Programme Title: Harnessing Sustainable Linkages for SMEs in Turkey’s Textile Sector
Prologue

This final evaluation report has been coordinated by the MDG Achievement Fund joint programme in an effort to assess results at the completion point of the programme. As stipulated in the monitoring and evaluation strategy of the Fund, all 130 programmes, in 8 thematic windows, are required to commission and finance an independent final evaluation, in addition to the programme’s mid-term evaluation.

Each final evaluation has been commissioned by the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office (RCO) in the respective programme country. The MDG-F Secretariat has provided guidance and quality assurance to the country team in the evaluation process, including through the review of the TORs and the evaluation reports. All final evaluations are expected to be conducted in line with the OECD Development Assistant Committee (DAC) Evaluation Network “Quality Standards for Development Evaluation”, and the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) “Standards for Evaluation in the UN System”.

Final evaluations are summative in nature and seek to measure to what extent the joint programme has fully implemented its activities, delivered outputs and attained outcomes. They also generate substantive evidence-based knowledge on each of the MDG-F thematic windows by identifying best practices and lessons learned to be carried forward to other development interventions and policy-making at local, national, and global levels.

We thank the UN Resident Coordinator and their respective coordination office, as well as the joint programme team for their efforts in undertaking this final evaluation.

MDG-F Secretariat

The analysis and recommendations of this evaluation are those of the evaluator and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Joint Programme or MDG-F Secretariat.
Final Evaluation
Final Report

Joint Programme Title:
Harnessing Sustainable Linkages for SMEs in Turkey’s Textile Sector (MDG-F – 2067)

Ümit EVREN, Independent Consultant | December 2012
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<td>Administrative Agent</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRO/BSO</td>
<td>Business Representative Organizations / Business Support Organizations</td>
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<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
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<td>DFR</td>
<td>Draft Final Report</td>
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<td>FR</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GoT</td>
<td>Government of Turkey</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>Inception Report</td>
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<td>IRAC</td>
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<td>Istanbul Textile and Apparel Exporters' Association</td>
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<td>JPM</td>
<td>Joint Programme Manager</td>
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<td>Joint Programme</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>Millennium Development Goal Achievement Fund</td>
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<td>Mid-Term Evaluation</td>
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<td>National Steering Committee</td>
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<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NRA</td>
<td>Non Resident Agency</td>
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<td>OJ</td>
<td>Official Journal</td>
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<td>Program Management Committee</td>
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<td>PSD</td>
<td>Private Sector and Development</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Resident Coordinator</td>
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<td>REAP</td>
<td>Responsible Entrepreneurs Achievement Programme</td>
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<td>RCO</td>
<td>Resident Coordinator Office</td>
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<td>SCC</td>
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<td>Steering Committee</td>
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<td>Sustainable Development</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>Small and Medium Sized Enterprise</td>
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<td>Technical Advisory Committee</td>
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<td>Textile and Clothing, also referred to as T/A: Textile and Apparel</td>
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<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>Prime Ministry Under Secretariat of Foreign Trade</td>
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<td>UN Country Team</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Cooperation Strategy</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>United Nations Evaluation Group</td>
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<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNWOMEN</td>
<td>United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women</td>
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<td>VCMP</td>
<td>Value Chain Management Platform</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the recent years, increasing environmental and social concerns have started to change the nature of competition in almost all industries. The global textile and clothing (T&C) industry is no exception. Once competing only on cost, the textile and clothing manufacturers increasingly feel the need for competing more "responsibly" and "sustainably". The conventional wisdom misleadingly points to the trade-offs between being competitive and socially and environmentally sustainable; whereas “MDG-F 2067: Harnessing Sustainable Linkages for SMEs in Turkey's Textile Sector” (hereinafter “the JP”) claims otherwise.

The JP, financed by the MDG Achievement Fund (MDG-F), brought together three UN Agencies (UNDP, UNIDO and ILO), and the “General Secretariat of the Istanbul Textile and Apparel Exporters' Associations” (ITKIB) in ambitious effort, which most possibly will have a transformational impact on how Turkey's textile and clothing industry will compete in the future. The JP falls under the MDG-F thematic window on “Development and the Private Sector”, and was implemented between January 2010 and December 2012, with a total budget of USD 2.7 million, which has been almost fully disbursed at the time of final evaluation.

The main objective of the JP is to increase competitiveness of Turkey's textile and clothing industry by (a) increasing productive and innovative capacities of the T&C SMEs, through enhanced collaboration and networking, and (b) integration of sustainable development, CSR principles and gender equality into the business processes and practices of the T&C SMEs, articulated in the form of two outcomes, each supported by four outputs.

At the national policy level, the JP aimed to develop a “CSR Strategy for the Turkey's T&C Industry” which included recommendations on sustainability of the T&C supply chain from (a) social and economic equality (MDG1), (b) environmental (MDG7) and (c) social (MDG3) perspectives. Also at the national level, the JP aimed at deployment of an online value chain management portal, enhancing collaboration and networking among the T&C businesses (both SMEs and large-scale companies). The meso-level objectives of the JP were geared more towards creating and/or developing institutional capacities for sustained impact of the JP. At the micro-level the JP addressed the specific needs of businesses, through training and counseling services as well as facilitating clustering for enhanced collaboration at the regional level.

The JP was implemented in Malatya, Kahramanmaraş, Gaziantep and Adıyaman (collectively referred to as “the pilot provinces”) and in Istanbul – the HQ of Turkey's T&C industry, in collaboration with national and local stakeholders, including government institutions at national and local levels, business representative organizations (BROs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector.

The final evaluation was initiated, in line with the instructions contained in the Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy and the Implementation Guide for Joint Programmes under the MDG-F. The Final Evaluation’s main objective is to measure to what extent the JP has fully implemented its activities, delivered outputs, attained outcomes, specifically focusing on development results and potential
impacts. The evaluation generated substantive evidence-based knowledge by identifying lessons learned that could be useful to other development interventions for scalability and replicability. The findings, presented in this report, are supported by the evidence gathered from (a) internal documents (e.g. the JP document, mid-term evaluation reports, technical reports, minutes of meetings, monitoring reports etc.) and external documents (e.g. national development plan, national textile strategy, UNDCS etc.); and (b) interviews with representatives of the implementing parties (i.e. ITKIB and UN agencies), and representatives of the national, regional and local stakeholders (i.e. governmental organizations, BROs, NGOs, companies etc.).

Relevance and Consistency of the Design of the JP

**Conclusion 1.** The design and strategy of the JP were both highly relevant to the MDGs (particularly to MDG1, MDG3 and MDG7), the national priorities, the UNDCS, and the needs of the industry and the target region, and the JP contributed significantly to the progress towards overcoming the needs and problems, identified in the design phase:

Both outcomes of the JP are clearly linked to the policy-level objectives, as indicated in the Ninth National Development Plan, and to the sectoral priorities and strategies, as presented in the National Textile Strategy. Furthermore relevance to the UNDCS, more specifically to the seventh outcome therein, is very high.

The macro-level problems and needs, identified in the design phase, are rather challenging in the sense that they can neither be fully solved in 2.5 years nor with the contribution of a single JP. However there are strong evidences (e.g. the VCMP, CSR Strategy, improved capacities, awareness and ownership) which provide very promising indications as to the JP's significant contribution to the progress towards overcoming such needs and problems. Most notably, the JP created, almost in all cases from scratch, the tools (e.g. the value chain management portal, CSR compliance tool etc.), the mechanisms (e.g. CSR strategy, Sustainable Competitiveness Center) and the capacities (e.g. through training of trainers, cluster development agents etc.) in the absence of which such problems cannot be addressed, and which did not exist before the JP.

**Conclusion 2.** The joint programming approach was highly efficient, with implementing partners' value added being highly visible, and thus making such approach indisputably the best option available for the second outcome of the JP. A similarly positive conclusion cannot be developed for the first outcome of the JP.

From a joint programming perspective; JP's second outcome; which aimed at integration of sustainable development, CSR principles and gender equality into the business processes and practices, can be named a good practice -if not a best practice. The design of the second outcome provided ample room for the three partaking UN agencies to leverage on their individual as well as each other's specialized knowledge and know-how, complemented with ITKIB's sectoral experience and knowledge. The spirit of the joint programming approach, adopted during the design phase, was skillfully executed by giving the overall coordination and leadership role to ITKIB, which is ideally and uniquely positioned to secure national ownership as well, and by tasking the UN agencies to focus on the individual pillars of CSR where they have the highest level of knowledge, experience and know-
how. The resultant CSR Strategy Report, thus, is very balanced and gives a holistic picture, which would probably might have not been the case, had this had been a single-agency effort.

The first outcome of the JP was not as efficient as the second outcome in terms of joint programming and execution. ILO did not have specific responsibility in Outcome 1. The three of the four outputs of Outcome 1 were designed to be implemented by UNDP, and a fourth one (Output 1.2) by UNIDO. Although the Inception Report made a genuine effort to benefit from the joint programming approach, due to unforeseen difficulties and resource constraints, experienced during development of the value chain management portal, possible synergies could not be exploited.

**Conclusion 3.** The extent of the usefulness and reliability of the JP's M&E and C&A strategies has been negatively affected from the rather overdue deployment of such strategies by the JP Management. The positive impact of deployment of M&E and C&A strategies immediately after and at the recommendation of the mid-term evaluation is an indication of missed opportunities.

The JP had significant difficulties in mobilizing a JP Manager. The JP Manager was mobilized in June 2010, some 6 months later than the official starting date of the JP. The inception phase took longer than anticipated, with the inception report being endorsed in April 2011. Although some of the JP activities had already been started by then, some had to be postponed, leaving a limited time for execution. Concerned for timely completion of the JP activities, JP management focused on activities, which left the monitoring reports, sent to the MDG-F secretariat the only tool for the overall M&E of the JP. This rather unfortunate string of events and their negative impact on the JP were addressed immediately after the mid-term evaluation with mobilization of an M&E specialist who produced M&E reports.

**Efficiency and Ownership**

**Conclusion 4.** The JP efficiently turned resources and inputs into results, mainly as a result of the appropriateness of the management model, and the effectiveness of the governance structure.

The extent, to which the JP turned resources and inputs into results, was high. The management model used in implementation was efficient, and has successfully brought all the key actors together at different decision-making levels.

Although the JP was rather efficient overall, the fact that ITKIB and UN agencies are located in different provinces caused some challenges in the coordination, management and implementation process. The fact that the JP had only one regional/local agent to coordinate the JP activities in 4 target provinces further exacerbated the coordination problems. This finding can also be interpreted as an administrative and managerial problem that the JP faced.

The disbursement figures, provided by the UN Agencies, indicate a high level of disbursement without any large discrepancy between the Agencies. However, the JP faced some financial obstacles, as a result of the delays experienced in resource-intensive outputs, budget of which is assigned to a single UN Agency. More specifically, the lower pace of disbursement of funds, dedicated to Output 1.1, Output 1.3 and Output 1.4, prevented the JP from reaching the threshold to request the next tranche of
funding from the MDG-F Secretariat. Since the pace of financial disbursement among the UN Agencies was not the same at all times, some UN agencies experienced problems in the flow of funds.

**Conclusion 5.** The joint programming approach increased JP’s efficiency in turning resources and inputs into results to a very satisfactory level as far as Outcome 2 is concerned; allowing to reach the conclusion that JP intervention (group of agencies) was more efficient in comparison to what could have been through a single agency’s intervention. However such approach did not make a similar level of contribution to the efficiency of Outcome 1; thus preventing any meaningful comparison of efficiency between a joint as opposed to a single-agency intervention.

Overall, the JP efficiently piloted the “One UN” approach. It is safe to conclude that JP intervention (group of agencies) was more efficient in comparison to what could have been through a single agency’s intervention as far as the second outcome of the JP is concerned. For that particular outcome, both each Agency’s specific value added to the intervention and the synergetic effect of collaboration were quite evident. In the absence of one UN agency or the others, it would have required much more resources and time to produce the same outputs under Outcome 2 at the same level of quality.

However there is hardly any evidence that would suggest that joint programming led to increased efficiency in producing the outputs and results under Outcome 1. Accordingly, as far as the first outcome of the JP is concerned it is also not possible to conclude that joint implementation has been more efficient than what would have been the case in a single agency implementation.

**Conclusion 6.** There are strong evidences that suggest a highly effective leadership being exercised by the national partners. The evidences of leadership by the regional/local partners are mixed and thus inconclusive.

In terms of ownership, the final evaluation concentrated the extent, to which leadership by the country’s national/local partners was effective in the JP, and developed a favorable opinion, based on several evidences. ITKIB’s commitment to sustain and expand the value chain management portal, as evidenced by the additional funding raised for the VCMP is one such evidence. Active involvement of and the leadership that the Ministry of Labor and Social Security demonstrated in promotion of social conduct tools is yet another such evidence, with further evidences that can be found in the body of the present report.

The evidences of regional/local leadership and ownership are rather mixed. The establishment of the Sustainable Competitiveness Center and its membership structure is a positive indication. However at the time of the final evaluation, there was no evidence of ownership of regional development agencies of the results of the JP. Although RDAs were ideally positioned to own the results of the JP, only one RDA participated to the PMC meetings.

**Effectiveness and Sustainability**

**Conclusion 7.** All of the objectives of the JP have been reached, indicating a high level of effectiveness. However, a higher level of effectiveness could have been possible, had the synergies between the outputs and outcomes have been fully exploited.
All activities of the JP have been completed and corresponding outputs have been produced, almost in all cases exceeding the performance targets, indicated in the original programme document. Overall JP’s outputs and outcomes were only moderately synergistic and coherent, and such coherence and synergies were rather unbalanced – sometimes to the extent of being so strong as to be named a best practice (Outcome 2) and sometimes falling on the less favorable side of the spectrum (Outcome 1).

**Conclusion 8.** National level impact both at the policy and institutional levels has been substantial and potentially long lasting. There is also evidence of impact at the local level, but to a lesser extent with some doubt on sustainability.

JP has managed to create substantial national impact at both the policy (i.e. CSR Strategy) and the operational (CSR tools, VCMP) fronts. However the impact, especially transformational impact, of the JP at the regional/local level would be visible only in the medium- to long-term. Thus level of JP’s impact has been uneven at national and regional/local levels. For instance, with regard to clustering and networking, the final evaluation reached different conclusions at national and local levels. At the national level, there are strong evidences of policy level sustained impact. At the local level, however, the sustainability of the clustering initiatives, launched within the scope of the JP, hinges heavily on the ability of these clusters benefit from the said support schemes. With this caveat, it is safe to argue that the results and deliverables, produced by the JP, hold strong potential for creating a long-term replicable and scalable impact, and to arrive to favorable conclusions on sustainability.

The JP has been quite successful in contributing to the institutional capacities, at national level, for securing sustained impact. UNIDO’s partnership with TTGV (Turkish Technology Development Foundation) and ILO’s strong cooperation with Ministry of Labor and Social Security have increased the probability of sustained impact and replication potential of JP’s outputs in the fields of social and environmental conduct.

**Cross-Cutting Conclusions**

**Conclusion 9.** Some of the assumptions, made during the design phase, did not hold true. Although this does not make the JP less relevant or consistent, it had an impact on the JP’s effectiveness and efficiency, especially in the absence of a properly functioning M&E system in place.

Although the design of the JP can be considered highly relevant overall, one particular weakness with regard to design is related to the "level of ambition". The JP was designed to attack at challenges not only at macro and meso levels, but also at the micro level. The design of the JP rather optimistically assumed that the transformational changes, which the JP intended to introduce, can be absorbed fully by the SMEs in the target region (i.e. pilot provinces) within the lifespan of the intervention. Hence the design of the JP was more responsive to the macro- and meso-level problems within its lifespan; micro-level (i.e. enterprise-level) impact is to be seen in the long-run.

Another design-related deficiency relates to yet another assumption, which was made during the design stage, but did not hold true during execution. While the original programme document assumed that the VCMP would leverage on the previous work done by ITKIB, in practice the VCMP had to be built from scratch, requiring more resources and time than projected initially.
Conclusion 10. Mid-term evaluation of the JP was very timely, and had contributed to the efficiency and effectiveness of the JP.

Overall the mid-term evaluation has had a positive impact on the JP. Most of the recommendations, raised in the MTE Report were taken up and put into immediate action by the JP Management.

The budget-neutral extension suggested by the MTE report (and later reinforced by the MDG-F Secretariat) was taken into consideration by the JP management; however, the JP management concluded that such extension would not yield the expected benefits.

Lessons Learned

The final evaluation draws four lessons:

- Lesson #1: Set the level of ambition realistically and manage the expectations carefully for increased ownership of results
- Lesson #2: Outcome-level is too high to foster cooperation between implementing partners in joint programming and implementation arrangements
- Lesson #3: JP management team should be located in the same province
- Lesson #4: The JP Manager should have full coordination, if not control, over the JP

Recommendations

Recommendations on JP approach are as follows:

- It is recommended that in future endeavors towards joint programming and implementation, a system that facilitates achievement of synergistic effects and coherence be pursued at output level rather than outcome level.
- UN agencies that would have an important specialized role with but with a limited budget may be considered as associates of a JP. The roles, defined in the European Union's grant scheme models might be a source of inspiration.
- In terms of M&E a more structured method is to be enforced by the Programme Authority (in this case the MDG-F Secretariat), including measures such as tying release of funds to presence of an efficiently and effectively functioning M&E system or ensuring that each JP has at least one focal point responsible for proper implementation of M&E and C&A strategies.
- UN agencies modes of engagement with the national implementing partner differ considerably. Partaking UN agencies agree on a single implementation modality at the outset of implementation.
- It is recommended for future JPs that the final evaluation is scheduled after all activities are completed, all outputs are prepared and final internal monitoring has taken place, and even the final report has been endorsed by the programming authority (in this case the MDG-F Secretariat).
- Especially in cases where a JP is to be piloted in more than one location, the differences in capacities of each location should be diligently analyzed during the design phase, and findings should be reflected into the implementation plan accordingly.
Key stakeholders (especially Governmental Organizations) are recommended to assign a permanent representative

Recommendations for the present JP are as follows:

- All implementing partners, including ITKIB, should actively pursue all opportunities that would incorporate results of the present JP into the tenth national development plan.
- Promotion of VCMP should continue.
- Regional development agencies’ ownership needs to be secured.
- The M&E system that was established towards the end of the JP should be sustained by ITKIB.
A INTRODUCTION

A.1 Background

1. The MDG Achievement Fund (MDG-F) is an international cooperation mechanism aiming to help advance the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) worldwide by implementing programmes for eradicating poverty and inequality. Established in December 2006 with a contribution of €528 million ($US 710 million) (in addition to €90M committed in 2008) from the Spanish Government to the United Nations system, the MDG-F supports national governments, local authorities and citizen organizations in their efforts to accelerate progress on MDGs.

2. All MDG-F programmes are joint programmes (JP), which bring together several UN agencies in a collective effort in order to address multi-dimensional development challenges, thereby strengthening the UN system's ability to deliver as one entity.

3. The MDG-F supports innovative actions with the potential for wide replication and high-impact in eight thematic areas: democratic governance, gender equality and women's empowerment, basic social services, economic and private sector development, environment and climate change, culture and development and conflict prevention and peace building.

4. "Harnessing Sustainable Linkages for SMEs in Turkey's Textile Sector" is one of the programmes under the thematic window Private Sector and Development (PSD).

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<th>Joint Programme Brief</th>
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<td>Thematic Window:</td>
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<td>Approved Budget by NSC (US$):</td>
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<td>Participating UN Organizations:</td>
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<td>Indicative end date:</td>
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A.2 Purpose, Goals and Methodology of Evaluation

Overall Goal of the Evaluation

5 One of the roles of the Secretariat is to monitor and evaluate the MDG-F. This role is fulfilled in line with the instructions contained in the Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy and the Implementation Guide for Joint Programmes under the Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund. These documents stipulate that all joint programmes will commission and finance a final independent evaluation.

6 Final evaluations are summative in nature and seek to:

   - Measure to what extent the joint programme has fully implemented their activities, delivered outputs and attained outcomes and specifically measuring development results.

   - Generate substantive evidence based knowledge, on one or more of the MDG-F thematic windows by identifying best practices and lessons learned that could be useful to other development interventions at national (scale up) and international level (replicability).

7 As a result, the findings, conclusions and recommendations generated by these evaluations will be part of the thematic window Meta evaluation, the Secretariat is undertaking to synthesize the overall impact of the fund at national and international level.

Scope of the Evaluation and Specific Objectives

8 The final evaluation will focus on measuring development results and potential impacts generated by the joint programme, based on the scope and criteria included in the term of reference for final evaluation.

9 The unit of analysis or object of study for this evaluation is the joint programme, understood to be the set of components, outcomes, outputs, activities and inputs that were detailed in the joint programme document and in associated modifications made during implementation.

10 This final evaluation has the following specific objectives:

   - Measure to what extent the joint programme has contributed to solve the needs and problems identified in the design phase.

   - To measure joint programme’s degree of implementation, efficiency and quality delivered on outputs and outcomes, against what was originally planned or subsequently officially revised.

   - Measure to what extent the joint programme has attained development results to the targeted population, beneficiaries, participants whether individuals, communities, institutions, etc.

   - To measure the joint programme contribution to the objectives set in their respective specific thematic window as well as the overall MDG-F objectives at local and national level. (MDGs, Paris Declaration and Accra Principles and UN reform).
To identify and document substantive lessons learned and good practices on the specific topics of the thematic window, MDGs, Paris Declaration, Accra Principles and UN reform with the aim to support the sustainability of the joint programme or some of its components.

**Methodology**

11 The methodology used in the final evaluation is in line with the methodologies and techniques specified in the Terms of Reference.

12 The evaluation process was conducted on three phases:
   - 1 Desk Study and review of documents
   - 2 Interview Phase
   - 3 Reporting Phase

13 Throughout the evaluation process the evaluator has focused on five criteria (dimensions for analysis) using the evaluation questions laid out in the Terms of Reference for final evaluation. The criteria are grouped according to the three levels of the programme: Design, Process and Results (Table 1) referred to as evaluation units.

14 At design level, the overall relevance of the programme is analyzed. The research areas are designed to enlighten to which extent the objectives of the project are consistent with the needs and interest of the targeted people, the needs of the country and the Millennium Development Goals.

15 Analysis at process level focuses on efficiency (to which extent resources and inputs have been transformed into results). Another dimension of analysis at process level is the ownership in the process, i.e. effectiveness of leadership practices by İTKİB in overall process implementation.

16 Analysis at results level has two dimensions: effectiveness and sustainability. Effectiveness dimension is searching the extent to which the objectives of the project have been achieved; and sustainability dimension is searching the probability of the project achievements continuing in the long term at local and international level.

**Table 1: Evaluation Units and Dimensions for Analysis**

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<th>Levels of the Programme (Evaluation Units)</th>
<th>Evaluation Criteria (Dimensions for Analysis)</th>
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<td>Design level</td>
<td>Relevance</td>
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<td>Process level</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
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<td>Ownership in the process</td>
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<td>Results level</td>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
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<td>Sustainability</td>
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1 The mid-term evaluation that includes information until April 2012 was reviewed and the final evaluation is built on it with additional information. The recommendations and findings stated in the mid-term evaluation were reviewed at the time of final evaluation; improvements and achievements were indicated in the final evaluation.
To assess the JP against these dimensions, the evaluator has conducted a comprehensive desk review of JP documents external research (List of Documents and External Sources Consulted in annex 1) and semi-structured live and phone interviews with the programme partners and stakeholders selected from the list of final evaluation reference group provided by the Joint Programme Manager (List Of Persons Interviewed in annex 2). Interviews are used for collecting information that may serve as basis to form judgments and to ensure that the opinions of final beneficiaries and the participants of the programme are taken into account effectively.

The final evaluation is based on the mid-term evaluation final report (April 2012), monitoring report (July 2012) which particularly focused on ongoing activities including the improvement plan and a review of the consolidated expenditures (October 2012). The evaluation findings were checked or completed with the additional data collection and analysis phase in December 2012.

A.3 Context

The Turkish "Textile and Clothing Sector" operates within the global context and is one of the most critical sectors in Turkey in terms of contribution to the gross domestic product (GDP) and employment generation. In the aftermath of the liberalization of the national economy in early 1980s, Turkey’s exports of clothing products increased by nearly 107 times in 27 years (from US$131 million in 1980 to US$14 billion in 2007) and the exports of textile products increased by 25.4 times (from US$342 million in 1980 to US$8.7 billion in 2007). Today there are more than 40,000 textile and clothing manufacturers, employing more than 2 million women and men in Turkey mostly working for the minimum wage, which roughly corresponds to net daily income of 10 USD. Turkey cannot afford a weak or weakening textile and clothing sector, as such trend will immediately be translated into serious and insurmountable economic and social problems. A 9% decrease in global demand may correspond to the loss of more than 200,000 jobs.

The global context, which worked in favor of the Turkish textile and clothing industry between 1980 and 2004, is now working against it. Turkey is not in a position to compete against the low-cost competition such as from China and India. In order to compete on elements other than cost, the Turkish textile and clothing industry must identify new comparative advantages by wider utilization of ICT tools in business processes, innovative business models, effective use of value chain, extensive collaboration among sector actors and adopting environmental sustainability and CSR principles. The plans, programmes and strategies developed by the Government of Turkey confirm the importance of the textile and clothing industry for Turkey’s development; together with the challenges awaiting the industry.

The Government of Turkey has adopted the National Textile, Clothing and Leather Sector Strategy (Textile Strategy) in September, 2008 which foresees that the manufacturing capacity in the western (and more developed) regions of the country would move to the eastern (less developed) regions, creating "regions" that specialize on different segments of the value chain. This strategy has recently been supported by a new incentives scheme, which encourages companies to move their manufacturing facilities to or set up new companies in less developed regions of Turkey, specially the
southeast, and further specifies textiles and clothing sector as a prioritized sector for investment in this region.

A.4 Description of the development intervention

Within the above context, the intervention modality of the JP is based on three main issues summarized below:

-1 One of the most important weaknesses of the sector is the lack of coordination and collaboration between the sub-sectors as noted by the specialized committee on textile, clothing and leather industries.

-2 The sector suffers from increased input costs and experiences difficulties in competing in international markets, especially in the commoditized segments (e.g. basic t-shirts etc). It is acknowledged by the sector that Turkish textile and clothing industry needs to become more innovative and more CSR-compliant in order to be able to compete globally.

-3 Regional and gender disparities cause Turkey lag behind the global development trend despite its high potential. Turkey has the worst position among the OECD countries in terms of regional GDP dispersion, and socio-economic indicators also point out massive disparities between genders in terms of social, educational and economic situation of women.

Although the Turkish textile and clothing sector has gained some strength over the last decade, it has not gained the resilience to fend off the impact of the economic downturns to the poor and most vulnerable segments of the society. Government of Turkey has taken a number of measures to protect the most vulnerable segments of the society from the economic downturns; however, there is still a need for a strong policy framework that empowers the industries in Turkey to remain competitive in times of economic crisis.

The JP aims to create a replicable model of improving competitiveness of a labour intensive sector through establishment of pro-poor and gender sensitive business models, from which policy-level lessons can be drawn. Particularly, the JP aims to contribute to policies and strategies related to textiles sector, including preparation of a national CSR Strategy for Turkish textiles and clothing sector to be developed and submitted to MoSIT for consideration to be included in the Textile Strategy and related policies.

The Turkish textile and clothing industry is in need of a major transformation and a paradigm shift in order to be a competitive and gender equal, socially and environmentally-responsible industry, providing more and qualified decent jobs for millions. One of the intended potential impacts of the JP is the raised profile of the Turkish textile and clothing industry, transforming into a more socially responsible industry, which attains internationally recognized norms and standards on CSR.

A.5 JP description

The UN Joint Programme MDG-F 2067: Harnessing Sustainable Linkages for the SMEs in Turkey’s Textile Sector was implemented with a budget of USD 2.7 million between 2010 -2012. The main objectives of the Joint Programme are to increase productivity and innovation capacities of the
SMEs in the Turkish textile and apparel industry especially in poor and vulnerable areas through enhanced collaboration and networking for increased competitiveness by;

-1 Supporting SMEs in textile and apparel sector from poor areas of Turkey, with a special focus on women entrepreneurs, equipping them with knowledge and tools to get integrated into national and international value chains through capacity building efforts on clustering, business linkage development and

-2 Supporting the integration of CSR principles and gender equality into the business processes and practices of the Turkish SMEs in textile and apparel sector for increased competitiveness.

The activities of the JP were implemented in four pilot provinces (Malatya, Kahramanmaraş, Gaziantep and Adıyaman) with the cooperation of three UN agencies, namely, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and International Labour Organization (ILO). The national implementing partner of the Joint Programme (JP) is the “General Secretariat of the Istanbul Textile and Apparel Exporters’ Associations” (İTKİB). The actions were implemented in collaboration with national and local stakeholders, including government institutions at national and local levels, BROs, trade unions, NGOs and private sector representatives.

The Joint Programme has two outcomes and 8 outputs grouped under the respective outcomes:

Outcome 1: Productivity and innovation capacities of the SMEs in the Turkish textile industry especially in poor and vulnerable areas strengthened through enhanced collaboration and networking for increased competitiveness.

-1 Output 1.1: An online Value Chain Management Platform (VCMP) activated by İTKİB and utilized by T/A value chain actors. (UNDP)

-2 Output 1.2: The capacity of national SME support and advisory institutions in the field of clustering and business linkage development are enhanced (UNIDO)

-3 Output 1.3: A Sustainable Competitiveness Centre (SCC) is established and activated (UNDP)

-4 Output 1.4: Sustainable business models in T/A industry, encouraged and achieved (through a support scheme) (UNDP)

Outcome 2: Sustainable development, CSR principles and gender equality are integrated into the business processes and practices of the Turkish SMEs in textile sector for increased competitiveness.

-1 Output 2.1: An assessment report on CSR in Turkish T/A industry produced. (ILO, UNDP, UNIDO)

-2 Output 2.2: An overall awareness-raising strategy developed, and enterprise-level awareness building tools produced and deployed (ILO, UNDP, UNIDO)

2 The output descriptions in the approved IR have been used.
Output 2.3: A CSR advocacy strategy, complemented with CSR-based management and reporting tools and improved institutional capacities (UNIDO)

Output 2.4: A national sustainable and responsible competitiveness agenda for the T/A industry created. (UNDP)
B ANALYSIS

B.1 Design | Relevance

Relevance of the Design and Strategy of the Development Intervention

31 The overall design and strategy of the JP is highly relevant to the Private Sector Policies of the Government of Turkey (GoT), to MDGs, UNDCS (United Nations Development Cooperation Strategy in Turkey).

32 The extent of relevance of design to national priorities can best be substantiated by the National Textile, Clothing and Leather Sector Strategy (aka Textile Strategy). Furthermore the Government of Turkey introduced a new incentive scheme (on 4 June 2009), which also encourages labor-incentive industries to move to the less developed regions of Turkey, including those targeted by the JP. Finally, the Ninth National Development Plan, which is the overarching document in terms of laying out the national priorities, makes specific references to better use of ICT (i.e. tools like the value chain management portal that the JP deployed), supporting clusters and clustering, and producing higher value added through innovative means.

33 In addition to the abovementioned official documents, the followings would cast further light on JP’s relevance.

34 The T&C sector creates employment, especially for women, yet informality is still an issue. There are approximately 40,000 companies in the textile and clothing sector, employing an estimated 2 million workers (including the unregistered work-force) mostly working for the minimum wage. The registered employment rate for women in this sector is around 35%, which is above the national average rate of women employment (23.5%). The actual rate of women employment in the sector is estimated to be 50% which means that a significant number of women are unregistered workers with no social security and retirement plan. Therefore the JP on textile and clothing sector directly target the poor population with a remarkable rate of woman workers involved. The gender sensitive focus of the JP will be an additional contribution to the improvement of women’s socio-economic status.

35 The effect of global crisis on T&C and thus T&C labor force is disproportionately high. According to the WTO, global trade will decline by 9% in 2009. The estimated correspondence of a 9% decrease in global demand is the loss of more than 200,000 jobs in Turkey. Considering the figures given above,

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3 The National Textile, Clothing and Leather Sector Strategy (Textile Strategy) foresees that the manufacturing capacity of the T&C sector accumulated in the more developed regions of the country would move to less developed regions, mainly in the eastern part of the country for creating regional specialization on different segments of the value chain.

4 Project Document

5 “The number of registered employees in the sector is around 590.000”, National Textile, Clothing and Leather Strategy (September 2008), http://www.stb.gov.tr/download/basin/tekstilstrateji.pdf

6 Minimum wage in Turkey roughly corresponds to net daily income of 10 USD.

7 As per February 2009 (ILO)

8 Source: WTO Press Release on 25 March 2009
it is clear that such decline will mostly affect the poor, especially woman workers, resulting in huge socio-economic problems.

36 The global trends in the sector show that the Turkish textile and clothing sector cannot sustain by competing with Asian countries on a cost-based commodity production. The Turkish textile and clothing sector (especially in the less developed eastern parts) can only survive and improve by better integration into global markets, and this requires some substantial measures to be taken in productivity and innovation capacity, collaboration among sector actors, effectively working value chain and adaptation of CSR and environmental sustainability issues.

37 The JP’s design and strategy is also strongly linked to the Outcome 7 of the United Nations Development Cooperation Strategy (UNDCS) in Turkey. The 7th Outcome of the UNDCS is “Increased opportunities for employment and decent work for all through the implementation of equity-enhancing policies, strategies and programmes that promote economic growth, based on competitiveness, increased productivity and corporate social responsibility.”

38 In the light of the above, it can be safely concluded that the design and strategy of the JP is highly relevant. The implementing partners indicate that the relevance of the design and strategy was further strengthened during the design phase and later during the inception phase, through participatory approach that secured national ownership. When asked to verify validity such statements by providing concrete examples, ITKIB reps indicated that although JP’s support to establishment of the value chain management portal (VCMP) was very important, it is only a drop in the ocean when compared to the follow-up and or complementary actions and investments to be made by ITKIB. When expansion and improvement plans and associated costs are considered, it can be safely concluded that such a portal would not have been deployed in the absence of a strong national ownership. The clustering approach that is embedded in the JP’s design is also a nationally owned and promoted strategy that can be verified by (a) the Ninth Development Plan, (b) Government’s Annual Programmes and (c) announcement of the Cluster Support Programme by Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology.

39 At the CSR front, national ownership to the design and strategy of the JP is also verifiable through the various legislative pieces that different line ministries have issued to encourage a more decent work environment (e.g. Directive on Risk Assessments on Occupational Health and Safety, published in OJ of 29.12.2012/28512).

**JP’s contribution to solving the needs and problems identified during the design phase**

40 The key needs and problems, which were identified during the design phase, were subject to further scrutiny not only by the partaking UN agencies but also by the stakeholders. The “prolonged” inception period provided the project parties (e.g. ITKIB, UN Agencies and other stakeholders) with the opportunity to have a critical look at the design of the JP and to define in what ways the JP would contribute to needs and problems of the industry. The resulting design was welcomed by all the parties (Source: MoM of the PMC). The JP defined two major problems: (1) the fragmented and geographically scattered nature of the textile and clothing value chain in Turkey prevents Turkish T&C

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9 [www.undp.org.tr](http://www.undp.org.tr)
SMEs from acting as a real network and thus benefiting from synergies that an efficiently functioning network would bring and (2) the global T&C markets are becoming increasingly CSR-conscious, whereas the Turkish T&C industry's CSR performance –especially those of the SMEs- is not very strong (Source: Assessments done during the preparation of the CSR Strategy Report).

41 The JP contributed significantly to the progress towards transforming the Turkish T&C industry a better and more efficient network. This was mainly achieved by establishment and operationalization of the Value Chain Management Platform (VCMP). The level of contribution of the JP to this particular need has been emphasized by nearly all the stakeholders that were interviewed during the final evaluation. One senior ITKIB Manager (Deputy Secretary General) reported that “establishment of such an online platform has long been a dream of the industry, now realized thanks to the JP”. Another important indicator that further verifies the importance of the VCMP is the Istanbul Development Agency’s financial support to promotion and strengthening of the content of the VCMP. Finally, the fact that the VCMP (www.styleturkish.com) enjoyed immediate international recognition by Internet Marketing Association is another indication that further underscores potential contribution of the VCMP to overcoming problems identified during the design of the JP.

42 A second set of activities that also aimed at improvement of networking among T&C SMEs was the clustering initiatives, launched in the target provinces (Adıyaman, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş and Malatya). Although the JP partners have indicated that some progress have been achieved, it is presently too soon to comment on how much the clustering initiatives, launched within the scope of the JP, have contributed to the needs of the local T&C industry. Since most clustering initiatives need more than a couple of years to take up and produce visible results, JP’s intervention can be considered a step towards the right direction, however a fair judgment cannot be produced at the present day.

43 The JP’s clustering initiatives and experience contributed to Turkey’s clustering policies. UNDP and Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology have benefited from the JP’s experience during the design of Turkey’s first-ever integrated cluster support programme, details of which have been announced in September 2012 through Official Journal.

44 The JP has also made significant contributions to increasing CSR awareness in the Turkish T&C industry. This has been mainly achieved initially by the JP activities, geared towards development of a Sectoral CSR Strategy, and later by dissemination of the report. The interviews, held with the representatives of the business organizations during the final evaluation, confirmed that the level of awareness has increased. JP’s focal point at UNDP also indicated that the report has been presented to the Ministry of Development for their review and possible incorporation into Turkey’s next national development plan as well as the Turkish Textile Strategy.

45 Finally, and as reported by UNDP, JP also contributed to incorporation of CSR parameters as evaluation criteria that would be taken into during the identification of clusters that will benefit from the cluster support programme to be implemented by the Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology.

10 Ministry of Economy also runs a programme that promotes international competitiveness of the clusters.
Joint design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation

46 As per the feedback received during the final evaluation, the extent to which the JP was jointly designed, implemented, monitored and evaluated was satisfactory overall. However further inquiries and triangulation revealed that some aspects worked better than others. More specifically; none of parties that were involved in the design process reported any problem with regard to lack of coordination. Preparatory financial allocation made by the MDG-F Secretariat, was –reportedly- very helpful in ensuring coordination as well as securing engagement of stakeholders into the design of the JP.

47 During the implementation phase however some problems have been faced due to the “multi-polar” nature of the JP. ITKIB is headquartered in Istanbul; all UN agencies have their office in Ankara; and the JP targeted 4 provinces. This caused some logistical difficulties in joint implementation and sometimes in joint monitoring. Although some interviewees reported discontent with this, none indicated that a major problem that would deter the JP from reaching its objectives was experienced. However the logistical problems, combined with the multi-stakeholder nature of the JP apparently made arranging joint meetings, especially those requiring senior-level participation, a very hard task than it should be.

Extent, to which JP was the best option to respond to development challenges

48 As described above the Programme Document identified some high-level as well as specific development challenges. The joint programming was definitely the best option as far as the CSR aspect of the JP is concerned. This can be best verified by the process, through which the CSR report was produced. Building on the original JP document, the Inception Report introduced a clear division of labor among the UN agencies, and mapped out the synergies between different aspects. The CSR issues could not have been possibly addressed by a single UN Agency at the depth and specificity that they have been addressed through a joint programming approach. This has been confirmed by all partaking UN agencies during the final evaluation mission.

49 As far as the first outcome (networking & innovation) of the JP is concerned, it is not possible to develop a similarly strong conclusion as regard to joint programming being the “best” option in responding to the development challenges. Although an evidence-based conclusion is hard to find, the fact that ILO did not have a particular responsibility under the activities of Outcome 1 could be considered as an indication.

Added value of the JP implementing partners

50 The extent to which implementing partners had an added value to solve the development challenges stated in the JP document was satisfactorily high. All the implementing partners reported quite favorably when asked whether or not ITKIB’s sector-specific know-how, outreach and experience were instrumental in reaching JP’s objectives. The international recognition that VCMP enjoyed shortly after its deployment also verifies such value added. As also mentioned above during the discussion on the benefits of joint programming, the value added of partaking UN agencies was particularly visible in the development of the CSR strategy.
The fact that the head of Turkey's Corporate Social Responsibility Association delivered a highly supportive speech about the CSR report also substantiates the value added of the implementing partners.

**Usefulness & reliability of the M&E strategy in measuring development results**

The M&E specialist of the JP reports that the M&E strategy that JP deployed was useful and reliable. However as indicated (at least alluded to) in the interim evaluation report, such strategy was put into real action too late, as such it took extra effort to improve reliability of the results of the M&E strategy. Reportedly, the M&E approach benefited from UNDP’s Yellow Book on M&E for development results.

This has also been verified by reviewing the JP's M&E framework against UNDP’s Yellow Book. Since the M&E strategy was deployed a rather late stage of the JP, the M&E strategy could not have the contribution that it would have to measurement of development results.

**Usefulness & reliability of the C&A strategy**

The communication and advocacy strategy of the JP had problems, similar to those of the M&E Strategy. Instead of having a fulltime communication specialist on board from the outset, the JP partners agreed, at the request of ITKIB, to receive services of a specialized communication and advocacy company (i.e. a PR company). Unfortunately, the first PR Company did not perform very well, and JP management decided to take the issue in its own hands. However, in the midst of tens of JP activities which needed to be implemented in tandem against strictly defined deadlines, apparently the C&A strategy was simply sidelined until the interim evaluation report.

The improvement plan, which the interim evaluation introduced, was a timely intervention as admitted by all partaking institutions; and the revised C&A strategy paid off. One concrete example of the revised C&A strategy is the way, in which the closure event was designed. At the closure event, rather than the consultants and/or agency representatives, businessmen talked and delivered presentations which complied fully with the spirit of promoting stronger engagement of private sector in development.

**Revisions to the design of the JP & improvements**

As indicated above, the JP’s intervention modality was slightly revised during the Inception Report. The revisions were needed to make the JP a more realistic intervention.

One of the most radical changes was to turn the SME Innovation Research and Advisory Centre into a platform of sustainable competitiveness (Output 1.3). Establishment of a research centre with the funding available was simply impossible and did not send the right messages, reports ITKIB and UNDP reps. ITKIB further reports that a research centre (Textile Park) that was established within the scope of an EU-funded project in Istanbul cost more than €15 million.

In addition to the revisions made at the inception stage, the JP followed most of the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation; most notably M&E and C&A plans were developed and deployed almost immediately. One of the recommendations that emerged during the interim
evaluation concerned deploying local agents in the target provinces; this recommendation could not be followed due to time constraints and the difficulties in identifying suitable candidates. The JP management compensated absence of local agents with more frequent visits to the target provinces. Improvement plan and progress is annexed.

B.2 Process | Efficiency and Ownership

Efficiency of the JP’s management model in comparison to the development results attained

59 The governance structure, adopted during the implementation of the JP, was in line with the management and coordination arrangements, set out in the MDG-F guidance note (March 2009). The management model set forth in the JP Document was kept intact during the entire lifespan of the JP. More specifically:

-1 Organizational Structure: Although it is difficult to measure the extent of efficiency of the organizational structure in comparison to the development results, attained by the JP, none of the interviewees reported anything that would indicate that the organizational structure was inefficient.

-2 Instruments: All of the management instruments (e.g. national steering committee, programme management committee, technical advisory committees etc.) suggested by the MDG-F Secretariat have been used. Regular and quarterly PMC meetings, regular and bi-monthly UN coordination meetings (at technical level) and bi-annual TAC meetings have taken place as planned. The feedback from UN agencies and the Project Manager shows that the committees fulfilled the roles and responsibilities expected of them in terms of high level participation, strategic guidance and management oversight and mutual accountability. As mentioned above the M&E tool was deployed rather lately, which deprived the management from valuable information with regard to progress towards results and impact. A quality assurance tool was only deployed after the interim evaluation report.11

-3 Economic, human and technical resources: In terms of human and technical resources, the JP can be considered “rich” (as also suggested by the interim evaluation report). ITKIB’s technical expertise of the T&C industry, combined with the expertise areas of the UN agencies, helped the JP enjoy high quality inputs.

-4 Information flows: The efficiency of the information flow was affected by the geographically scattered nature of the JP. As per day-to-day management the main means of communication was emails, complemented by infrequent meetings at the technical level. As per management-level information flows, the JP leveraged on the regular JMC meetings. However as indicated earlier, arrangement of such meetings had been a challenge, leading to postponement of many such meetings to find a timeslot that would be convenient for all.

11 Although a project-specific quality assurance tool was deployed only after the interim evaluation, partaking UN agencies indicate that their corporate quality assurance systems had already been deployed at the outset of the JP.
Decision-making in management: Interviewees report that almost in all cases the PMC made decisions in a timely, transparent and participatory manner. Interviewees’ statements were checked against the minutes of the PMC meetings, and it has been observed that the PMC was provided with sufficient information (i.e. progress, planning etc.) to make decisions, and accordingly made informed decisions in a timely manner.

Efficiency of joint programme intervention (group of UN agencies), compared to a single UN Agency

The second outcome of the JP could not have been more efficient had it been pursued by a single UN Agency rather than the three partaking agencies “delivering as one”. Reps of the UN agencies have an overall consensus on the higher level of efficiency that was achieved as a result of joint work towards development of the CSR strategy. The only problem that had an adverse effect on the efficiency relates to the timing of inputs. Another source of inefficiency was the inconsistency between the tone and style of the individually produced reports. In due course, consolidating the reports, generated by different implementing partners had been a problem, and caused further delays in issuance of the final product i.e. the CSR Strategy Report.

As far as the first outcome of the JP is concerned, it is difficult to measure the extent to which joint programme intervention was more or less efficient than a single-agency-intervention. As indicated earlier ILO took part in but had no specific responsibility under the first outcome. A UN agency representative reports that all of the activities under the first outcome could have been implemented by UNDP or UNIDO which might have increased efficiency of the intervention. It is difficult to verify this statement; however it is clear that Output 1.2 which concerned clustering and business linkage development had been carried out somewhat detached from the other outputs under the same outcome. For instance; the inception report indicates that Output 1.4 (i.e. support scheme) would be used in support of the clustering activities of Output 1.2. This did not become the case and Output 1.4 mainly supported Output 1.1 (VCMP) in accordance with PMC decisions. However this does not necessarily mean that such approach had been more inefficient, sometimes pooling resources for achieving a single objective is more rewarding than spreading them too thin.

As such, the extent to which JP increased efficiency in attaining outcome 2 and delivering outputs therein was very high. The logistical difficulties were foreseen and were, by and large, offset by the efficiency gains achieved as a result of leveraging on the specialized knowledge and experience of implementing partners. As far as outcome 1 is concerned however, neither a similarly favorable nor an alarmingly unfavorable opinion can be developed.

Efficiency of the governance structure

The governance of the programme was implemented at two levels: (1) national level by the National Steering Committee (NSC - consisting of non-implementing parties for independent functioning) and (2) programme level by the Programme Management Committee (PMC – chaired by the RC and consisting of participating UN agencies, MoSIT, MoE (formerly UFT), ITKIB, GAP RDA, and Chambers of Commerce and/or Industry from Gaziantep, Adiyaman, Kahramanmaraş and Malatya). In
addition to programme and national-level management structures, a Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) was also established.

64 The governance structure contributed significantly to the efficiency and effectiveness of the JP. At the national level, participation of the Ministry of Development into the NSC made it possible to build linkages between the results of the JP and the process through which Turkey's tenth national development plan is being prepared. At the programme level, the PMC not only contributed to the efficiency and effectiveness of the JP, but also helped member line ministries benefit from the experiences of the JP. Verifiable examples of such positive externalities include the design of the Cluster Support Programme of the Ministry of Science, Industry and Trade.

65 The positive impact of the governance structure of the JP in securing national ownership was also visible at the closure event of the JP. When the floor was given to the members of the PMC that represented the target provinces of the JP, the speakers made clear statements on how the JP has contributed to their regions and how they intend to sustain the impact of the JP.

Financial Progress of the JP

66 Amounts committed and disbursed by UN agency are shown in the following table. There are not large discrepancies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Funds Committed</th>
<th>Total Funds Disbursed</th>
<th>Disbursement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>1,428,922.50</td>
<td>1,428,778.94</td>
<td>99.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>858,675.00</td>
<td>858,675.00</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>410,880.00</td>
<td>395,784.00</td>
<td>96.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2,698,477.50</td>
<td>2,683,237.94</td>
<td>99.44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Obstacles faced by the JP and their effects on its efficiency

67 The main administrative obstacle, as alluded to earlier, relates to the geographically scattered nature of the JP Management team. The JP Manager was duty stationed in Istanbul, whereas the UN agency staff/consultants responsible from the JP’s implementation were mainly duty stationed in Ankara. This hindered efficiency of day-to-day management activities.

68 The JP faced an important obstacle with regard to Output 1.1. Originally it was envisaged that the VCMP would build on the previous work that ITKIB and CISCO. Reportedly, however, after approval of the JP by the MDG-F CISCO’s financial expectations increased disproportionally. In due course, ITKIB management concluded that such partnership could not be pursued in the long term. Upon abolishment of the partnership between ITKIB and CISCO, the VCMP had to be developed from scratch, requiring more financial resources and time.

69 Another obstacle relates to the clustering initiatives, implemented under Output 1.2. At the inception phase it was realized that this particular output was underfunded. Thus the inception report included measures to build linkages between Output 1.4 and Output 1.2. This could not be achieved
during the implementation as Output 1.4 was decided to be used in support of Output 1.1 (VCMP), due to the reasons explained above.

70 The JP experienced some difficulties in identification of the JP Manager. This caused major delays at the outset of the JP. Additionally, the time dedicated to development of the IR was longer than originally anticipated. These two factors both individually and combined, squeezed the implementation period, which was only recovered partly upon securing a cost-neutral extension.

**The impact of mid-term evaluation on the efficiency of the JP**

71 The MTE had a significant contribution to the efficiency of the JP through triggering development and deployment of (1) M&E strategy, (2) C&A strategy and (3) a quality assurance system. The improvement plan has been developed promptly and was followed. Please see Annex III.

**B.3 Results | Effectiveness and Sustainability**

72 This section initially analyzes the extent, to which the objectives of the development intervention have been achieved, and later discusses the probability of the benefits of the intervention continuing in the long term.

**Contribution of the JP in attainment of development outputs and outcomes**

73 The first outcome of the JP aimed at strengthening productivity and innovation capacities of the SMEs in the Turkish textile and apparel industry especially in poor and vulnerable areas through enhanced collaboration and networking for increased competitiveness. The JP was designed to contribute to the progress towards achievement of this particular outcome through the four outputs that are listed and analyzed (in terms of effectiveness) in detail below:

1. **Output 1.1: An online Value Chain Management Platform (VCMP) activated by İTKİB and utilized by T/A value chain actors**: As evidenced by the [www.styleturkish.com](http://www.styleturkish.com), this output has been fully achieved, though significantly later than originally envisaged. The latest monitoring report, made available to the evaluator, 5217 accounts (members) were active as of end of 2012. Compared to targeted 3500 members, the VCMP exceeded expectations, with the only downside being the limited number of members (i.e. 205) from the target provinces. The JP monitoring framework annexed to the inception report had the following target “1000 SMEs registered in the platform at the end of the third year, 50% being from RCOP region”. In comparison to the target, set out during the Inception Phase, the 3500 VCMP users signals a high level of effectiveness (350%), however the JP had not been equally effective in reaching out to the SMEs.

12 This section answers the following question “To what extent did the joint programme contribute to the attainment of the development outputs and outcomes initially expected /stipulated in the programme document? And as per MDG-F’s guidance requires detailed analysis of: 1) planned activities and outputs, 2) achievement of results.

13 As per TURKSTAT data the Turkey’s textile and clothing exports increased by 10% in the 5-year period covering 2008 to 2012. The JP’s outcome-level indicator with respect to outcome 1 was the share of T&C exports in Turkey’s total exports (Source: Inception Report – Annex III). Again as per TURKSTAT data the share of T&C exports declined from 17.3% in 2008 to 16.5% in 2012.
in the target provinces. Another important indicator of success is the level of satisfaction (80%) of the VCMP users that completed online courses (32).

-2 Output 1.2: The capacity of national SME support and advisory institutions in the field of clustering and business linkage development are enhanced: This output has also been fully achieved. As per the JP Monitoring Framework annexed to the IR, the JP was to develop capacities of 25 experts and 4 business support organizations. As per the latest JP monitoring report some 95 people received training on cluster development. Some 101 SMEs participated to the cluster diagnostic studies and another 26 to network analysis. Cluster development agents, mobilized within the scope of the JP reached out to 40 SMEs as opposed to targeted 65 as of end of 2012. 14

-3 Output 1.3: A Sustainable Competitiveness Centre (SCC) is established and activated: This has been an output which has been radically changed at the inception phase and later fine-tuned during the implementation 15. All of the activities defined in the inception report has been fulfilled as evidenced by reports (such as the needs assessment report, training reports, training participation lists) and the memorandum of understanding signed between ITKIB and Kahramanmaraş Chamber of Trade and Industry for establishment of the SCC. As per the latest monitoring report of the JP, some 10 organizations are represented in the SCC. More than 250 people benefited from the training & counseling services rendered through the SCC. Same monitoring report indicates that the SCC reached out to some 136 SMEs in target provinces, this signals an almost 200% effectiveness when compared to IR's target of 70 SMEs.

-4 Output 1.4: Sustainable business models in T/A industry, encouraged and achieved (through a support scheme): The IR defined 5 activities for delivery of this output, with the assumption and expectation that the activities under this particular output would be implemented in close cooperation with clustering activities under Output 1.2. Instead this output was reformulated during the execution of the JP to support Output 1.1 (VCMP). All of the activities have been delivered and some 174 SMEs benefited from the support scheme.

74 To sum up, the extent to which JP contributed to the attainment of the outcome 1 and the relevant outputs when compared to initial expectations of the programme document has been very high. In almost all fronts the JP exceeded the targets indicated in the inception report, signaling a high level of effectiveness.

75 The second outcome of the JP aimed at integration of the CSR principles (including sustainable development, gender equality) into the business processes and practices of the Turkish SME's in textile sector for increased competitiveness. The JP was designed to contribute to the progress

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14 In a joint effort of UNDP and UNIDO 70+ experts from 24 regional development agencies were also trained on clustering and assessment of clusters.

15 At the original JP Document the title of the Output 1.3 was "An SME Innovation Research and Advisory Centre (IRAC) is established and activated in Kahramanmaraş S. University". However during the inception phase, JP partners decided to establish a Sustainable Competitiveness Centre in an effort to make the output more realistic as well as more supportive of Outcome 1.
towards achievement of this particular outcome through the four outputs that are listed and analyzed (in terms of effectiveness) in detail below:

- **Output 2.1: An assessment report on CSR in Turkish T/A industry produced.** This output has been fully achieved with all the activities delivered, as evidenced both by the consolidated report as well as the individual report\(^\text{16}\). The 5 business models, studied and developed within the scope of this activity, can be considered an effective intervention as these models demonstrated the good practices in Turkey.

- **Output 2.2: An overall awareness-raising strategy developed, and enterprise-level awareness building tools produced and deployed:** As per the feedback received during the interviews, the “overall awareness-raising strategy” that was planned to be produced under this particular output has been merged into Output 2.3 and has been made part of the CSR Advocacy Strategy. Enterprise-level awareness building tools were produced and deployed. The tools that were developed included training programmes, training of trainers (TOT) programmes, manuals and booklets. As per the JP’s last monitoring report some 1589 workers (Women: 679) and 197 employers (Women: 62) attended to the training on “Gender and Social Conduct”. When compared to the target for training 750 workers and managers (Inception Report, Annex III), the JP’s achievement was quite high, suggesting a high-level of effectiveness. Again as per the JP’s last monitoring report some 1,071 workers (Women: 667) and 288 employers (Women: 72) attended to the training on “Environmental Conduct”. The trainings were complemented by informative visual materials on labour standards and gender that reached to 1500 people.

- **Output 2.3: A CSR advocacy strategy, complemented with CSR-based management and reporting tools and improved institutional capacities:** This output has also been fully achieved. A CSR-based reporting tool has been produced. Capacity building activities have been carried out at the enterprise level (pilot companies, as indicated in the programme document). Training of core project staff and training of trainers programmes were held with the participation of 58 persons.

- **Output 2.4: A national sustainable and responsible competitiveness agenda for the T/A industry created:** This particular output had three activities, as listed in the IR. The first activity (2.4.1) concerned improvement of National awareness on SD, MDGs and CSR. This was tried to be achieved through the closing event of the JP and dissemination of CSR report to a wide variety of organizations across the country. The UN agency reps also indicate that a considerable number of activities within other components (outputs) of the JP also contributed to raising awareness. The second activity of Output 2.4 concerned development of a policy note. Reportedly in an effort to ensure coherence this was made a part of the CSR Strategy Report, which also included policy level recommendations. The last activity (2.4.3) concerned establishment and implementation of an M&E system, which was realized at towards the end of the JP.

\(^{16}\) Activity 2.1.1 Assessment of contribution to the MDGs by the Turkish T/A industry (UNDP/ITKIB), Activity 2.1.2. Assessment of social conduct and gender in the T/A industry (ILO) and Activity 2.1.3 Assessment of environmental conduct in the T/A industry (UNIDO).
To sum up, the extent to which JP contributed to the attainment of the outcome 2 and the relevant outputs when compared to initial expectations of the programme document has been very high. In almost all fronts the JP exceeded the targets indicated in the inception report, signaling a high level of effectiveness.

**Contribution of the JP to MDGs, MDG-F’s relevant thematic window, Paris Declaration & delivering as one**

It was not possible to find and substantiate a direct contribution of the present JP to the quantifiable MDG targets. Most of the contribution of the JP to the MDGs would be at policy level, and hence are to be observed in medium- to long-run.

The MDG-F Thematic Window Terms of Reference for Development and the Private Sector list 6 key challenges to be addressed by the thematic window. JP’s contribution to overcoming these challenges is discussed below (the discussion below is kept short to avoid redundancy with the rest of the report):

- **1. Creating incentives for entrepreneurship and investment**: A direct contribution of the JP on this challenge was not expected.

- **2. Increasing productivity through competition, innovation, networking and decent working conditions**: The JP’s main contribution to the MDG-F thematic window on Development and the Private Sector was observed in this particular area. VCMP provides room for increased productivity through networking. The CSR strategy on the other hand advocates decent working conditions for increased competitiveness.

- **3. Harnessing economic linkages**: VCMP will contribute to strengthening the linkages between the SMEs and large-scale companies (including global clothing retailers). At the local level, clustering initiatives will also harness economic linkages.

- **4. Improving market access and functioning**: The JP contributes improving SMEs’ access to markets through (a) VCMP and (b) helping SME improve their CSR performance, which is fast becoming a critical success even survival factor in the global T&C markets.

- **5. Reducing risk and vulnerability**: A direct contribution of the JP on this challenge was not expected.

- **6. Engaging the private sector in the broader development process**: The JP indirectly contributes to engaging private sector in the broader development process mainly by helping T&C companies improve their CSR performance. The 5 business models report, produced within the scope of the JP is a good example of how private sector can get engaged in broader development process.

JP’s contribution to the Paris Declaration, in particular the principle of national ownership was strong, as detailed in Section B.2.

JP made important contributions to delivering as one at country level. There are two evidences of such contribution. First, UNDP and ILO implemented an EU-funded project on promoting registered
employment. A UNDP representative indicated that the JP made such partnership feasible. Second, UNIDO and UNDP partnered on delivery of a training programme on clustering to regional development agencies. Though these examples may sound anecdotal, the fact that such partnerships did not occur in the past can be seen as an indication and evidence of JP’s contribution to delivering as one.

**Synergy and coherence between JP’s outcomes and outputs to produce development results**

81 Overall JP’s outputs and outcomes were moderately synergistic and coherent, and such coherence and synergies were rather unbalanced – sometimes to the extent of being so strong as to be named a best practice and sometimes falling on the less favorable side of the spectrum.

-1 Evidences of strong coherence are most visible between the outputs that were produced within the scope of the second outcome of the JP. In fact, there is no detectable incoherence between the outputs of Outcome 2.

-2 As far as the outputs under the first outcome is concerned, there was a high level of synergy and coherence between Output 1.1 and Output 1.4. However such synergy and coherence were achieved in an *ad hoc* manner, in response to the difficulties in making the VCMP up and running. Unfortunately, this became at the expense of losing synergies between Output 1.2 and Output 1.4, as originally envisaged at the inception phase.

-3 The coherence between the two outcomes of the JP and their synergistic effects were most evident in two cases. First the tools (i.e. training programmes) that were developed within the scope of Outcome 2 were incorporated into the VCMP, which is a product of Outcome 1. Similarly, the SCC benefited from such tools in rendering services and developing its service portfolio.

**Contribution to advancement and progress of fostering national ownership**

82 During the implementation of the JP the Ninth National Development Plan was in place. The Ministry of Development launched the preparations for the Tenth National Development Plan in the second half of 2012. This provided the JP with opportunity to provide inputs to the Turkey’s next NDP. This said however there is no hard evidence which would suggest that the JP made a direct and visible contribution to the advancement and the progress of fostering national ownership processes and outcomes.

**Decisions and course of actions to ensure the sustainability of the JP**

83 The JP decision making bodies and implementing partners have undertaken decisions and course of actions to ensure the sustainability of the effects of the JP. Evidences of considerations and decisions related to the sustainability include PMC’s discussions on sustainability of the VCMP. In line with such discussions a model that would have manageable level of operational costs has been adopted. In order to ensure sustained utilization of the tools, produced within the second outcome of the JP, a decision was taken to incorporate such tools into the VCMP and making them readily available to the industry at an affordable cost.
The only point of concern that can be raised here is the sustainability of clustering initiatives, launched locally within the scope of the JP. The JP contributed favorably towards the sustainability of clustering at the policy level. As indicated earlier, JP’s experience has already been incorporated into the Cluster Support Programme to be implemented by the Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology.

**Capacities at national and local levels to ensure sustained impact of the JP**

There is ample evidence that would suggest that national and/or local institutions supported the JP:

1. VCMP is supported not only by ITKIB but also by the Ministry of Economy who in the course of JP’s implementation requested detailed information from ITKIB for possible replication of the same model in other sectors. The financial support of the Istanbul Development Agency to the VCMP is yet another indication of support from the national/local authorities.

2. The collaboration with the Labor Inspection Board of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security during the delivery of training programmes on labor standards can also be considered a concrete example of national authorities' support to the JP.

3. Incorporation of the JP’s experience in clustering into the design of the cluster support programme of the Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology also demonstrates national support to the JP, its design and objectives.

4. Local chambers actively participated in most JP activities, and also became members of the Sustainable Competitiveness Platform.

In terms of ownership, a point of concern is the regional development agencies, support and ownership of which could not have been secured.

The JP had in its design interventions geared towards establishing technical capacities both at the national and local levels to sustain the impact of the JP. Examples of such interventions included training programmes, delivered and supportive tools, generated within the second outcome of the JP. As indicated earlier, the JP has exceeded its initially set targets in terms of the number of persons to be trained. The assessment reports that was produced upon completion of the training programmes and the results of the last monitoring report of the JP point to encouraging results in terms of availability of skills and competencies both at the national and local levels.

In terms of the financial capacity to keep up the benefits produced by the JP, the national counterparts would have no problem. In terms of financial sustainability at the national level, the riskiest element of the JP is the VCMP. During the final evaluation mission, ITKIB managers have been asked to discuss their plans to sustain the VCMP. First and foremost, ITKIB relies on the membership fees, which will be easier to collect once the portal starts generating benefits for its members. Secondly, ITKIB plans to obtain funding from other resources for improvement and expansion of the VCMP. The fact that ITKIB already secured funding from the Istanbul Development Agency confirms validity of this plan/assumption.
At the local level financial sustainability of the clustering initiatives will likely to be an issue, if the clusters, activated within the scope of the JP cannot obtain funding from the various support schemes of the government.

**Scalability and replicability of the JP**

The JP has a strong potential to be up-scaled and replicated, but may be not in its entirety. As per the feedback received from ITKIB replication of the VCMP would be a costly endeavor, due to the fact that the portal has been designed to address the specific needs of the T&C value chain. Similar portals will need to go through the same path.

The approach adopted for the second component of the JP is easily replicable in other industries. Despite the fact that the CSR tools had T&C-specific elements, most of them are still directly applicable in other industries.

**The impact of mid-term evaluation on JP's effectiveness and sustainability**

A direct impact of the MTE on JP’s effectiveness and sustainability was not observed. According to the feedback received during the interviews, most of the recommendations raised by the MTE report on effectiveness and sustainability were already in the JP management's agenda.
CONCLUSIONS

Based on the above analyses, the data collected, and information and evidences gathered during the final evaluation, the following conclusions can be made.

C.1 Design | Relevance

The design of the JP adequately responded to development challenges stated in the Programme Document, and was highly relevant to national priorities, UNDCS, as well as the needs of the target region. The relevance of the design has been substantiated not only by the national policy documents (e.g. textile strategy, ninth national development plan), but also by various assessments, conducted during the execution of the JP.

It can also be safely concluded that JP contributed significantly towards overcoming the problems and addressing the needs, articulated in the programme document. The VCMP filled an important gap in the national T&C industry by providing a virtual networking and collaboration platform. The CSR Strategy, along with the tools that the JP produced for its implementation, possesses significant potential to progress towards increasing sustainable competitiveness of the national T&C industry.

Joint programming approach was efficient overall, however its efficiency was more pronounced as far as the second outcome of the JP was concerned. The design of the second outcome provided ample room for the UN agencies to leverage on their individual as well as each other’s specialized knowledge and know-how. This complemented with ITKIB’s sectoral experience and knowledge ensured a high level of efficiency. Joint programming was less efficient as far as first outcome is concerned, though there was no finding that would lead to a definitive judgment of inefficiency.

On a relevant note, added value of the implementing partners was highly evident. The supportive tools (e.g. on social conduct, environmental conduct) that were generated within the second outcome of the JP are examples of such value added. Another good example of implementing partners’ value added is the clustering approach (along with networking) that UNIDO introduced in a rather structured way. ITKIB’s value added was observed at many levels; however securing participation and commitment of large-scale T&C companies to the JP is particularly noteworthy. One area that partaking UN agencies’ value added was less visible (or lacks evidence) is the VCMP, which has mainly driven by the industry needs.

The original design of the JP included M&E and C&A strategies, which were not deployed properly until the improvement plan that was produced as a result of the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation report. In the absence of an M&E strategy, the progress of the JP could only be monitored at the activity level for almost three fourths of the lifespan of the JP. A similar observation

UNDP representative states that UNDP suggested inclusion of elements into the VCMP’s business plan that would positively discriminate against (a) the smaller companies in less developed regions and (b) the companies with higher CSR performance in terms of pricing. Although this suggestion has been taken into account, it could not be verified.
To sum up, it can be concluded that the design of the JP was highly relevant, and in most cases it leveraged on the benefits of a joint programming approach.

However, the final evaluation observed three rather important weaknesses in the design.

- **1** First; the original programme document assumed that the VCMP will leverage on the previous work done by ITKIB in cooperation with a globally renowned company. Accordingly, the budget allocated for VCMP was very modest. In practice however this did not realize and the VCMP had to be built literally from scratch, requiring more resources and time. Since there was no documented contingency plan that demonstrated what the implementing partners would do, if the underlying assumption did not hold true, ad hoc solutions needed to be developed.

- **2** Second important weakness in terms of the design of the JP is related to the absorption capacities of the beneficiaries/target groups. The JP was designed to attack many challenges at many levels i.e. macro, meso and micro, as indicated in the IR. The JP made a rather optimistic assumption with regard to the capacity to absorb the results of the JP at the micro level (i.e. SMEs etc.). Although, the number of SMEs that participated in the JP activities (e.g. trainings etc.) is an encouraging indication of JP’s potential impact, the lifespan of the JP was not sufficient to observe and document attitudinal and behavioral changes.

- **3** Involvement of local stakeholders at design phase was limited which caused relatively low level of local ownership at meso and micro level at the beginning of the JP. Nevertheless, a satisfactory degree of ownership (at meso and micro level) was achieved during the implementation of the JP. The vertical integration of micro, meso and macro levels allowed JP to accomplish the outcomes. By the end of JP, there was a remarkable degree of ownership by the SME’s at the local level, which made up the deficit of lack of involvement of meso/micro levels at the design stage.

**C.2 Process | Efficiency & Ownership**

The final evaluation concludes that the extent, to which the JP turned resources/inputs (funds, time, human resources, etc.) into results, was also high. The management model that has been adopted to pursue the targeted development results was efficient, and has successfully brought all the key actors together at different decision-making levels.

The factor that prevented the JP from having a “very” high level of efficiency was the fact that ITKIB and UN agencies were located in different provinces. The interviewees report that this JP was the only JP that had this problem in Turkey. Much like the present JP, the other JPs implemented in Turkey also had “pilot” regions, such as Kars, Antalya and Seyhan basin; however implementing partners including the government counterparts were all located in Ankara which made the coordination and thus the management and implementation process more efficient. The fact that there was only one regional/local agent to coordinate the JP activities in 4 target provinces further
exacerbated the coordination problems. This finding can also be interpreted as an administrative and managerial problem that the JP faced.

103 There are strong evidences that substantiate the efficiency gains accrued as a result of joint implementation. As indicated above, such efficiencies were most visible as far as the second outcome of the JP was concerned. As far as second outcome is concerned, it is also safe to argue that joint programme intervention (group of agencies) was more efficient in comparison to what could have been through a single agency’s intervention. More specifically, none of the UN agencies “reinvented the wheel” and capitalized successfully and deliberately on their experiences and knowledge, enabling the JP to avoid from redundancies and inefficiencies that would have been observed.

104 As far as the first outcome is concerned there is no evidence that would (a) substantiate efficiency gains that were accrued as a result of the joint program implementation or (b) indicate that joint implementation has been more efficient than what would have been the case in a single agency implementation.

105 The disbursement figures, provided by the UN Agencies, indicate a high level of disbursement without any large discrepancy between the Agencies. However, the JP faced some financial obstacles. More specifically, activities under Output 1.2 were significantly underfunded. JP’s effort to create additional funding for clustering activities by creating synergies between Output 1.2 and Output 1.4 (support scheme) did not realize. Although the JP achieved Output 1.2 by completing all of the related activities, additional financial allocation to clusters that are at early stage of their lifecycles would have let to more efficiency.

106 In terms of ownership, the final evaluation concentrated the extent, to which leadership by the country’s national/local partners was effective in development interventions, and developed a favorable opinion, based on several evidences including (but not limited to) (1) Ministry of Labor and Social Security’s ownership of social conduct and gender tools; (2) ITKIB’s commitment to improve and sustain VCMP; (3) Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology’s cluster support programme; and (4) Ministry of Development’s interest in the CSR as an element to be considered within the scope of the tenth national development plan. This also verifies that the deliverables produced by the JP have the quality to create long-term replicable and scalable positive impacts.

107 The extent, to which targeted participants and national authorities made the JP their own by taking an active role in it, was also very high. ITKIB took full leadership in development of the VCMP and securing participation of large-scale T&C companies into the system. As indicated above, Ministry

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18 In fact, the local/regional agent worked only for a very limited amount of time. Thus for a good portion of the JP, there was no workforce dedicated to the JP activities in the target provinces. The two cluster development agents, mobilized by UNIDO, were engaged mainly in clustering & networking but provided support during organization of some trainings that were delivered by ILO.

19 This also relates to the design deficiency highlighted above with regard to the VCMP needing more resources that initially foreseen.

20 Clustering theory suggests that without building trust between the cluster actors, the odds of activating self-sustainable clusters are very low. Without the “trust” most cluster actors would be reluctant to invest time and money in a clustering initiative. Such trust is built gradually, yet the seeds are planted at early stages of the cluster lifecycle. Hence the need for public resources at the early stages of the cluster lifecycle is very high.
of Labor and Social Security's ownership of social conduct and gender tools, and the leadership that the said Ministry played are both strong evidences. At the enterprise-level the strongest sign of ownership is the 5 business models that the JP produced.

108 At the local level, reaching a conclusion on the level of ownership is not as straightforward as it has been the case at the macro level. Establishment of the Sustainable Competitiveness Centre is a good indication, evidencing ownership. However, more evidences are needed to conclude that local ownership was sufficiently strong.

109 One particular point of concern was that there was no evidence of ownership of regional development agencies of the results of the JP. Only one regional development agency participated to the PMC meetings. In fact, with their resources (i.e. money and qualified staff) and mandates, the regional development agencies were ideally positioned to own the results of the JP.

C.3 Results | Effectiveness & Sustainability

110 The final evaluation has developed a favorable opinion of the extent, to which the objectives of the development intervention have been achieved. This conclusion has been developed upon verifying the JP’s achievements in comparison to the targets that were set out during the design stage and inception phase. As discussed in detail in the preceding section of this report, all activities have been completed and corresponding outputs have been produced.

111 Overall JP’s outputs and outcomes were moderately synergistic and coherent, and such coherence and synergies were rather unbalanced – sometimes to the extent of being so strong as to be named a best practice and sometimes falling on the less favorable side of the spectrum.

112 In terms of impact, the final evaluation cannot develop a conclusion, mainly because of the fact that the impact, especially transformational impact, would only be visible in the medium- to long-term rather than immediately after the conclusion of the JP. With this caveat, it is safe to argue that the results of the JP hold strong potential for creating real impact, and to present conclusions on sustainability.

113 The final evaluation identified several venues which increase the probability of the benefits of the JP continuing in the long term. Sustainability of the VCMP has been a major concern for the JP management, and has been discussed thoroughly in the PMC meetings as well. The minutes of the PMC meeting, at which the final design of the VCMP was presented, include specific guidance, for instance on operational costs. ITKIB’s partnership with Istanbul Development Agency with a view to raise additional funding for VCMP’s content and promotion is also a strong evidence of JP management’s deliberate approach to sustainability.

114 On a relevant note, UNIDO’s partnership with TTGV (Turkish Technology Development Foundation) and ILO’s strong cooperation with Ministry of Labor and Social Security have increased the probability of sustained impact and replication potential of JP’s outputs in the fields of social and environmental conduct. The operating capacities created and/or reinforced through “training of trainers” programmes is also an assurance of sustainable impact.
With regard to clustering and networking the conclusions are different at national and local levels. At the national level, there are strong evidences of policy level sustained impact. Evidences are the Cluster Support Programme of the Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology, and the Ministry of Economy's International Competitiveness Development programme. At the local level however, the sustainability of the clustering initiatives, launched within the scope of the JP, hinges heavily on the ability of these clusters benefit from the said support schemes.

C.4 Cross Cutting Issues

Overall the mid-term evaluation has had a positive impact on the JP. Most of the recommendations, raised in the MTE Report were taken up and put into immediate action by the JP Management, as evidenced by the improvement plan.

The MTE report suggested a budget-neutral extension in the timeframe of the JP (i.e. 6 months). Reportedly, MTE Report's suggestion was later reinforced by the MDG-F Secretariat during their visit to Turkey. JP management considered such extension, however concluded that a budget-neutral extension would not yield the expected benefits.
LESSONS LEARNED

As per UNEG guidance, this section presents lessons, drawn from the present JP, in a generalized manner, going beyond the JP, and indicating what wider relevance the lessons might have.

Lesson #1: Set the level of ambition realistically and manage the expectations carefully for increased ownership of results

The scope, resources, and expected outputs and results of a JP are a function of the needs and challenges to be identified at the design stage. It is the designers’ challenge to identify the needs and problems that the JP would attack in what is usually a very long list of problems and needs. More often than not, even if stakeholders would agree on needs, the level of priority that they will assign to the problems will differ. For a company, experiencing problems, short-term practical solutions will be preferable to policy-level solutions that would have an impact over the medium- or long-term.

Resources, however, are almost always scarce and never sufficient to overcome all the problems. The designers will need to make decisions by taking cons and pros of different design options available to them. Whether or not the designers would pick the “right” or even the better option is another issue that can only be evaluated after the implementation, however whatever option is picked, the trade-offs should be documented, and the decisions should be communicated to the stakeholders. This will help manage expectations and set the level of ambition more realistically.

Involving local stakeholders at design level is particularly important for a demand driven programme and ownership at meso and micro level. Field surveys implemented both at design and process stages help (a) the JPs identify local needs and expectations (relevance); and (b) improve ownership.

The ownership is gained and sustained when the programme activities generate fast results, especially in the areas identified as a need by the local stakeholders, but cannot be addressed by the local resources. Focus on outputs and measurable impact need to be balanced. In addition a certain degree of flexibility and responsiveness to changing demands and emerging expectations will help the JPM implement the programme more effectively and produce successful results.

Lesson #2: Outcome-level is too high to foster cooperation between implementing partners in joint programming and implementation arrangements

A programme’s or project’s outcome level impact is often not immediately visible. Furthermore; typically outcome statements are usually formulated at a macro level, achievement of which requires progress in areas beyond the scope of a single programme or project. These make accountability less of a concern for parties that only “pledge” to “contribute” to the progress towards an outcome rather than its achievement.

Outputs on the other hand are immediately visible. Implementing partners can be kept directly accountable for their achievement. Besides, outputs bridge the gap between the activities and the outcomes, hence are instrumental. Encouraging implementing partners to define or formulate joint
outputs would not only contribute to the coherence of the intervention but also help them think of more synergetic ways of implementation.

**Lesson #3: JP management team should be located in the same province**

125 It is only natural that partaking agencies of a JP would have their own individual premises, sometimes located in a single building (such as UN House), sometimes in different building in the same province or even in different provinces. However the team assigned for implementation of the JP and its day-to-day activities should ideally be located in the same province. Despite the advance in online communication means, being together physically still has many benefits all of which are lost when a JP is tried to be managed from different locations.

**Lesson #4: The JP Manager should have full coordination, if not control, over the JP**

126 Selecting a capable JP Manager is one of the most important contributions that the implementing partners can make. Additionally, implementing partners should make sure the JP Manager is sufficiently empowered to have full coordination, if not control, over the JP and its implementation. In the absence of such empowerment, it is most likely that individual implementing partners do their own “things”, and JP Manager just functions as a person who copy-pastes inputs of individual implementing partners into the joint reporting tools.

127 On a relevant note, the skills and capabilities to be sought in a JP Manager should be diligently identified. The JP Manager may not have the specialized knowledge of and experience on all the different aspects that a JP may entail. That is only natural. However strong coordination and facilitation skills, complemented with analytical thinking capabilities, and experience in working in a multi-stakeholder environment seem to be the minimum qualifications that all JP Managers should possess.
E RECOMMENDATIONS

This section provides recommendations that could be taken into account (a) during formulation of similar JPs in the future and (b) follow-up on the present JP.

E.1 Recommendations on Joint Programming

The design and implementation of the present JP provides important insights that would enhance efficiency and effectiveness of joint programming.

UN agencies have different yet sometimes overlapping mandates. In joint programming and implementation arrangements what really matters is how much partaking UN agencies might benefit from each other’s knowledge and experience, and consequently complement each other’s work. This was very clearly achieved in the second outcome of the present JP and not so much in the first outcome. Thus it is recommended that in future endeavors towards joint programming and implementation, a system that facilitates achievement of synergistic effects and coherence be pursued at output level rather than outcome level. The output- and budget-oriented approach adopted by the MDG-F, though understandable, had several weaknesses, especially in terms of fostering cooperation to achieve an output.

Although not fully applicable for the present JP, the economies of scale should also be considered when deciding on the UN agencies roles in a JP. Here EU’s approach in grant programmes might a source of inspiration. In EU’s grant programmes, there is an “applicant” (much as the lead UN agency in a JP setting), partners (by analogy other UN agencies in a JP setting) and associates (that do not exist in JP setting). UN agencies that would have an important specialized role with a limited budget may be considered as associates of a JP. This would still provide a JP with the opportunity to leverage on the know-how of associate UN agencies; while at the same time reducing the coordination inefficiencies in a multi-partner setting. However such a mechanism should only be considered for increasing operational efficiency of JPs, and definitely not lead to a governance structure that would sideline and thus diminish the involvement of the agencies with limited budgets.

The MDG-F Secretariat’s guidance on M&E and C&A as cross-cutting quality assurance elements of implementation is much appreciated. Yet experience shows that in terms of M&E a more structured method is to be recommended. This could have been achieved, for instance, by making UNDP’s Yellow Book on M&E the standardized approach for all JPs. In fact, as was the case with the present JP, most of the project/programme management teams would have a natural tendency to concentrate on activities at the expense of monitoring for results. As such, it is recommended that release of funds is tied to presence of an efficiently and effectively functioning M&E system. Though quite radical, such approach would ensure that JP managements pay due diligence to M&E. Another possible way to deal with this problem is to ensure that each JP has at least one focal point responsible for proper implementation of M&E and C&A strategies. This may increase the management costs of JPs, but the benefits (such as early warning systems, timely revisions to design etc.) to be accrued will offset the downside of increased management cost.
Implementing modalities of the UN agencies vary considerably. With the present JP, UNDP adopted the “NGO execution” modality in line with its Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures. UNIDO and ILO adopted an approach whereby these two agencies would have direct control over budget, contracts etc. The objective of bringing this issue up is not put a preference on one or the other. However different implementation modalities within a single JP made it difficult for ITKIB. **It is therefore recommended that partaking UN agencies agree on a single implementation modality at the outset of implementation as long as the selected modalities conform to operation policies and procedures of specific UN agencies.**

**134** It is recommended for future JPs that the final evaluation is scheduled after all activities are completed, all outputs are prepared and final internal monitoring has taken place, and even the final report has been endorsed by the programming authority (in this case the MDG-F Secretariat). This will increase the efficiency of the final evaluation.

**135** The JPs that would have local presence or activities in more than one location, the differences in capacities of each location should be diligently analyzed during the design phase, and findings should be reflected into the implementation plan accordingly. In the case of the present JP, several provinces with different capacities were targeted with a one-size-fits-all approach. Such approach is neither suitable from a theoretical project management perspective, nor helpful in terms management of expectations nor securing ownership.**21**

**136** Key stakeholders (especially Governmental Organizations) are recommended to assign a permanent representative for such programmes to ensure continuity, institutional memory and concomitant ability for (a) providing substantive contribution and input to the programme; (b) integrate the JP outcome into policy and institutional processes; and (c) facilitate sustainability. Furthermore, it is advised that the Governmental Organizations meet separately (with each other) to discuss the involvement degree and responsibility (for future implementation and sustainability) of each Ministry, and provide input to the JP accordingly.

**E.2 Recommendations for the present JP**

**137** Recommendations, listed below for the present JP, focus on the issues that might increase the probability of continued impact of the JP at macro, meso and micro levels.

**138** All implementing partners, including ITKIB, should actively pursue all opportunities that would incorporate results of the present JP into the tenth national development plan, which is still in the make. Although it is unlikely for the tenth national development plan to make a specific sectoral reference, the annual programmes through which the national development plan is operationalized would provide ample room for replication and up-scaling of JP’s results. The most practical way of

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21 Reportedly, during the inception phase implementing partners have had long discussions on this issue. One UN agency representative reports that “...We identified that just before the launch of the JP, two EU-funded programmes covering almost the same issues were launched in Kahramanmaraş. It was obvious to us that the province did not have sufficient capacity to commit to implementation of three international projects at the same time. The studies during the inception phase also showed that the industry in Gaziantep was light years ahead of the other target provinces, showing that melting the needs of all provinces in one pot would almost be impossible.”
achieving this is to develop projects with the concerned line ministries and secure inclusion of such projects into the government's annual investment budgets. In addition, the efforts for reflecting the programme findings in the tenth national development plan need to be supported by active advocacy (especially to the government organizations, for the promotion, implementation and reinforcement of CSR principles in business at policy level) and effective follow up (specifically to receive feedback on implementation results and suggestions for improvement) in order to strengthen the impact at policy level.

139 VCMP is an impressive output with a great potential to grow and produce remarkable results for the sector, however promotion of VCMP should continue to ensure the sustainability of the portal with paid membership in the following years.

140 The capacity and awareness built for developing networks and clusters, fostering innovation and CSR-compliance need to be improved further by follow-up interventions. At the local level the best way to ensure such follow up is to secure ownership of the JP results and outputs by the regional development agencies. The UN agencies and ITKIB may consider cooperating with Ministry of Development (which oversees operations of the regional development agencies) to facilitate such follow-up activities.

141 The M&E system that was established towards the end of the JP should be sustained by ITKIB. If ITKIB sustains the M&E system and continues to make the progress achieved readily available for public scrutiny, they will have a much higher chance for securing additional financial or technical support not only from the UN system but also from the government as well as the international donors.

142 Should there be further stages or follow-up programmes, Şanlıurfa is recommended to be included in the design, because the training, awareness raising and capacity development activities of the JP will be valuable inputs for the SMEs and local business support organizations in Şanlıurfa (Şanlıurfa is a province with an industrial capacity developing, but still having room for improvement. Although there are some T&C companies in Şanlıurfa, the province can take place in the textile value chain especially with its cotton production and cotton ginning).
ANNEX I - LIST OF DOCUMENTS AND EXTERNAL SOURCES CONSULTED

The documents, consulted during the development of the final evaluation report, are as follows:

-1 Project Document for MDG-F - 2067
-2 Inception Report (IR-v4), March 2011
-3 Diagnostic Study Report, 2011, Mr. İ. Vedat KUNT and Mr. M. Hakan ZOBU
-4 Mid-term evaluation Final Report, v.1, 30 April 2012, Monika Zabel
-5 Communication Strategy for MDG-F - 2067
-6 Monitoring Report, July & December 2012
-7 Exit and Sustainability Strategy, November 2012
-8 Improvement Plan updated, 19 December 2012
-9 Consolidated Financial Report, 10 October 2012
-10 JPM Presentation for MDG-F 2067, December 2012

Other resources, consulted, include:

-1 UN Development Cooperation Strategy
-2 UNDP Country Programme Document and Action Plan
-3 National Textile Strategy
-4 Ninth Development Plan
-5 Cluster Support Programme Directive
-6 www.mdgfund.org
-7 www.un.org.tr
-8 www.itkib.org.tr
-9 www.styleturkish.com
-10 www.oecd.com
-11 www.ekonomi.gov.tr
-12 www.tuik.gov.tr
## ANNEX II - LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED/CONSULTED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency / Stakeholder</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Shahid NAJAM</td>
<td>Resident Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Halide ÇAYLAN</td>
<td>Coordination Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPT</td>
<td>İnci Ataç-Rösch</td>
<td>JPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPT</td>
<td>Çetin Duman</td>
<td>Financial officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Melih Aral</td>
<td>Monitoring Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN AGENCIES</td>
<td>Murat Gürsoy</td>
<td>UNDP Senior Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN AGENCIES</td>
<td>Damla Taşkıns</td>
<td>UNIDO National Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN AGENCIES</td>
<td>Özge Berber Agtaş</td>
<td>ILO Project Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İTKIB</td>
<td>Jale Tuncer</td>
<td>Board Member&lt;sup&gt;22&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İTKIB</td>
<td>Cemal Bayazıt</td>
<td>Deputy General Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İTKIB</td>
<td>Özlem Güneş</td>
<td>Project Department Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İTKIB</td>
<td>Emine Açılan</td>
<td>İTKİB R&amp;D Department Director&lt;sup&gt;23&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kahramanmaraş CC&amp;I</td>
<td>Eyüp OZAN</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>Figen Öğüt</td>
<td>Deputy General Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPT</td>
<td>Vedat Kunt</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoSIT</td>
<td>Tolga Arıcan</td>
<td>Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Development</td>
<td>Mustafa Özçörekçi</td>
<td>Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sena Tekstil (Adıyaman)</td>
<td>İsmet Nedim Açıkgöz</td>
<td>Company owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marisa Tekstil (Kahramanmaraş)</td>
<td>Ömer Yenikomşu</td>
<td>Company owner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>22</sup> Also the General Manager at Şahinler Holding
<sup>23</sup> Also the National Development Plan Textile/Apparel/Leather Goods Sector Working Group Reporter
The actions taken towards the recommendations stated in the Mid-term Evaluation were summarized in the Improvement Plan Update. This document is provided by the JPM, and ongoing activities were reviewed by the Final Evaluator on 19 December 2012. The review notes are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MTE Rec.#</th>
<th>Related with</th>
<th>Action taken</th>
<th>Completed</th>
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<tr>
<td># 3</td>
<td>Improvement of internal and external joint programme reporting</td>
<td>PMC MoM was improved in next PMC during October 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td># 4</td>
<td>CSR Handbook to respect the set deadlines</td>
<td>CSR Report was prepared in English and planned to be printed and distributed in September 2012. However printing of Turkish copy was delayed (due to obstacles faced in translation). English copy of the report was distributed at closing meeting on 19 December 2012.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td># 6</td>
<td>Membership of VCMP</td>
<td>Management and staffing issues of VCMP are clarified by ITKIB. Management will be handled by ITKIB and staffing is completed</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td># 15</td>
<td>Exit strategy</td>
<td>Sustainability strategy is revised, combined with the exit strategy and endorsed by the PMC</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td># 17</td>
<td>Introducing a gender differentiated counting</td>
<td>Gender documentation for JP provided</td>
<td>✓</td>
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