides data or evidence that supports its request. The Evaluator will have the final say over whether to accept or reject such changes. For the sake of evaluation quality, the Secretariat's Portfolio Manager can and should intervene so that erroneous data, and opinions based on erroneous data or not based on evidence, are changed (**within 14 days of delivery of the draft final report**). The evaluation reference group may also comment on the value judgements contained in the report, but these do not affect the Evaluator's freedom to express the conclusions and recommendations he or she deems appropriate, based on the evidence and criteria established.

3. The Secretariat's Portfolio Manager shall assess the quality of the final version of the evaluation report presented, using the criteria stipulated in the annex to this TOR (**within seven days of delivery of the draft final report**).

4. Upon receipt of input from the reference group, the Evaluator shall decide which input to incorporate and which to omit. The Secretariat's Portfolio Manager shall review the final copy of the report, and this phase will conclude with the delivery of this report by the MDGF Secretariat to the evaluation reference group (**within seven days of delivery of the draft final report with comments**).

Incorporation of recommendations and improvement plan (within 21 days of delivery of the final report):

1. The Secretariat's Portfolio Manager, as representative of the Secretariat, shall engage in a dialogue with the reference group to establish an improvement plan that includes recommendations from the evaluation.

2. The Secretariat's Portfolio Manager will hold a dialogue with the reference group to develop a simple plan to disseminate and report the results to the various interested parties.

10. ANNEXES

a) Document Review

This section must be completed and specified by the other users of the evaluation but mainly by the management team of the joint programme and by the Programme Management Committee. A minimum of documents that must be reviewed before the field trip shall be established; in general terms the Secretariat estimates that these shall include, as a minimum:

MDG-F Context

- MDGF Framework Document
- Summary of the M&E frameworks and common indicators
- CPPB Thematic Window TORs
- General thematic indicators
- M&E strategy
- Communication and Advocacy Strategy
- MDG-F Joint Implementation Guidelines

Specific Documents for Joint Programme

- Joint Programme Document
- Revised versions of M&E Framework, RRF, AWP
- Joint Programme Monitoring Reports and Quarterly Progress Reports
- Minutes of the National Steering Committee Meetings
- Minutes of the Programme Management Committee Meetings
- Communication and Advocacy Strategy and related materials
- Research reports commissioned as part of the MDGF in Croatia.
- Relevant activity reports or other materials describing the MDGF in Croatia.

Other in-country documents or information

- Evaluations, assessments or internal reports conducted by the joint programme
- Relevant documents or reports on the Millennium Development Goals at the local and national levels
- Relevant documents or reports on the implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action in the country
- Relevant documents or reports on One UN, Delivering as One



PROGRAMME

Final Evaluation of the MDG-F Programme in the Republic of Croatia
4-14 April 2011

PROGRAMME OVERVIEW

	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
						2 April	3 April
						Arrival	ZAGREB
WEEK 1	4 April	5 April	6 April	7 April	8 April	9 April	10 April
	ZAGREB	ZAGREB	FIELD TRIP Zadar County, Šibenik- Knin County	FIELD TRIP Zadar County, Šibenik- Knin County	FIELD TRIP Vukovar-Srijem County		
WEEK 2	11 April	12 April	13 April	14 April	15 April		
	FIELD TRIP Sisak-Moslavina County	FIELD TRIP Sisak-Moslavina County	ZAGREB	ZAGREB	Departure		

Sunday, 2 April 2011

Final Evaluation of the MDG-F Programme in Croatia

TIME	MEETING	REFERENCE	VENUE	ATTENDANCE	NOTES
10.00-11.00	Initial Briefing with the MDG-F Programme Manager Mr. Hans Risser		Regent Esplanade Zagreb	Evaluator: Mr. Roger Maconick	
11.00-13.00	Initial Briefing with the UN Resident Coordinator / UN Resident Representative Ms. Louisa Vinton		Regent Esplanade Zagreb		

TIME	MEETING	REFERENCE	VENUE	ATTENDANCE	NOTES
08.00-09.30	Initial Briefing of the Evaluation Team Mr. Roger Maconick, Ms. Ivana Novoselec, National Assistant to the MDG-F Final Evaluation		Regent Esplanade Zagreb	Mr. Hans Risser, MDG-F Programme Manager	
10.00-11.00	Introduction of the Final MDG-F Evaluation to the UN HoAs and PIUs <u>UNDP:</u> Mr. Nenad Kocmur, Programme Manager (Local Development) Mr. Davor Bončina, Project Manager (Local Development) Mr. Mario Krešić, CTA (Justice & Human Security) Mr. Krunoslav Katić, Project Coordinator (Justice & Human Security) Ms. Ana Grozaj, Programme Associate (MDG-F; Justice & Human Security) <u>UNHCR:</u> Mr. Terence Pike, Representative Ms. Lada Blagaić, Associate Programme/Admin Officer <u>UNICEF:</u> Ms. Lora Vidović, Head of Office Ms. Đurđica Ivković, Programme Officer Ms. Martina Tomić Latinac, Programme Officer <u>IOM:</u> Mr. Jona Kulenović, National Coordinator		UN Conference Room (7 th floor)	Evaluation Team: Mr. Roger Maconick Ms. Ivana Novoselec Mr. Hans Risser, MDG-F Programme Manager	
11.00-12.00	Initial Briefing - UNHCR PIU Ms. Lada Blagaić, Associate Programme/Admin Officer Mr. Mario Pavlovic, Associate Protection Officer Ms. Nevenka Lukun, Reintegration Adviser MDG-F	JP Outputs 1.2, 2.4, & 3.2	UN Conference Room (7 th floor)	Evaluation Team: Mr. Roger Maconick Ms. Ivana Novoselec	
12.00-13.00	Initial Briefing - UNDP PIU Mr. Hans Risser, MDG-F Programme Manager Ms. Ana Grozaj, Programme Associate (MDG-F; Justice & Human Security) Mr. Nenad Kocmur, Programme Manager (Local Development) Mr. Davor Bončina, Project Manager (Local Development) Mr. Mario Krešić, CTA (Justice & Human Security) Mr. Krunoslav Katić, Project Coordinator (Justice & Human Security)	JP Outputs 1.1, 2.1, 3.1, 3.3, & 3.4	UN Conference Room (7 th floor)	Evaluation Team: Mr. Roger Maconick Ms. Ivana Novoselec	
13.00-14.00	Lunch		TBC		

TIME	MEETING	REFERENCE	VENUE	ATTENDANCE	NOTES
14.00-15.00	Initial Briefing - UNICEF PIU Ms. Đurđica Ivković, Programme Officer Ms. Martina Tomić Latinac, Programme Officer	JP Output 2.3	UN Conference Room (7 th floor)	Evaluation Team: Mr. Roger Maconick Ms. Ivana Novoselec	
15.00-15.45	Initial Briefing - IOM PIU Mr. Jona Kulenović, National Coordinator	JP Output 2.2	UN Conference Room (7 th floor)	Evaluation Team: Mr. Roger Maconick Ms. Ivana Novoselec	

TIME	MEETING	REFERENCE	VENUE	ATTENDANCE	NOTES
09.00-09.30	Office Work		UNDP		
10.00-11.00	Initial Briefing - The Kingdom of Spain H.E. Mr. Rodrigo Aguirre de Cárcer Mr. José Pedro Torrubia Asenjo, First Secretary/Deputy Head of Mission	Donor / Member of the Steering Committee	Embassy of the Kingdom of Spain, Tuškanac 21a	Evaluation Team: Mr. Roger Maconick Ms. Ivana Novoselec	
11.30-12.30	Lunch		TBC		
13.00-14.00	Initial Briefing - Office of the Vice Prime Minister for Social Issues and Human Rights Ms. Maja Andrić Lužaić, Advisor to the Vice Prime Minister	Government / Member of the Programme Management Committee	Government Building (VPM's office), Trg sv. Marka 2	Evaluation Team: Mr. Roger Maconick Ms. Ivana Novoselec	
14.00-18.00	Travel to Zadar			Evaluation Team: Mr. Roger Maconick Ms. Ivana Novoselec Mr. Hans Risser, MDG-F Programme Manager	

FIELD TRIP - Day 1: Zadar County, Šibenik-Knin County

No	Name	Interview schedule	Project title	Position	Institution	Address
1	Davor Lonić	8:45 - 9:45	Project Partner, Member of Local Development Zadar Project Board	Head of Department	Zadar County - Department for development and European processes	Božidara Petranovića 8 23000 Zadar
2	Lovro Jurišić		Project Beneficiary, Trainings	Head Assistant	Zadar County - Department for development and European processes	Božidara Petranovića 8 23000 Zadar
3	Field Office Zadar	10:00 - 11:15			UNDP	Liburnska obala 6 23000 Zadar
trip from Zadar to Karin Donji 11:15 - 12:00						
4	Tomo Aračić	12:00 - 13:00	Project Beneficiary - UNHCR	Head of Union	ZUNH - Union of Settlers in Croatia	Karin Donji
trip from Karin Donji to Udbina 13:00 - 14:15						
5	Ivan Pešut	14:15	Project Beneficiary - Completion of documentation for application of business zone Buljme for IPA III c – Call for Proposals	Municipality Mayor	Udbina Municipality	Stjepana Radića 6 53434 Udbina
6	Zlatko Brkić Danica Prica			Officers in Municipality		

FIELD TRIP - Day 2: Zadar County, Šibenik-Knin County

No	Name	Interview schedule	Project title	Position	Institution	Address
7	Milan Tankosić	9:00 - 10:00	Project Partner - Safer Community Plan (SCP)	Deputy Mayor	Gračac Municipality	Park sv. Jurja 1 23440 Gračac
8	Slavica Miličić	10:15 - 11:15	Project Beneficiary - Community building in ASSC (UNHCR/Association MI)	President of Association	Association "Prospero"	Hrvatskog proljeća 1 23440 Gračac
9	Perica Ešegović	11:15 -12:15 visit of the premises without interview	Project Partner - Safer Community Plan (SCP)	Chief of Police	Police station Gračac	Obrovačka bb 23440 Gračac
10	Ivana Jelinčić Lasić	visit	Project Beneficiary - Reconstruction of High School's Gym in Gračac (SCP)	School Principle	High School Gračac	Školska 8 23440 Gračac
11	Marijana Frček	visit	Project Beneficiary - Reconstruction of playground and installation of new windows in Kindergarten "Baltazar" (SCP)	School Principle	Kindergarten "Baltazar"	Školska 14 23440 Gračac
trip from Gračac to Knin 12:15 - 13:15						
12	Nenad Damjanović	13:15 - 14:00	Project Partner - Reconstruction of Sportsground of Elementary School "Domovinske zahvalnosti" in Knin (SCP)	Head of Department	City of Knin - Department of Finance and Social Services	Dr. Franje Tuđmana 2 22300 Knin
13	Ante Prnjak			School Principle	Primary School „Domovinske zahvalnosti"	22300 Knin
14	Zdenka Šimpraga	14:00 - 14:45	Project Beneficiary - County Social Planning (UNHCR)	Head of Association	NGO Hoću Kući	22300 Knin
15	Ojdana Vještica	15:00 - 15:30	Project Beneficiary - Community building in ASSC (UNHCR/Association MI)	Head of Association	NGO Dinarke	22300 Knin

FIELD TRIP: Vukovar-Srijem County

TIME	MEETING	REFERENCE	VENUE	ATTENDANCE	NOTES
07.30-10.45	Travel to Vukovar				* Overnight in Zagreb
11.00-11.15	Opening ceremony of the "Flower's Fair" in Vukovar	Invitation of the City of Vukovar	Main Square, Vukovar		
11.15-12.00	City of Vukovar Mr. Dejan Drakulić, Deputy Mayor	UNDP beneficiary JP Outputs 2.1, 3.4	Grad Vukovar Dr. Franje Tuđmana 1 32000 Vukovar	<u>Evaluation Team:</u> Mr. Roger Maconick Ms. Ivana Novoselec	
12.00-12.45	Crime Prevention Council Mr. Sinisa Mitrovic, Senior Associate for Civil Society Development and Youth Issues Mr. Zeljko Simundic, Head of Vukovar Police Station Mr. Ivan-Branimir Vrdoljak, Community Policing Coordinator	UNDP beneficiary JP Output 2.1	Grad Vukovar Dr. Franje Tuđmana 1 32000 Vukovar	<u>Office of the Vice Prime Minister:</u> Ms. Maja Andrić Lužaić, Advisor to the Vice Prime Minister	
13.00-13.45	County Court Ms. Danijela Cukelj, VWS Support Officer	UNDP beneficiary JP Output 1.1	Zupanijski Sud Vukovar Odjel za podršku zrtvama i svjedocima Zupanijska 33 32000 Vukovar	Mr. Hans Risser, MDG-F Programme Manager	
14.00-15.00	Lunch and visit to project site "open gym on Danube"	UNDP beneficiary JP Output 2.1	Restaurant "Dunavska golubica"		
15.00-15.45	NGO Europe House Ms. Dijana Antunovic-Lazic, Secretary of the Europe House	UNHCR beneficiary JP Output 2.4	Europski Dom Vukovar Ljudevita Gaja 12 32000 Vukovar		
16.00	Departure to Zagreb				

FIELD TRIP - Day 1: Sisak-Moslavina County

TIME	MEETING	REFERENCE	VENUE	ATTENDANCE	NOTES
07.30	Departure from Zagreb				* Overnight in Zagreb
09.00-09.45	Meeting with UNDP and UNHCR project teams in		UNHCR field office in Sisak, S. I A. Radica 50	Evaluation Team: Mr. Roger Maconick Ms. Ivana Novoselec	
10.00-10.45	Primary School Braca Ribar - UNICEF Violence Free School Ms. Ms. Nada Berek , principal Ms. Gabriela Kramaric Eid, school pedagogue and coordinator of project activities	UNICEF Beneficiary JP Output 2.3	Primary School Braca Ribar Zagrebacka ulica 8 a, Sisak	Mr. Hans Risser, MDG-F Programme Manager UNDP/UNHCR field project teams	
11.45-12.30	Hrvatska Dubica - visit to DUZ (women's association)	UNHCR Beneficiary, JP Output 2.4	Hrvatska Dubica		
13.15-15.00	Bestrma - visit to Community Center - lunch	UNDP & UNHCR Beneficiaries, JP Outputs 2.4 & 3.4	Bestrma		
15.30-16.30	Petrinja - visit to association IKS (women and youth) and HVIDR	UNDP Beneficiary, JP Output 3.4	Petrinja		
16.30	Departure to Zagreb				
19.30	Dinner with the Spanish Ambassador		At the Residence: Jurjevska 5	Mr. Roger Maconick	* Taxi

FIELD TRIP - Day 1: Sisak-Moslavina County

TIME	MEETING	REFERENCE	VENUE	ATTENDANCE	NOTES
07.30	Departure from Zagreb				* Overnight in Zagreb
09.00	Meeting with UNDP and UNHCR project teams and start of the field trip		UNDP Petrinja office Trg Stjepana Rđaića 14	<u>Evaluation Team:</u> Mr. Roger Maconick Ms. Ivana Novoselec	
09.15-09.30	Nova Drenčina - demined land, orchards	UNDP Beneficiary, JP Output 3.3	Project sites	Mr. Hans Risser, MDG-F Programme Manager	
10.45-12.30	Dvor - meeting with the Mayor and representatives of Dvor Women's Club - visit to children's playground - visit to family husbandry Korizma (Javoranj) - refreshment	UNDP, UNHCR Beneficiaries, JP Outputs, 2.1, 2.3, 2.4, 3.3 & 3.4	Dvor Women's Club & project sites		
13.30 -14.30	Glina - meeting with the Mayor - visit to SRC Banovac and Red Cross	UNDP/UNHCR Beneficiaries, JP Output 3.2, 3.4	Mayor's office and project sites		
15.15-16.15	Vojnić - meeting with the Mayor - visit to Cultural Centre and Vojnić Women's Club	UNDP beneficiaries, JP 3.4	Mayor's office and project sites		
16.30	Departure to Zagreb				

TIME	MEETING	REFERENCE	VENUE	ATTENDANCE	NOTES
11.00-12.00	Briefing with the Chairman of the Programme Management Committee Mr. Alessandro Fracassetti, UNDP Deputy Resident Representative		UNDP/ DRR office	<u>Evaluation Team:</u> Mr. Roger Maconick Ms. Ivana Novoselec	* Overnight in Zagreb
12.00-13.00	Meeting with the MDG-F ProDoc formulation team UNDP - Mr. Nenad Kocmur, Programme Manager (Local Development) UNDP - Mr. Mario Krešić, CTA (Justice & Human Security) UNHCR - Ms. Lada Blagaić, Associate Programme/Admin Officer UNICEF - Ms. Đurđica Ivković, Programme Officer		Conference Room/8 th floor	<u>Evaluation Team:</u> Mr. Roger Maconick Ms. Ivana Novoselec Mr. Hans Risser, MDG-F Programme Manager	
14.00-15.00	Croatian Red Cross Ms. Sanja Pupacic, Head of Asylum and Migration Department (with expertise in social services) Ms. Mirjana Ercegovic, Regional Programme Coordinator	UNHCR Social services provision and county social planning	UNHCR Office	<u>Evaluation Team:</u> Mr. Roger Maconick Ms. Ivana Novoselec	
15.00-16.00	Research Team - Refugee Return Sustainability Study Mr. Dragan Bagić	JP Output 2.4	UNHCR Office		
17.00-17.45	Meeting with representatives of the EU Delegation in Croatia Mr. JEAN MARIE MOREAU, First Secretary Mr. RICHARD MASA, Second Secretary		EU Trg žrtava fašizma 6 Zagreb	<u>Evaluation Team:</u> Mr. Roger Maconick Ms. Ivana Novoselec Mr. Hans Risser, MDG-F Programme Manager <u>The Spanish Embassy:</u> Mr. José Pedro Torrubia Asenjo, First Secretary/Deputy Head of Mission	

TIME	MEETING	REFERENCE	VENUE	ATTENDANCE	NOTES
09.30-10.30	Ministry of Health and Social Welfare Ms. Ana Butkovic, Head of Department for development, quality standards and methodology centers	UNHCR JP Output 2.4	At the Ministry	<u>Evaluation Team:</u> Mr. Roger Maconick Ms. Ivana Novoselec <u>UNHCR:</u> Ms. Lada Blagaić, Associate Programme/Admin Officer	* Overnight in Zagreb
11.00-15.00	Office Work		UNDP Office		
15.30-16.30	Final Briefing - Steering Committee, UN Heads of Agencies Prof. Slobodan Uzelac, Vice Prime Minister for Social Issues and Human Rights H.E. Mr. Rodrigo Aguirre de Cárcer, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Spain Ms. Louisa Vinton, UN Resident Coordinator Mr. Terence Pike, UNHCR Representative		Government Building (VPM's office), Trg sv. Marka 2	<u>Evaluation Team:</u> Mr. Roger Maconick Ms. Ivana Novoselec Mr. Hans Risser, MDG-F Programme Manager	
TBC	Final Briefing with UN Resident Coordinator and MDG-F Programme Manager Ms. Louisa Vinton, UN Resident Coordinator Mr. Hans Risser, MDG-F Programme Manager		TBC	<u>Evaluation Team:</u> Mr. Roger Maconick Ms. Ivana Novoselec	

Outcome 1: National policy coordination on conflict prevention, reconciliation and recovery strengthened

The primary intention of this outcome was to support national institutions to enhance coordination of national policies related to the recovery of the war affected areas of special state concern (ASSCs). This would primarily be achieved by providing support to the Deputy Prime Minister's office to organize quarterly coordination meetings among government institutions providing support and social-services to the ASSCs. Rule of Law activities (UNHCR support to free legal aid and UNDP's witness victim support) were included in this outcome since they primarily dealt with national judicial institutions and legislation. The implementation of these outputs was meant to provide an improved environment for sustainable local development, access to justice and integration of conflict prevention into regional development policies for the ASSCs. The result was partially achieved with the organization of the first coordination meeting by the office of the Deputy Prime Minister. However, the programme suffered a setback when the Deputy Prime Minister lost his mandate for 'regional development', which was passed to another deputy prime minister in the cabinet reshuffle in Summer 2009. Despite the best efforts of the Programme to engage the ministry and new deputy prime minister responsible for regional development, there was no willingness from these government institutions to organize additional coordination meetings for assistance to the ASSCs. Had further coordination meetings taken place, it was the intention of the MDGF programme to better integrate the activities of the UN into the government's own activities to achieve more sustainability.

Despite this setback, the programme continued to provide support to the Deputy Prime Minister's office under his expanded mandate for human rights and returnees, particularly on legal issues. The WVS output also improved access to justice by providing better services at courts in Osijek, Vukovar, Zadar and Zagreb. Likewise, UNHCR's work on free legal aid led to engagement of the Ministry of Justice to reform the free legal aid law in order to enable more individuals to qualify for free legal aid assistance. These recommendations are now being considered by the Ministry and Parliament in order to revise the law. In conclusion, the goal of this outcome was partially achieved by sustainable improvements to access to justice represented by the completion of the UNHCR free legal aid output and UNDP WVS output. Support was provided to the Deputy Prime Minister's office, but when he lost the mandate for regional development, the programme was unable to achieve the enhanced coordination of assistance to the ASSCs that the outcome originally intended, which would of provided the sustainable linkages at the regional and national levels for the MDGF's activities at the local level.

Outcome 2: Enhanced community integration, safety and social cohesion

Outcome 2 was focused on local initiatives in the ASSCs designed to improve safety and social cohesion through conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. The Outputs included in this outcome included implementation of Safe Community Plans designed by Crime Prevention Councils, which are themselves sustainable mechanisms for communities to jointly discuss, analyse and agree courses of action to improve safety and security. UNICEF's violence free schools initiatives, teach youth the necessary skills to prevent conflict and violence. IOM's activities were intended to focus on those vulnerable groups most likely to be excluded in the ASSCs. UNHCR's activities focused on providing grass roots community groups with the skills to prevent conflict and overcome divisions in order to better their communities through local community building projects. Put together the implementation of these activities did lead to improved conflict prevention and social cohesion in the communities that the MDGF engaged as evidence by the results on the ground in local communities.

Outcome 3: Enhanced socio-economic recovery of areas of Special State Concern

Like Outcome 2, this outcome focused on the local level in order to provide socio-economic recovery of the ASSCs, without which there could be no sustainable livelihoods or peace. The activities of UNDP and UNHCR in this outcome aimed to provide enhanced local capacities for socio-economic recovery including improved social services to vulnerable communities in ASSCs, implementation of economic activities to increase the likelihood of sustainable employment, capacity of the local communities, county and municipal governments to absorb EU funds for the betterment of their local communities. Put together, these activities would form the basis for an improved socio-economic situation necessary for sustainable returns to the ASSCs. Unfortunately, the indicators (e.g. successful applications for EU funds, reduced unemployment and increased absorption of EU funds in the ASSCs) to measure the programme's effectiveness in this area will only be seen in the next year or two after the programme's closure when decisions on project proposals to the EU are made. Furthermore, the

economic crisis made it unlikely that employment would improve during the programme cycle, but it is hoped that the seeds were sown to enable improved employment in the ASSCs once the Croatian economy begins to grow again.

Expected Results (Outcomes & outputs)	Indicators	Baseline	Overall JP Expected target	Achievement of Target to date	COMMENTS
From Results Framework	From Results Framework	Baselines are a measure of the indicator at the start of the joint programme	The desired level of improvement to be reached at the end of the reporting period	The actual level of performance reached at the end of the reporting period	
Output 1.1 Establishment of a coordination mechanism for regional development of war affected areas and violence prevention / safety mechanisms under Vice Prime Minister UNDP	1) Coordination mechanism established and coordination meetings amongst five line ministries, UN and IFIs on regional development and peace-building held 2) Witnesses and victims supported by WVS support officers;	1) No co-ordination mechanism on regional development & conflict recovery; 2) Not fully developed policies and implementation mechanisms on violence prevention or Witness and Victim Support In 2008, 4 pilot offices were opened in 4 courts.	Coordination mechanism established; 8 coordination meetings organized Pilot Offices supporting Witness/Victims in 4 Courts: Zagreb, Zadar, Osijek and Vukovar. Estimated 4,000 Persons (1,000 per court) will benefit from WVS offices Sustainability achieved when Ministry of Justice finances operations of pilot WVS offices and amends procedures to align with WVS procedures.	1 coordination meeting organized. Assistance no longer required since govt. reshuffle in Aug.2009. Witness and Victims Support offices working in 4 county courts (Zagreb, Zadar, Osijek and Vukovar) with new offices opened in 2 additional courts (Sisak and Karlovac). WVS Info Campaign in Nov-Dec 2009 led to ca. 50% increase in number of witness/victims benefiting from WVS offices. Total WVS beneficiaries: 4209 by Jan 2010 (2269 beneficiaries in Oct 2009). Ensured sustainability through govt. financing and integration into court procedures – new civil servant positions for Staff of WVS offices.	What was real purpose/prime directive of this <u>outcome</u> ? See comments above for Outcome 1. What are tangible/observable benefits that witnesses/victims have received? – Support and information about court procedures received, level of discomfort lower, witnesses less reluctant to testify How many Witnesses/Victims are there? To date according to the statistics made by the offices on respective courts there are 5800 witnesses that have received support. How do you define W or V? Definition of a VICTIM: “A person subjected to death, suffering, ill treatment OR oppression”. Definition of a WITNESS: “A person who sees, knows OR vouches for something AND is able to give testimony to it”. (Source: Chambers 20th Century Dictionary) Both categories can be witnesses at court. How big is 4209 as % of total? Since the establishment of WVS offices, all witnesses on the courts with existing WVS office are approached by WVS office staff and so far no one has refused support. How many Civ serv positions/ level? 8/court officers

Revised MDG-F M&E Framework

					What changes to which procedures initiated /completed – Legal framework was changed at three levels: a) Strategic documents (Action plan of the Judicial Reform Strategy, National Programme for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights); b) Legislative Acts related to judicial system organisation (Courts Act, organisational bylaws); c) Criminal Procedure Act; which resulted in establishment and functioning of the new court service – WVS offices.
Output 1.2. Support to the implementation of fundamental rights for returnees UNHCR	Returnees receiving legal aid through the programme	1) Number of returnees requesting legal aid (2009) 2) Number of beneficiaries before new restrictive norms of Legal Aid Act (2009)	Please state the number of direct beneficiaries that this programme has helped (or provide percent% info)	Govt of Croatia report during Feb 2009 - 31 Dec 2010, 71% of requests for free legal aid were approved (6,248 out of 8,755 requests). UNHCR implementing partners provided some 8,000 free legal advice and other type of legal assistance. Some 20% under MDG project.	Is there some metric for seriousness of problems for which requests for free legal aid requested
	NGOs and associated attorneys at law trained on returnee rights, the Law and Free Legal Aid and provide support in the implementation of the Law on Anti-Discrimination	Baseline: No. of NGOs/people providing this service in 2009	Number of NGOs supporting the implementation of the Law on Anti-Discrimination; Number of NGOs and associated attorneys at law trained on returnee rights, the Law and Free Legal Aid;	27 NGOs registered as legal aid providers under the Law. 80 participants of the Conference on Law on Free Legal Aid.	What are baseline data? What is estimated annual demand for NGO services?
	Monitoring and evaluation and the analysis of the implementation of the Law on Free Legal Aid and its shortcomings;	Baseline: No law on Free Legal Aid) Number of coordination meetings to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the Law on Free Legal Aid;) Number of roundtables to analyze, discuss and plan to mitigate the shortcomings of the Law on Free Legal Aid;	6 coordination meetings with NGOs. 1 conference on Law on Free Legal Aid with 80 participants. The Ministry of Justice has also recognized the shortcomings of the Law and announced changes in the future implementation.	What is state of play on the Law?

Revised MDG-F M&E Framework

<p>Output 2.1. Enhanced ability of local population to plan and realize Safe Community Plans in conjuncture with Community Policing UNDP</p>	<p>Community plans development supported and implemented in cooperation with Community policing, local government, citizens and other major community stakeholders</p>	<p>Baseline: 3 safer community plans – piloted – Bjelovar, Vukovar and Cakovac (2008)</p>	<p>10 Safe-Community plans implemented.</p>	<p><u>10 Safe-Community Plans implemented (Kindergarten Gracac; Knin Elementary School; High School Gracac; Slunj; Karlovac; Vukovar; Tenja; Dvor; Sunja; Banovac)</u></p> <p>- Safe-Community Plans focused on , traffic safety, education on alcohol abuse; creating recreational opportunities and safe environments for youth, and refurbishment of community centres.</p>	<p>Is there any data on effects of safe community plan? Vukovar police reported 14 offences committed in the city centre between July – Oct 2009 (before the SCP). During same period in 2010, only 9 offences were committed (a reduction of ca. 35%) and police reported that these offences were moved to the periphery of the city centre, with no offences committed in the very city centre (source Powerpoint presentation by Vukovar CPC, Oct 2010). Other evidence is anecdotal from police in Gracac (see below). Has any social dynamic been set in motion? The Crime Prevention Council model and Safe Community Plans were piloted by UNDP prior to the MDGF. With the support of the MDGF, the CPC and SCP models were expanded to other communities in the ASSCs. With the SCP implemented in the MDGF, sustainable CPCs, involving civil society, local government and police have been created in several communities in the ASSCs. Some of the CPCs (e.g. Vukovar) have proven to be very sustainable and, after completing the MDGF sponsored SCP, initiated other activities without UN-sponsorship.</p> <p>From 2007-2010 nineteen criminal acts were reported near the Baltazar Kindergarten in Gracac because of the frequent gathering of young people at night in the park consuming alcohol, damaging public property, and disturbing the peace. Since interventions in Gračac Municipality and completion of new windows at the Gračac High School there has not been a single criminal act recorded (according to local police station report).</p> <p>Living conditions for 1,200 children from city centre of Knin were improved.</p> <p><u>Town Slunj</u>, safety has significantly increased. In fact, for years police have "fought" with much too careless drivers and everyday complaints and disapproval of their own citizens and they were aware of the possible danger of pedestrians, mostly children, as street connects the two schools, kindergartens, sports halls and shopping mall. Current traffic situation is calm, they have no incidents even recorded violations, and citizens unreservedly praised the project. <u>Elementary School and Kindergarten Karlovac</u>; positive changes for the safety of children and youth are</p>
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Revised MDG-F M&E Framework

					<p>visible in that area. Children and adolescents are still gathering, but they do not disturb public peace and order in relation to before. Before there were at least 3-4 reported vandalism on that place.</p> <p>Open playground in Vukovar; Tenja: Police crime statistics comparing data prior and after the project implementation are available. Local community has reacted to the change of once problematic area into safe haven for all community members which is also mathematically confirmed.</p> <p>Children's playground in Dvor: implemented project resulted in a gathering of children in non-threatening area without fear of rushing cars. There is no danger of running out on a very frequent road. Besides, newly purchased toys relieve the only one they previously had so there's much less fights or shoving over it.</p> <p>Water supply in Sunja: UNDP covered expenses for water connections in lower part of water pipeline and the Municipality covered the upper part. With this project implemented there is less tensions in the village. 70 households in Klinjacka and 40 in Bestрма were connected to the water pipeline.</p> <p>Recreational centre Banovac in Glina: the project is in its finishing phase and positive results are expected very soon. In general, number of vandalism has decreased since the public ligh has been set and reflectors are put on whole playground area. There hasn't been reports on violation of public peace and order in the centre of the town.</p> <p>Sports associations in Slunj, Rakovica and Cetingrad, project implementation is ongoing.</p>
<p>Output 2.2. War veterans' and women's associations enabled to actively support conflict prevention activities, rehabilitate and reintegrate communities in Areas of Special State Concern (ASSC)</p>	<p>Conflict resolution and management trainings organized for veterans associations and NGOs.</p>	<p>Baseline: 7 war veterans cooperatives and 5 veterans associations (2008/2009)</p>	<p>6 2-day workshops in war affected areas (including at least 10 veterans associations/cooperatives (at least 90 war veterans)</p>	<p>8 2-day workshop in war affected area; 7 workshops for War Veterans organized in 7 targeted counties in Skradin, Benkovac, Gospić, Slunj, Petrinja (x2), Knin and Tovarnik</p>	<p>How has behaviour/beliefs of participants changed, especially wrt conflict prevention?</p>
	<p>Trainings organized for women on conflict prevention, reconciliation and peace building through a women's NGO;</p>	<p>Baseline: Social exclusion of women (national statistics 2008)</p>	<p>1 NGO educated/ToT in capacity building of women NGOs 9 2-day workshops in war affected areas (10-15 women per session – at least 90 women participants)</p>	<p>1 women NGO targeted and training planned. -APR2010, 3 workshops with women NGOs held in Drniš (NGO Žena), Benkovac (NGO Maslina) and in Gračac (NGO Prospero); on conflict, reconciliation, gender equality and recognition of women's needs and possible future partnership of local</p>	<p>What has happened to social inclusion /exclusion of women in conflict prevention? What are changes in local institutional arrangements for the provision of services for self – employment and employment?</p>

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IOM	Situation analysis of war veterans and women in war affected areas.	Baseline: 2006 labour market analysis on war affected areas.	4 studies – 1) Mapping and capacity assessments of CSOs for war veterans and women 2) Labour market analysis 3) Field Mapping of war veteran associations.4) Involvement of women in social and political life in war affected areas.	institutional arrangements for the provision of services for self – employment and employment 4 studies finished – 1) Mapping and capacity assessments of CSOs for war veterans and women 2) Labour market analysis and 3) Field Mapping of war veteran associations.4) Involvement of women in social and political life in war affected areas.	Do Capacity Assessments exist in English? If not can very short simple summaries be made? In brief what do Labor Mkt analysis/ Field Mapping WVAs/Involvement of women conclude?
Output 2.3 Protection of children & youth from peer violence & bullying in schools UNICEF	Schools and communities educated for prevention of peer violence.	Baseline: 12 schools (2008)	25 schools	25 schools and communities engaged (12,142 schoolchildren, 1,084 teachers and school counsellors)	What measure/ observations do Croatian authorities use to measure peer violence/bullying? Croatian authorities use the National Protocol on Procedures in Cases of Violence against and among Children and Youth. Procol was adopted by the Governemnt in 2004, and in the 2006 – 2010 period there was triple increase in referring the cases of peer violence.
	Violence prevention and conflict resolution content in school standards introduced in ASSC and nation-wide.	Baseline: Criteria of quality and sustainability adopted in 2007.	20 schools adopt standards in ASSC; 150 school adopt standards nation-wide.	14 schools adopted standards in ASSC and 157 schools adopted standards nation-wide.	What use has been made of the 2007 criteria of quality and sustainability, by whom & to what effect? All schools nation-wide should comply with the Criteria of Quality and Sustainability in order to receive certificate “Violence-free School”. Above mentioned Criteria is the key measure in the re-assessment after 3 years.
	ASSC schools involved in the National Network of Violence-free Schools; Number of meetings/exchanges for National Network of Violence-free School.	Baseline: Network established in 2007 with 89 schools, 11 from ASSC.	Extend network to include at least 50% of targeted 25 schools from ASSC and organise 2 national and 6 regional meetings.	14 schools included in National Network of Violence-free Schools; 2 national and 6 regional meeting organized.	So What?? Schools – members of the Network that are warded with VFS certificate or re-assessed as the VFS school reach noticeable positive change in school environment, level of teacher’s competence toward bullying, recognition of all forms of discrimination and violence, level of peer violence, etc. Through national and regional meetings, school exchange examples of good practice and lessons learnt.
	Decrease of exposure of children to school violence (data from 11 target schools)	Baseline: Survey data (2008) – <i>Determining level of peer violence in schools</i>	Target: Improved data/statistics in repeat Survey in school year 2011/2012	Data to be collected in 2011/2012 school year.	Plans? Finances? Activities on peer violence prevention, UNICEF started in 2003. Since then, motivated schools were included in the programme. Within MDGF special attention was given to ASSC. UNICEF CO will continue to support these activities from

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					other UNICEF resources in next CPD 2012-2016.
Output 2.4. Development of conflict resolution skills amongst grassroots groups, women and municipal/ county authorities UNHCR	Local stakeholders and communities equipped with conflict prevention skills	Baseline: Divided communities in former war affected areas lack conflict prevention and project development skills.	2 peace-building forums and trainings on conflict prevention; at least 20 community leaders participate in 3 leadership trainings.	Two 4-days peace-building forums co-funded by EU/IPA total 97 participants and 3 leadership trainings for participants from 20 project communities.	What is evidence for changes in conflict prevention and project development skills?
	Support in development and implementation of joint small-scale projects formulated by local stakeholders	Baseline: insufficient engagement of local communities in conflict areas to prepare development projects to unify and benefit entire community.	20 joint small-scale development projects proposals implemented in 20 communities with financial programme support	20 community projects supported in Biskupija, Karin, Kasic, Ervenik, Udbina, Gospic, Lipik, Donji Lapac, Kistanje, Barilovic, Plaski, Sunja, Vukovar x2, Gracac, Hrvatska Dubica, Dvor, Glina, and Vojnic. Two technical support trainings for 20 selected local projects representatives organised.	What is evidence of effects of community projects?
Output 3.1 Capacity Development of local authorities, communities and regional development agencies to plan, prioritize and deliver projects for their communities UNDP	Trainings organized for local authorities, communities and regional development agencies for better EU funds application, project planning/design and implementation	Baseline: Training Needs Assessment findings (2008). Weak knowledge of project management, resource mobilization and knowledge of EU funding opportunities.	8 certified trainings organized for local authorities, communities and regional development agencies in project development management implementation and fundraising for EU funds	5 Certified trainings organized on topics of Project Cycle Management, Managing Successful Programmes, LEADER Approach to Rural Development, Prince 2 Foundation, and Prince 2 Practitioner level.	<p>What is measure of changes in capacity of local authorities, communities and regional development agencies to plan, prioritize and deliver projects for their communities and knowledge of EU funding opportunities?</p> <p>In total 81 people (46 men and 35 women) directly benefitted from the trainings. This included representatives from 23 national institutions and 39 local institutions from the ASSCs. Participants at the trainings completed evaluations at the end of the courses and 30 participants completed an online Survey at the end of 2010 covering the series of MDGF trainings. Overall participants expressed satisfaction with the courses (see summary of trainings and surveys sent separately).</p> <p>Assisted in linking UNDP training dept. with Zadar County in joint implementation of Prince 2 training for 8 employees.</p> <p>LEADER participatory planning sessions that lead into establishment of 2 LOCAL ACTION GROUPS – 145 stakeholders from public, private and civil sectors have joined LAG establishment processes in Zadar and Šibenik-Knin Counties. Initiatives have included the drafting of a statute, 2 local development strategies including one year operational program and partnership projects.</p>

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Output 3.2 Immediate support and provision of services to refugees, returnees and vulnerable populations in remote areas prior to their inclusion in national social protection schemes UNHCR	Number of trainings organized for local/regional authorities on outsourcing social and communal services;	Poor ability of regional and local authorities to provide social and community services, esp. to vulnerable groups (returnees, veterans, elderly, children, people with disabilities);	4 county social plans established to provide improved social and community services in areas of return.	Jointly with the line ministry, County Social Planning process organised in 4 counties with high rate of returns and poor social infrastructure. County plans delivered for period 2011-2014	How has provision of social and community services, esp. to vulnerable groups changed? How has ability of regional and local authorities to provide such services changed?
	Trainings, workshops and coaching provided for CRC teams and their volunteers' programs in the areas of return	Poor ability of regional and local authorities to provide social and community services, esp. to vulnerable groups (returnees, veterans, elderly, children, people with disabilities)	On-the-job trainings, workshops and coaching provided for CRC teams and their volunteers' programs, coordination meetings (topics, no. of trainees, locations)	<i>Volunteer Grassroots Network:</i> Red Cross volunteers in the villages provide information on the needs of the vulnerable persons and support them accordingly, directly or through mobile teams. Their work gives contribution to better reintegration of returnees into receiving communities. On the job training provided by Mobile teams members with minimal budget.	How has better data provided by RC Volunteers changed provision of services ?
	Returnees and other vulnerable population in remote areas receive immediate arrival assistance	Baseline: local statistics in areas of programme focus (2009)	Target: ca12,000 beneficiaries (returnees and other vulnerable populations) in 14 remote areas of Croatia receiving immediate assistance from CRC mobile teams.	Some 12,000 beneficiaries received assistance through CRC mobile teams (19 members) programme in 14 locations in Croatia – Karlovac, Sisak Novska, Slunj, Gvozd, Glina Donji Lapac, Benkovac, Gracac, Knin Korenica, Otocac,Darda, Slatina.	? Impact of this assistance?
Output 3.3 Job creation and business development benefiting returnees, women, youth, elderly, war veterans UNDP	1) Increased number of business support services and improved business infrastructure in target area	1) Poor business support services, infrastructure and information on incentives for war affected areas in Croatia Baseline: No LAGs exist and LEADER concept not introduced in Croatia (2008)	Increased number of business support services and improved business infrastructure in target area	50 Cooperatives, associations and family farms improved business processes and access to market through implementation of following activities: Assessment of training needs of family farms; 3 certified vocational trainings organized for dairy and cheese makers in Zadar county, Cattle breeders in Sisak-Maslovina County and Sheep breeders in Lika-Senj County; 8 training workshops on Leader approach to Rural Development, establishment of local action groups; management of	Of the 50 Cooperatives, associations and family farms with improved business processes and access to market, turnover/profit increased? Since publication and distribution of the “Guide for investors in business zones in Lika-Senj” 14 investors have been made Expressions of Interest; and preparation of full technical documentation and application for IPA III C (passed 1 st evaluation phase). Increased capacity for 14 managers of business zones in Lika-Senj County. A total of 37,000.00 HRK to date has been allocated to family farms through the joint-fund grants scheme partnership with the Lika-Senj County.

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				<p>entrepreneurial zones and EU funding opportunities. 4 publications produced on orchard and agricultural zones, guide for investors and business zones.</p> <p>Establishment of radio program in Vrhovine, a returnee area, to distribute information on trainings and job opportunities; technical documentation prepared for business zone in Udbina.</p> <p>Joint fund established for technical documentation for agricultural processing facilities in Lika-Senj County.</p>	<p>47 vocational trainings recipients; 621 participants of info workshops on EU accession measures and capacity building for fruit producers.</p> <p>25 participants have attended introductory workshops on LEADER Approach that led into partnership between two Counties on establishment of two Local Action Groups (LAG), and each one includes about 25,000 inhabitants.</p> <p>Radio program Vrhovine counts over 5,000 listeners mainly in bordering countries. It firstly informs about returnee programs and possibilities as well as realistic picture on living conditions in the area of return.</p> <p>Increased capacity for 27 cattle breeders in Sisak-Moslavina County and their families / family husbandries. They became certified cattle breeders. It is important to stress that when EU accession takes place, professional cattle-breeding will only be able to sell their product if possessing needed qualification - certification. With this education, preconditions to continue to cattle-breed after EU accession are fulfilled.</p> <p>This education took place on two locations, both financed through UNDP donations. As for the trainer, he was UNDP beneficiary who has family husbandry. He also participated in IPARD seminar as beneficiary and he is now spreading gained knowledge in other educations he holds. He continued with education in other parts of Croatia, where needed, like Benkovac, Kistanje, Gračac, Sunja., Topusko, Gvozd.</p> <p>IPARD Conference in Novska - how to use Pre-accession Agriculture and Rural Development Funds - was organized in Sisak Moslavina county or 54 participants. IPARD measures and instruments were presented in detail, including examples of best practice so far.</p> <p>IPARD training about measures 101 and 103 in Petrinja - Education for 19 consultants and county departments on IPARD programme from Sisak-Moslavina, Karlovac, Bjelovar-Bilogora and Vukovar-Sirmium counties. IPARD measures 101 and 103 were presented in detail, including examples of best practice so far. As at 13 October 2009 and 25 and 26 may 2010 UNDP and</p>
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					<p>Croatian Employees association - Centre for European Pre-accession Processes (HUP-CEPP) organized and implemented IPARD seminar in Novska and Petrinja (Sisak-Moslavina County). UNDP contribution was amounted on HRK 25 thousand. UNDP contribution was charged to MDGF project during 2009 and 2010. Based on information gathered from beneficiaries which were present at the Seminar we can conclude that this seminar had significant impact on the business development, access to the market and/or increase of profit of certain companies, family husbandry, municipalities, development agencies or interested individuals.</p> <p>In a last 18 months, most of the beneficiaries applied for the IPARD program, mostly requiring financial resources for buildings or expansion of agricultural production. For example company Fruktus d.o.o. which grow apples and vineyard, applied for IPARD program requiring the resources for the acquisition of forklift truck and palettes since they have plan to increase the production in accordance with European standards. At this moment they sell their product mostly to the big shopping centers, but in a future they plan to export their product on the Russian market.</p> <p>However, there was also a lot of beneficiaries who used the knowledge gathered on the Seminars in order to offer their consulting services in the form of education course for small family husbandry and farmers. For example Family Husbandry Džakula developed the educational program which is accepted by Croatian and European standards and all beneficiaries of their program will obtain certification which will be entered into the Work book. In this way, those beneficiaries will be able to place their product on a wider market.</p> <p>A development agencies and consulting companies used the knowledge gathered on the Seminars in order to offer a service of preparation of tender documentation for applicants who wants to apply for IPARD program according to the IPARD methodology. For example Development agency „Petra“ from Petrinja is waiting for some legal issues to be solved for Business zone and they will then apply for IPA. The consulting company Impuls d.o.o. also started to offer their services of preparation of tender documentation and their revenue was increased for 30% during 2011 comparing with prior periods</p>
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	Cooperatives / associations increase and improve business processes and access to market		At least 40 Cooperatives / associations and small family farms improve business process and access to market		<p>A total of 3 cheese-makers in Lika-senj County have registered mini cheese producing facilities on their family farms and are actively promoting and selling their goods in the marketplace.</p> <p>Figures relating to income and profits are currently unavailable from any of the County institutions</p>
	Job creation through development of business infrastructure benefiting returnees, women, youth, elderly, war veterans	Baseline: Lack of adequate infrastructure in selected communities.	No. of business infrastructure projects, locations, type of projects, beneficiaries, potentially jobs created – potential impact Direct/indirect beneficiaries (families x 3-4)	6 micro-projects implemented to improve business infrastructure. Hygiene training and equipping of 11 milk cooling tanks for 70 dairy farmers in Dvor. Equipped school and agro-cooperative in Mecencani for agricultural production benefiting 142 pupils and 27 staff members. Supported women association in Dvor (Enabled heating and repairs of toilet facilities) to expand training facilities, in Hrvatska Dubica prepared project documentation for restoration of traditional house for visitors center, repaired Vojnic Cultural Centre and in Topusko procured IT equipment and organized 1 IT courses for unemployed women. Total beneficiaries 650 women, 342 children and youth, 220 elderly population, local population and 2100 visitors.	<p>How much has employment increased? 3 people have been employed through public utilities/works involving clearing of overgrown gravel roads and paths in order to improve access to Lišane Ostrovičke, Ostrovica and Dobropoljci settlements, benefiting 764 residents of Lišane Ostrovičke Municipality</p> <p>Association IKS - Employed 4 people, 5 part-time employees and 15 volunteers in Petrinja Multimedia Civil Centre. It engaged 10 members of HVIDRa for interior renovation of their premises – additional income. Also 2 blocks of Computer trainings in Petrinja for 24 War Veterans are ongoing. Trainers are 2 members if association IKS, they are certified so at least 12 participants will have qualification “computer operator”.</p> <p>Dairy farmers in Dvor – increased quality of produced fresh milk and ensure better purchase of milk for 60 family farms in Dvor municipality, milk was before 3rd class now is 1st and 2nd class. Purchase of milk from farmers-milk producers is organized by the Municipality, average collection is 27.000 Liters / per month (from 23.000 to 32.000). Without this organized milk collection these 60 family husbandries would not be able to sell milk to diary Križevačka mljekara d.o.o. No diary wanted to collect milk from these remote farmers.</p> <p>Agro-cooperative in Mecencani – Zrikavci. Project implementation resulted with increased number of students involved in various activities in the cooperative. At the moment 80 of them are active in several different sections. They are using vegetable from their garden for school meal promoting healthy diet (20 pupils). The students are also preparing “herbal spiral” for “Earth day” (20 pupils). The cooperative promotes and sells its products throughout the year for various events (Christmas and Easter celebration, chestnut season, different fairs, UN Day, “open door” for citizens when everybody can buy their products). They sell herbal plants to Suban company – producer of tea from</p>

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					<p>Samobor. They also sell honey (15 pupils) on different events (above mentioned).</p> <p>Implementation of project for <u>Women association in Dvor</u> encouraged self-employment and women working to preserve the tradition. During project implementation, 6 women have been trained to work on the loom and 6 children also watched and learned to weave. The project resulted with employment of 4 women (through public/utility works/services (measure of Croatian Employment Institution), which are now making clothes for the Red Cross aimed for the poorest inhabitants. At least 30 women got interested later (after education) and are interested to start and continue to weave in their households. Results - additional income and women of all 3 ethnical groups gather and work together in premises of the Association.</p> <p><u>Vojnic Cultural Centre</u> - Derived ensured safer environment and space to conduct activities. Various activities, assemblies, educations, trainings and folklore trainings were held since the end of January 2011. Enumerators of the population (18 enumerators +2 controllers + instructor) held three-day training. Inhabitants of Bosniac entity founded Cultural association in the southern part of the municipality, so now all three entities have their own cultural association (folklore), and they all cooperate, participate in programs regardless of who is the organizer. Municipality plans for the "Municipal Day" to organize multicultural program which will present all three cultures. For this year is planned series of activities in Cultural Centre i.e education, gathering, socializing for all population, especially children and young people.</p> <p><u>Association Izvor Topusko</u> procured IT equipment and organized IT courses for 14 unemployed women. So far there are 4 new women employed and much more are interested for employment. Many different people aside from unemployed women had shown their interest in IT courses, like professional cook and waitress in wellness resort Top Terme.</p> <p><u>Women's association DUŽ</u> – from Hrvatska Dubica – on going project. Women produce souvenirs and sell on events (as AC Zrinskavci) – additional income and women of all 3 ethnical groups gather and work together in premises of DUŽ.</p> <p><u>Community center in village Sas near Sunja</u> in implementation.</p>
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<p>Output 3.4. Community - identified sub-projects implemented to enhance the connectivity of divided communities and associated business development UNDP</p>	<p>Prepared documentation for community infrastructure project proposals (conflict prevention community projects)</p>	<p>Insufficient engagement of local communities (esp. conflict affected) in preparing development projects and mobilization of additional funds (EC, WB, Government)</p>	<p>20 sets of technical documentation produced for water supply system and community infrastructure</p>	<p>Completed total of 12 sets of technical documentation and other preparatory documentation for infrastructure project proposals in war affected areas. Including: 1 set of Technical documentation for construction of Benkovac Cultural Center; 7 sets of technical project documentation produced for water supply system (Plaski, Slunj, Vojnic, Petrinja, Topusko-Gvozd, Glina, Dvor). 3 Feasibility studies conducted for new business zone in Petrinja, <u>Donji Kukuruzari</u> cross border business zone and <u>Krnjak</u> road project. Designed plans of architectural, landscaping, parking space, water and sanitation installation on multi-purpose object "Eko Ethno Adica Center" in Vukovar for entrepreneurs and handicrafts.</p>	<p>State of advancement of infrastructure projects? State of Financing? Co-financing of water management systems - 211.687,40 USD. Half of the total value is from the local contributions.</p> <p>Feasibility studies conducted for new business zone in Petrinja – the Town will apply for EU pre-accession funds IPA. Other also 2 resulted in creating necessary precondition for preparing all project documentation and creation of business zone in these areas where is evidence of lack of job opportunities. In this way we ensured one of the steps needed to create job places in post conflict area of Banovina.</p> <p>"Eco Ethno Adica Center" in Vukovar – UNDP gave technical support for 720.000,00 € in project writing for business and touristic infrastructure for IPA IIIC. Vukovar also agreed on cross-border project with Municipality Bač for touristic development. Total value of the projects is 400.00,00 € and is aimed for equipping accommodation Unit and shop with old crafts. UNDP is continuing to assist Vukovar Town in implementation process of the projects.</p>
	<p>2) Number of small primary community infrastructure and other sub-project interventions for conflict affected communities supported</p>	<p>12 new infrastructure and other sub-project interventions implemented. LEADER, and LAGs – how many LAGs (4 established 3 more in process), how many people (30,000 people each LAG)</p> <p>Co-financing secured from local governments (500,000 contributions to date)</p>	<p>Completed 11 new infrastructure sub-projects in conflict affected communities. Including: Refurbishment of "Outward Bound Leadership training Centre" in Perusic; Construction of education center for traffic safety and bus stop shelter at Elementary School in Gracac; Procured and installed 16 bus station shelters for settlements around Drniš, Lički Osik and municipalities of Barilovic and Cetingrad; New windows in the gym of high school Gračac; Equipment purchased for Croatian Mountain Rescue Service in Zadar; Setup of children's playground in Lišane Ostrovičke; Replanted orchards in former landmined agricultural land in Nova Drencina (Petrinja); Solved ownership issues of 10 abandoned schools, and prepared documentation for renovation of 3 such schools in Karlovac</p>	<p>Effects of completed projects?? Transformation of former Army building into a Community and Cultural Centre in Benkovac. In the framework of the project, full technical documentation has been prepared and project listed for structural EU funds, which Zadar County included into their Regional Development Strategy and submitted to the Ministry of Regional Development.</p> <p>"Outward Bound" – provided skills development through an extra-curricular program based in the outdoors. The program was available to select high school students from Lika-Senj, Zadar and Šibenik-Knin County. The project helped participants to strengthen their role as active stakeholders in the development of their communities, providing a platform for young people to meet and work with representatives of County Departments of Education. Outward Bound has reached the agreement with Lika-Senj County on using old school premises free of charge for the next thirty years for their program. Furthermore, this program, once located in Gospić, will have special focus on working with children from Areas of Special State Concern.</p> <p>"Arrangement of Polygon for Educational Programme on Traffic Security" – children gained theoretical education</p>	

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				County.	<p>on traffic safety through practical exercises and simulations.</p> <p>Purchase of bus shelters for settlements in the area of City of Drniš, Lički Osik, Barilovic and Cetingrad 75 children and 80 passengers per day (average) – decreased dangers of intense traffic for inhabitants who commute daily by bus, as well as providing protection from bad weather conditions, especially the long winter periods.</p> <p>“Replacement of Windows in the Gym of High School Gračac” – decreased at-risk behavior of young people in the municipal park and school area, prevented injuries amongst youth and stopped vandalism. The site has been restored preventing any further destruction and deterioration of school property.</p> <p>“Purchase of Equipment for Croatian Mountain Rescue Service – Base Zadar” – raised overall level of safety for residents and hikers throughout the Zadar based hills, mountains and countryside.</p> <p>“Setup of Children’s Playground in Lišane Ostrovičke and Settlement Ostrovica” - enabled overall improvement of community safety and the quality leisure time for children and their families from a number of settlements throughout the municipality of Lišane Ostrovičke and bordering areas of the City of Benkovac, as well as secured new activities and space for children and young people in the area.</p> <p><u>Replanted orchards in former land mined agricultural land in Nova Drencina (Petrinja) -</u> Delivery of 1825 seedlings (hazel and walnut) to 5 beneficiaries and plan of planting with instructions on how to grow and nurture plants.</p>
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